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When the Libyan Revolution broke out in February 2011, the European Council 
called a special meeting to voice the European Union’s (EU) support for 
democratisation. When following the recent economic crisis youth unemployment 
figures began to rise dramatically, the European Council dedicated special attention to 
this topic over the course of 2012, culminating in a proposal on Youth Employment 
Initiative in February 2013. When long-term policy on establishing EU internal energy 
market was in the making, the European Council first endorsed the need for such a 
project in 2005, and since then has regularly monitored progress, commenting on 
Commission reports, requesting Member States to implement new directives, and 
fixing the deadline for the completion of the common energy market. In short, the 
European Council has had its footprint on almost every issue circulating in the EU 
policy process, setting the agenda of the Union and taking major decisions for the 
course of integration.  
Not surprisingly therefore this institution has been called the ‘engine’ (Johnston, 1994: 
145) of the Union, its ‘supreme political authority’ (Westlake & Galloway, 2004: 171), 
or ‘a locus of power second to none in the … EU’s institutional system today’ (Hayes-
Renshaw & Wallace, 2006b: 165). The European Council comprises the Heads of 
State or Government of all EU member states, together with the President of the 
Commission, and since December 2009 a permanent President of the European 
Council.1 They meet regularly since March 1975 in order to ‘provide the Union with 
                                                          
1 The Heads of State or Government used to be assisted by their Foreign Ministers (who could 
be replaced by other junior ministers sometimes), while the President of the Commission was 
accompanied by another Commission member. This practice was abolished by the Lisbon 
Treaty due to the large number of participants but such kind of ‘assistantship’ is still viable in 
special cases. It was also the Treaty of Lisbon which introduced a permanent European 
Council President. Previously, meetings were chaired by the President-in-office, i.e. the Head 




the necessary impetus for its development and … define the general political 
directions and priorities thereof’ (Treaty of Maastricht)2. While the claim of observers 
that the EU summits constitute ‘the government of Europe’ (Peter Ludlow, in 
Peeperkorn, 2013; see also Werts, 2008) might still appear an overly strong definition, 
scholars agree that the European Council should be studied as ‘the nexus of European 
political governance’ (Foret & Rittelmeyer, 2014b: 2). 
Thanks to the virtue of its composition, the institution has always had relative 
discretion in the selection of topics for discussion and the attention it can spend on 
them. But behind this self-sustained collective freedom of choice there are multiple 
factors which directly or indirectly influence the final composition of the body’s 
agenda. Our knowledge thereof and understanding of the processes underlying such 
policy dynamics are severely limited. This dissertation deals with the question of what 
affects the agenda of the European Council, by analysing the nature of attention shifts 
in the institution and examining determinants of its agenda’s structure and scope. The 
answer to this question has implications for both studies of the political system of the 
EU and it policy output, and the literature on issue prioritisation and political 
attention.  
This introduction sets the framework for the enquiry. It begins with a brief overview 
of the literature studying policy agendas in the EU, and then turns towards the 
European Council and its involvement in EU agenda setting. The following two 
sections present the limited existing knowledge about the topics of deliberation at 
European Council meetings and the factors determining issue selection and emphasis, 
which serves as a basis for the subsequent research. Then, the core methodological 
approach taken in the analyses, in terms of measuring the European Council agenda, 
is outlined. Finally, the structure of the dissertation is set out, with short descriptions 
of the following studies. 
 
                                                          
2 For an overview of the main provisions regarding the European Council in the EU Treaties 




Agenda Setting and the EU 
Political agenda is a concept which denotes ‘the set of issues that are the subject of 
decision making and debate within a given political system at any one time’ 
(Baumgartner, 2001: 288). Thus, setting the political agenda means allocating attention 
across policy issues, which involves both selection and prioritisation (Cobb & Elder, 
1971). Each political system has limited capacity to process the multiplicity of agenda 
items (Kingdon, 1984) or, in other words, due to bounded rationality policy makers’ 
attention is scarce and only a limited number of issues can gain access (Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2005b). Therefore, rather than reacting duly to information signals, 
policy makers tend to ignore information as long as this is sustainable, or overreact by 
allocating attention disproportionately. In the long run this results in a punctuated 
equilibrium pattern of attention (Baumgartner & Jones, 2005; Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005b). 
The study of agenda setting in the EU has just come of age. It can be traced back to 
the mid-1990s, and in particular to an article by Guy Peters (1994; see also 2001), 
which emphasised how different the EU system is from those of nation states as 
regards this process. The European Community was seen as offering multiple access 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs, and featuring a dense number of venues with 
flexible jurisdictional boundaries. Since then, the research has grown and developed in 
a few directions. Studies of EU agenda setting have focused on the role of different 
EU institutions and member states in the process (e.g. Blom-Hansen, 2008; Bunse, 
2009; Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2010; 2013; Tallberg, 2003b), the involvement of 
organised interests (e.g. Coen & Richardson, 2009; Klüver, 2013), issue framing and 
underlying strategies behind it (e.g. Daviter, 2001; Rhinard, 2010), agenda dynamics 
exhibited by single policy issues (e.g. Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Moschella, 2011), as well as 
theorising on the specific nature of EU agenda setting or testing the extent to which 
existing theories apply to the EU context (e.g. Citi, 2013; Princen & Rhinard, 2006; 
Princen & Kerremans, 2008). 
The formation of EU policy agendas consists of three steps: emergence of an issue in 




placement on the governmental agenda, and ending with a further move of the issue 
towards the decision agenda if potential obstacles are overcome (Princen, 2009). Yet, 
different reasons can be concealed behind the selection of an issue and usually there is 
no single cause to be traced.3 An important factor to take into account is 
competencies of the Union versus the Member States, as well as powers of one EU 
institution versus another. The fact that as a political system the EU is in a continuous 
redesign provides favourable conditions for redrawing of jurisdictional boundaries and 
windows of opportunity for the entry of new policy items. This also makes it easier to 
redefine issues and allows for alternation between conflict expansion and contraction. 
In short, the overall receptivity of the EU agenda is dependent upon institutional 
architecture, issue framing, and skilful redrawing of the boundaries of political conflict 
(Princen, 2007; 2009). The exact nature of each of these elements varies with respect 
to the policy venue involved.  
 
Focus and Relevance of the Research Project  
The simple question ‘Who sets the EU agenda?’ does not have a straightforward 
answer. According to the treaties the European Commission has monopoly over 
legislative initiatives. This legal standing has motivated a perception of the European 
Commission as the central actor in EU agenda setting (e.g. Klüver, 2013; Schmidt, 
2004). But more often scholars point out a complex interdependency of the main EU 
bodies in this process. Agenda-setting power is seen as a ‘shared and contested 
competence’ by the main institutions – the European Council, the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission and the Parliament – with various interest groups and 
subnational entities also trying to influence the political agenda (Cini, 1996: 145-146; 
Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996: 359). Although this interaction of multiple venues is 
typical of multilevel systems, and arguably even more of the EU (Peters, 1994; 2001), 
ultimately agenda setting in the Union can happen following two mechanisms: 
                                                          
3 As Kingdon (1984) points out, the important consideration about agendas is not the origin of 




ascending from below in a ‘low politics’ route or moving down from above in a ‘high 
politics’ trajectory (Princen & Rhinard, 2006). In the first type issues originate in 
expert working groups within the Commission and climb the ladder of the EU 
organisational hierarchy. The high politics path starts at the top where the Heads of 
State and Government of EU member states interact, most notably in the European 
Council, and then descends to the formal policy-making machinery.  
Hence, two institutions of extremely different nature – the Commission and the 
European Council –both play a gatekeeper role for the EU agenda. The first body has 
legal embedding as formal initiator and exhibits a supranational drive towards deeper 
integration, while the second one enjoys the clout of ultimate political authority and 
exercises it in providing impetus for EU development. Yet, the European Council’s 
establishment and self-triggered power expansion has actually contributed to the 
decline of the Commission’s agenda setting role (Moravcsik, 1998; Nugent, 2010; 
Werts, 2008). The struggle between the two institutions in this respect has been 
subject to limited empirical research, and only recently some preliminary evidence 
suggested the notion of competitive cooperation due to high level of interdependence 
and mutual influence (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014; see also Bouwen, 2009; 
Eggermont, 2012). And yet, as Werts (2008: 46) notes, the European Commission has 
admitted that only a limited number of its proposals (some 10 per cent) are the result 
of a ‘proper initiative’. This undermining of the Commission’s position is largely due 
to the European Council requesting it to prepare reports, present proposals, etc. 
Despite the lack of consensus on the question ‘Who sets the EU agenda?’ and the 
dominant notion of some sort of institutional interaction, the role of the European 
Council in this process is recognized as crucial. The body is not only at the ‘centre’ or 
‘heart’ of decision making in the EU (Bonvicini & Regelsberger, 1991; Nugent, 2010) 
but it has also turned into the main agenda-setting institution (Werts, 2008). Looking 
at the most significant achievements at the summits, van Grinsven recognises 
‘enormous influence’ of the negotiations’ results over the European integration 
process (2003: 4). De Schoutheete and Wallace suggest that since its establishment, 
the European Council has ‘fixed the agenda of the Union, especially as the EU has 




been the incubator of new initiatives, which then had to be taken up by the 
Commission (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; de Schoutheete, 2012). Recent research on the 
way in which European Council Conclusions have been used in the decision making 
process in the EU demonstrates that the body has indeed largely acted as a core 
‘political initiator’ via the provision of ‘impulses’ to this process and European 
Integration generally (Eggermont, 2012: 359). 
This dissertation focuses on the European Council as one of the key venues for 
agenda setting, which is also largely a black box for scholars of EU policy. The main 
goal of the research is to analyse the allocation of political attention and the 
determinants thereof. Knowing how the European Council agenda is structured and 
what actors or conditions can influence it is crucial for grasping the broader agenda-
shaping processes in the EU. Moreover, long-term systematic analyses of the patterns 
of impact are required in order to be able to move away from case study evidence 
which although providing valuable insights is usually limited by the virtue of its 
approach. Understanding the way in which agenda setting happens in the European 
Council is essential for the further study of policy development and decision making 
in the EU. It will furthermore provide another anchor for interpreting the evolution 
of the European integration process. But the studies focusing on a prima facie unique 
institution have broader implications also for the literature on issue dynamics. Testing 
general theories of agenda setting in this context can serve as a further empirical check 
as well as sketch directions for the expansion of existing theories. The results from 
analysing agenda determinants for the European Council can set the framework for 
research on the broader role of such factors in structuring political agendas.  
 
Policy Issues and the European Council  
Nature and Composition of the Agenda 




utional/functional and legal aspects of the evolution of this body.4 This is not 
surprising since the European Council was born outside the treaties, remained there 
for a long time (until the Treaty of Maastricht, 1993), and was listed among the EU 
institutions only in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Consisting of the Heads of State and 
Government of all member states, the European Council has naturally represented a 
powerful actor. But the closed meetings with stress on informality have made its 
agenda setting role go unnoticed for years. Existing research on the European Council 
analyses thoroughly its establishment, gradual institutionalisation and positioning in 
the overall EU framework, as well as its functions and powers. Extensive studies 
appeared first in the 1980s–early 1990s (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; Johnston, 1994; 
Taulègne, 1988; Werts, 1992; Wessels, 1980), and recently there has been a revival in 
the academic interest very much related to the ever increasing role of the body as well 
as formalisation as an EU institution (Eggermont, 2012; Foret & Rittelmeyer, 2014a; 
Stäsche, 2011; Werts, 2008).5  
The first attempt to categorise the issues discussed by the EU leaders at their summits 
was made in the late 1980s. Bulmer and Wessels argued that there are four types of 
points which enter the informal agenda: ‘those outstanding from the previous session, 
important current issues, the priorities of the Presidency-in-office and the proposals 
of other member governments and of the Commission’ (1987: 52). Bonvicini and 
Regelsberger (1991) addressed the same categories of topics adding international 
developments and issues linked to the economic and social situation of the European 
Community. Yet, the results of these classification attempts constitute a mixture of 
functional types of issues and substantial policy topics.  
A slightly more substantial policy area categorisation has appeared in textbooks on the 
EU. Nugent (2010) differentiates among six broad topic categories: evolution of the 
EU, constitutional and institutional points, economic and monetary policies, 
                                                          
4 To some extent behavioural characteristics have also been analysed (see e.g. Tallberg’s study 
on bargaining in the European Council, 2008a). 
5 Some of these manuscripts are the direct result of PhD dissertations (Eggermont, 2012; 




enlargement, external relations, and specific internal policy issues. In recent studies 
Wessels moves a step further in categorising the activity profile by counting the 
number of headlines in the Conclusions and dividing them among five types of policy 
areas – constitutional, socioeconomic, internal, external and other – each consisting of 
a few subcategories (Wessels, 2008a; Wessels, 2008b).  These studies (especially 
Wessels, 2008a) have increased our knowledge about what issues get access to the 
European Council agenda. They allow drawing some preliminary conclusions about 
the extent to which certain topics are addressed (for example, foreign affairs are the 
most prominent theme) and the temporal developments in attention, which in terms 
of number of headings do not suggest extreme change.  
But these analyses suffer from two measurement shortcomings. First, the counting of 
headings does not necessary correspond to the share of overall attention, as sections 
can differ substantially in size. Second, the approach is based on the issue definitions 
ascribed by the European Council itself, which might involve bias towards certain 
terminology. This is especially so because a portion of text often comprises more 
issues than are actually mentioned in its title, which might lead to omissions (or 
sometimes also overemphasis). For example, a heading labelled ‘Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice’ can include issues such as immigration, terrorism, organised 
crime, legal cooperation, civil rights, etc. or any combination of these matters with 
changing contents over time. Therefore, I suggest a new method for analysing the 
agenda of the European Council by measuring and studying the content of the 
Conclusions in a much more detailed manner. The empirical approach, which will be 
explained below, is the basis for all the studies included in this dissertation. It allows 
undertaking a systematic exploration of the composition of the agenda, and testing 
hypotheses regarding the nature of attention allocation in longitudinal perspective.  
 
Conditions for Agenda Formation 
While the European Council can and does collectively determine its own agenda, in 




complex interplay between actors with different motivations who behave within a 
framework of information-processing constraints and contextual pressures. The 
extent to which the agenda can be shaped, i.e. new issues introduced or pre-scheduled 
ones postponed, depends on a number of factors. They can be broadly grouped in 
three categories – institutional conditions, external stakeholders’ effect and the 
‘problem stream’.  
The first group of factors – the institutional one – comprises both features of the 
European Council as a policy venue and its institutional environment. We know that 
EU competencies are hardly a factor here since the European Council has discussed a 
lot of issues outside Community jurisdictions (see e.g. de Schoutheete, 2012). But 
institutional role expectations for the EU top body could be more relevant to 
consider. For example, the fact that the European Council draws the overall directions 
of EU development might suggest that it preoccupies itself with a narrow set of issues 
that are core to the existence and functioning of the EU polity, just like executives in 
nation sates would do (Jennings et al., 2011). Individual country preferences are also 
part of this group, since the European Council is the arena for national interest in the 
EU. But research shows that coalition building between states can happen on various 
lines and these are generally unstable (Tallberg & Johansson, 2008; Tallberg, 2008a). 
Other EU institutions could also attempt to leave their mark on the European Council 
agenda. In particular, the European Commission might file dossiers at the summits in 
order to seek political endorsement for its initiatives (Eggermont, 2012).6 The Council 
Presidency, which until the entry in force of the Lisbon treaty rotated among the 
member states, is potentially another institutional access point. The country occupying 
                                                          
6 But the pure presence of discussions of such items on the agenda does not preclude that it is 
the European Council’s own preference to address the issues. Thus, estimating the 
Commission’s role in influencing the attention of the top informal institution is empirically 




the office could misuse the chairing role for promoting domestic interests (Elgström 
& Tallberg, 2003).7  
The second group of factors underlying the dynamics of agenda formation 
encompasses external stakeholders. These are actors who are not directly involved 
with the European Council (as are the member states and the EU institutions) but are 
nevertheless situated nearby. In this category we could theoretically include organised 
interests, the media and the general public. Yet, unlike the Commission and the 
Parliament, and similarly to the Council of Ministers, the European Council is hardly 
the subject of preference ‘attacks’ by organised interests. It is almost impossible for 
interests groups to lobby it because of the lack of transparency of the meetings, the 
consensus decision-making norm, and absence of permanent staff (Hayes-Renshaw, 
2009). The influence of the media is also not applicable when we talk about the 
European Council, and probably to the EU as a whole, since there are no real 
European level news outlets and national media have diverging agendas. Thus, the 
only relevant actor here could be the public in terms of some aggregate level of 
citizens’ preferences in the EU (since there is also no European demos). The salience of 
European integration for voters as a dimension additional to the left-right cleavage 
(Gabel & Hix, 2002; Hix & Lord, 1997) is a reason to believe that citizens actually care 
about EU policy making and would like to see accountability. Not to mention the fact 
that a lot of the policies with direct impact on national publics are actually made on 
EU level. While responsiveness is usually sought in bodies that have legislative 
functions and can produce substantial policies, besides in effective terms institutions 
can respond rhetorically by allocating attention to matters of public concerns (see 
Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). This kind of responsiveness seems to fit with the role 
of the European Council in the EU’s institutional framework.  
A third group of factors which can structure the allocation of attention is enshrined in 
what Kingdon (1984) calls the ‘problem stream’. Here various issue indicators can be 
                                                          
7 The role of the new permanent President of the European Council also merits special 





considered, from unemployment to environmental pollution. While such indicators 
are issue specific and therefore usually have an effect on the attention towards a 
particular issue, there might be ways to analyse problem indicators’ role on a more 
general level. But an issue is never a problem on its own, it needs to be framed as such 
by participants in the agenda-setting game. Therefore, some types of indicators might 
have a higher likelihood of being referred to by the European Council. Another factor 
in this group is the occurrence of an unexpected sudden event of large scale which has 
the potential to shake the priorities of the day (Birkland, 1997; 1998). The so-called 
focusing events or crises might be particularly relevant to study in the framework of 
the European Council because of its freedom in scheduling meetings and its 
representative position as an arena for expressing the ‘singe voice’ of the EU. The last 
element in Kingdon’s problem stream, feedback, is not applicable to the European 
Council agenda due to the institution’s distance from policy implementation in the 
EU.  
 
Empirical Approach  
Already in the late 1980s Bulmer and Wessels pointed out that the ‘agenda of the 
European Council plays an underestimated role in relation to the body’s performance’ 
(1987: 137). The fact that little advance has been made in analysing this agenda and 
the processes behind it is a function of the complexity of undertaking such analyses. 
As Tallberg suggests, the lack of research is generally due to three of the core 
characteristics of the body: an institution ‘that convenes behind closed doors, whose 
proceedings are undocumented and whose participants are usually hard to gain access 
to’ (2008a: 686). Despite these essential constraints, studying the policy agenda of the 
European Council is not impossible and core data can be derived from the only 
existing written account documenting the issues to which the institution has paid 
attention – the European Council Conclusions.  
The Conclusions are not a direct reflection of the points debated at the meetings. 




disputable agenda items, these documents are said to conceal divergence of opinions 
among the Heads of State and Government (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987). But as 
Westlake and Galloway argue ‘[w]hat matters to the outside world is not what the 
European Council thinks, but what it has decided’ (2004: 181). This is so because the 
standing of the Union represented by the European Council is not necessary a 
reflection of the positions of its individual actors. No matter whether differences 
between the leaders’ views and desires exist or not, what is eventually agreed upon 
constitutes the position of all of them collectively. Therefore, the Conclusions are a 
reliable reflection the final agenda of the European Council, close to Kingdon’s (1984) 
definition of the decision agenda. The initial discussion agenda represents the desired 
points of different actors that are not necessary a reflection of joint auspices. 
Sometimes the points on the adopted Conclusions might mirror those prepared for 
discussion. Yet, it is only after the formal approval of the document by the European 
Council that they can be viewed as the final decision agenda.  
The formula of the Conclusions has so far allowed the European Council to keep the 
balance between confronting the public with the common position of the Union on a 
number of important topics and not obliging the Member States’ governments to 
follow a particular concrete action in response to the agreed decisions (Werts, 2008). 
The Conclusions are a way to induce other Community institutions into action or 
deliberation on specific issues. The General Affairs Council, the Commission and 
COREPER usually review the results of the meetings directly after the end of a 
summit (Bonvicini & Regelsberger, 1991). Although the texts cannot be formally seen 
as instructions to the European Commission8, the monopolist on policy proposals in 
the EU is not free to ignore the Conclusions because of an existing ‘underlying power 
play’ (de Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002: 9). Often the European Council’s decisions 
could give green light to an action, which the Commission desires to undertake (van 
Grinsven, 2003) or require it to rearrange its own agenda. They can also put pressure 
on the Council of Ministers to speed up decision making on a particular item or 
provide direction as to what decision should be taken formally by the respective 
                                                          
8 According to the treaties, the Commission ‘shall neither seek nor take instructions from any 




Council formation (Christoffersen, 2009). Only in the field of foreign policy no 
further consideration of the Conclusions is envisaged, since the European Council is 
the final decision maker in this field. Nevertheless, some ‘instructions’ for action of a 
rather procedural nature could still be referred to the Foreign Affairs Council 
(Bonvicini & Regelsberger, 1991).  
It is important to note some differences in the formal reference to the Conclusions, 
which have been issued since the first meeting of the European Council in 1975. The 
London Statement on the Organization of European Council Meetings stipulated that 
the Conclusions will be issued ‘on the authority of the Presidency’ (Conclusions, June 
1977). Therefore they have been mostly entitled ‘Presidency Conclusions’ but this 
term should not cause confusion, as the texts are ultimately agreed upon by consensus 
between all members of the European Council and only published by the Presidency. 
Recently, after a permanent President of the European Council became active, the title 
of the documents shifted towards European Council Conclusions. In a few cases 
(especially at informal or extraordinary meetings) a different formulation has been 
used for a title, e.g. Declaration, and sometimes documents have been issued on 
behalf of all Heads of State and Government (instead of the European Council). Yet, 
all these texts have the same standing and are the product of meetings under the same 
auspices.9  Therefore all documents are included in the analyses, and for the sake of 
simplicity, referred to as Conclusions.  
The following studies utilise a dataset compiled within the framework of this 
dissertation project. All Conclusions issued from the first meeting in 1975 until the 
end of 2012 were content coded using the EU Policy Agendas Project codebook10 (an 
EU version of the Comparative Agendas Project codebook). Content analysis of the 
Conclusions allows for conducting longitudinal inquiries in relation to the policy 
issues present on the agenda and the level of attention allocated to them. The dataset 
resulting from this coding enterprise consists of over 44000 (quasi-)sentences which 
                                                          
9 A consultation with the Council Secretariat and one of the key experts of the European 
Council, Jan Werts, has further confirmed this claim. 




contain a single policy issue each. The issues can be aggregated further to general topic 
categories, each comprising a number of issues following the codebook. The dataset 
covers a total of 126 documents released in the 38-year-long period (1975–2012), 
which featured 154 meetings (i.e. some meetings, especially informal ones, did not 
produce Conclusions). A detailed account of the meeting dates, places and 
corresponding Conclusions, as well as respective Presidency-holders is available in 
Annex 2, presented on half-annual basis. A research note by Alexandrova, Carammia, 
Princen and Timmermans (2014) published in the journal European Union Politics 
provides an extensive description of the preparation of the overall dataset, its nature 
and potential uses. Annex 3 of this dissertation presents an overview of the dataset 
and specifies its application in the different chapters. 
 
Overview of the Dissertation Contents 
The dissertation consists of five separate studies elaborating on the nature and 
determinants of the European Council agenda. It starts with an empirical overview of 
the topics addressed by this institution and testing of theories on overall attention 
dynamics. The research then moves towards incorporating the notion of issue 
character in an attempt to explain the composition of the agenda. In the following 
study the role of the EU Council Presidency as a channel of national interest on the 
European Council agenda is put to test. Then, building on the concept of rhetorical 
responsiveness the extent to which the EU top institution addresses citizens’ concerns 
is scrutinised. Finally, the power of focusing events to disturb the European Council 
agenda is estimated and the conditions under which this happens identified. The 
dissertation concludes with an integrated summary and some reflections. 
The first study offers a detailed empirical analysis of the themes on the European 
Council agenda. Via classifying the issues in standardised topic categories, the overall 
allocation of attention across these topics and the temporal shifts in it are examined. 
The analysis then proceeds with testing hypotheses on information processing 




of punctuated equilibrium (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005b) and its extension towards 
attention diversity (Jennings et al., 2011) to the agenda of the European Council. 
Attention shifts are expected to display a pattern similar to other ‘process agendas’ (i.e. 
involving both input of information signals and policy output production) and feature 
many examples at both the positive and negative extremes. The first proposition rests 
on institutional role perceptions of the European Council as a body which exercises 
multiple functions related to both policy input and output. It expresses the ‘single 
voice’ of the EU, takes final decisions on key subjects, initiates new policies, and 
delegates tasks to the other institutions. The instability of coalitions in the European 
Council is the basis for expecting major rises in attention to topics as well as complete 
ignorance of other matters as we move from one meeting to the next. The hypotheses 
on agenda diversity anticipate increasing agenda fragmentation over time but also 
some level of alternation between diversity and concentration. The first is likely to 
happen in effect of the expanding jurisdictional capacity of the EU over the years, 
whereas an alternation should result from growing institutional complexity related to 
this deepening of competences as well as the enlargement to more member states. 
The second study builds on the general notion that in order to understand the final 
composition of a political agenda we need to look at various factors related to the 
participants in the policy process and their environment. Yet, it argues that in practice 
this model works only if we analyse the appearance of a single issue on the agenda, 
reflecting the process of issue problematisation. Once our interest lies in explaining 
the overall agenda we need an intermediary element in the model, and this role can be 
allocated to the concept of issue character. The study then applies the updated 
theoretical model to the agenda of the European Council. With the help of statistical 
techniques for dimensionality reduction, it disentangles what types of issue character 
underline the attention spread across policy topics. An underlying assumption here is 
Lowi’s (1964) claim that certain sorts of issue characteristics structure political 
debates. Yet, this argument is developed further, suggesting that the emphasis on a 
particular type of issue character can vary over time. This emphasis is influenced by 
features of the agenda setter, e.g. party political orientation or preferences for 




events, etc. After evaluating the types of issue character that structure the allocation of 
attention in the European Council, the logic behind temporal changes in the saliency 
of one of the discovered lines is further scrutinised using data on factors associated 
with the European Council and its environment.  
The third study focuses on the role of a single institutional feature – the rotating 
Presidency – in European Council agenda setting. With its task to chair the meetings, 
the Presidency has been considered to have an advantaged position when it comes to 
deciding what topics should get addresses and how the items on the agenda should be 
ordered (Johnston, 1994). But empirically the success of misusing this position for 
one’s own benefit is questionable and case studies provide conflicting evidence. For 
various reasons, e.g. commitment to good reputation, member states might prefer to 
remain neutral when moderating the discussions at European Council summits. Even 
if they do not want to keep their national interests aside, the leeway for promoting 
them might not be so wide. And yet, some member states have been able to advocate 
particular topics on the European level when occupying the office. Therefore, this 
study poses the question whether the Presidency provides an institutional advantage in 
European Council agenda setting. It aims to find out if a member state is more likely 
to leave an impact on the agenda in line with its domestic position when it is chairing 
compared to when it is only a ‘simple’ member. Technically, this is done via 
combining the data on the European Council agenda with data on executive agendas 
in five EU member states which have each held the Presidency several times.  
The fourth study explores the role of public opinion in agenda formation. Due to its 
functions and position in the EU institutional architecture, the European Council 
might be expected to represent a venue for rhetorical responsiveness (Hobolt & 
Klemmensen, 2008). This institution might in theory appear as the primary example of 
the democratic deficit claim due to its distance from the citizens and no direct 
electoral link with them. But its discretion in picking up issues for discussion might as 
well equip the European Council with the necessary tool to address citizens’ concerns 
and secure output legitimacy for the EU. The study utilises data on prioritisation of 
problems by the public in the EU during the last decade and relates this measure to 




same issues. The analysis proposes to start with an aggregate framework in order to 
estimate whether rhetorical responsiveness occurs or not. A positive finding 
predisposes a further scrutiny of the results in order to confirm the direction of 
causality and estimate whether the European Council is responsive in all considered 
issue areas or only to a selection of them.   
The fifth study analyses the power of focusing events to set the agenda, or rather 
upset it since addressing such matters is associated with modifying the agenda last 
minute. It starts with an exploration of the focusing events that have been addressed 
at European Council summits over time, estimating their number, type, frequency of 
appearance, and the share of attention received. The research then moves to the more 
fundamental questions what determines whether a focusing event is discussed or not, 
and in case it appears on the agenda what determines how much attention such an 
item will receive. It is suggested to look at both exogenous and endogenous 
characteristics viewed from the perspective of the political venue, which takes the 
decision whether to react to what has happened. Exogenous characteristics comprise 
event type – manmade versus natural occurrences – and magnitude, in terms of the 
harm it causes to individuals, infrastructure, etc. Endogenous factors reflect certain 
relationship between the venue addressing the occurrence and the country/region in 
which the event takes place (e.g. political or economic ties). They might also include 
some features of the political agenda on which the event appears (e.g. its carrying 
capacity). Combining data on various striking sudden occurrences of a large scale and 
relating it to the focusing events on the European Council agenda, the analysis 
evaluates which of these factors play a role in deciding which events to discuss and 
how much attention to award them with. 
The conclusion bridges the findings of the five studies and emphasises the empirical 
and theoretical contributions of the dissertation. It further draws on the implications 
of the findings for research on the European Council as a policy venue, the broader 










2. Policy Punctuations and Issue Diversity 
on the European Council Agenda11 
Co-authored with Marcello Carammia and Arco Timmermans 
 
Abstract 
The European Council is the highest political body of the EU and the main venue for 
setting the agenda on high politics. Using a new dataset of all content-coded European 
Council Conclusions issued between 1975 and 2010, we analyse the policy agenda of 
the European Council and test hypotheses on agenda change and diversity over time. 
We find that the theory of punctuated equilibrium applies to the agenda of the 
European Council, which exhibits a degree of kurtosis similar to that found in policy 
agendas of other institutions located at the juncture between input and output of the 
policy process. Throughout the 36-year period, agenda-setting dynamics involved both 
small changes and major shifts but also more frequent medium-sized negative changes 
than found elsewhere. Given capacity limits to the agenda, large expansions of 
attention to topics involved large cuts in attention. Cuts were more often medium in 
size in order to maintain some level of attention to the topics affected, even though 
issue disappearance from the European Council agenda has been frequent too. This 
relates to the functions of the European Council as a venue for high politics, with 
expectations about issue attention rising with increasing policy jurisdictions 
throughout the European integration process. Studying dynamics over time, we 
measured entropy to show how the agenda became more diverse but also displayed 
episodic concentration in an oscillating pattern. This can be accounted for by the 
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Punctuations and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda. Policy Studies Journal, 





nature of the European Council as a policy venue: increasing complexity of this 
institution pushed the members to produce a more diverse agenda, but capacity limits 




When the credit crunch hit Europe, it set in motion a rapid wave of attention to 
financial and economic problems. National governments responded with large-scale 
bailouts, and this pushed the snowball of economic problems to the European agenda 
as deficits were rising rapidly and the euro, the symbol of monetary integration, came 
under so much pressure that experts began to predict its collapse. These signals of 
alarm made economic governance the top priority of the EU. 
Years before this sense of urgency, national governments in the EU followed national 
budgetary policies, defended national interests, and sometimes even deployed 
strategies of misinformation about domestic budgetary conditions in order to qualify 
for the euro, as in the case of Greece. When the rules set by the Stability and Growth 
Pact of 1997 appeared to be violated, adaptations were made in 2005 not to ensure 
better enforcement, but to avoid political confrontation between member states. In 
these years, European policymakers locked on to the indicators allowing maintenance 
of the deals on budgetary policy. Information signals pointing to more drastic change 
in attention were mostly filtered out. Only when the signals on budgetary and 
monetary problems reached extreme levels, European agenda setting began to show 
the characteristics of disproportionate information processing: deficit issues came to 
dominate over all other topics, and a drastic new policy design was hammered out 
during special summit meetings in the spring of 2011. 
The shock-like rise in attention to European economic governance is an example of 
the way in which issues may come and go on the political agenda of the EU. Within 
the institutional architecture of the Union, the European Council is an arena par 
excellence for agenda setting on matters of high politics as it brings together the heads 




of state or government of all member states. The range of issues that may obtain high 
political status is enormous, but the capacity of the agenda is limited. Thus, problems 
compete for attention; they go up and down and on and off the agenda. Capacity 
limits to the policy agenda stem from cognitive boundaries of policymakers and ways 
of organizing rationality in information processing. They also depend on the 
institutional rules of the European Council evolving over time. The European Council 
not only experienced changes in architecture and procedure, such institutional design 
choices were themselves matters of high politics on its agenda. 
This contribution analyses the allocation of attention to major topics of European 
policy on the agenda of the European Council since this institution was established in 
1974. As a policymaking venue, the European Council has features that make it 
distinct from most national governments. While protocol often is strict, the European 
Council has considerable flexibility in determining agenda space and does not face the 
formal bounds of annual presentation of the policy agenda, as national executives do. 
Furthermore, the number of state and government leaders gathering in the European 
Council expanded with EU enlargement, much beyond alterations in the number of 
cabinet ministers that political parties sometimes make in order to allocate portfolio 
payoffs. Do these characteristics make a difference to the pattern of agenda setting? 
This contribution begins by addressing the position of the European Council in the 
European institutional framework. Then, we link the study of the European Council 
agenda with the theory of punctuated equilibrium and cast several expectations about 
the nature of agenda setting in the European Council. After presenting our data, we 
map the pattern of attention to major policy topics and move on to analysing the 
distribution of attention. We first explore the question: How incremental or 
punctuated are attention changes throughout the period the European Council has 
been operative? Then, we also look at the scope of the agenda over time and ask 
under what conditions during its institutional development the European Council 
agenda concentrates or becomes more fragmented. In our conclusion, we reappraise 





The European Council as a Policy Venue 
Within the EU, the European Council is the venue where member states are 
represented at the highest political level by their head of state or government. In its 
initial years, the institution was predominantly an arbiter to settle complex political 
issues among member states, while later it developed more into an agenda setter of 
the EU (Christoffersen, 2009; de Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002; Werts, 2008). This 
transformation elevated the European Council to “the apex of the EU institutional 
system” (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006a: 173), functioning as a venue for agenda 
setting and authoritative decision making on major policy issues, including the 
institutional architecture of the EU (Wessels, 2008a; 2008b). Treaty revisions and 
enlargement also are foremost at the table of the European Council, as are 
appointments for European top positions such as the presidents of the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank. 
The agenda-setting function of the European Council has been the object of a limited 
but growing scholarly debate. Studies have focused on the sources of agenda-setting 
power within the institution, in particular the central role of the presidency (Elgström, 
2003a; Tallberg, 2003a; 2007) and on factors constraining its ability to steer the agenda 
(Thomson, 2008). Less is known about the substantive agenda of the European 
Council. Some studies of agenda content exist, but they focus on single meetings, 
presidencies, or years of particular historical significance. Systematic analyses of longer 
time periods of European Council agenda setting are non-existent, besides some 
reflections on the institution’s action profile within major policy domains (Wessels, 
2008a; 2008b). 
The agenda-setting and decision-making powers of the European Council are mostly 
informal and self-designed (de Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002; de Schoutheete, 2006). 
The European Council does not take part in the “normal” legislative process in which 
the several Councils of Ministers with their respective policy jurisdictions act together 
with the European Parliament, following proposals drafted by the European 




Commission (Princen, 2009).12 The European Council plays a coordinating role on 
such matters across policy jurisdictions or when issues are politically controversial 
between member states. This role involves creating package deals and “naming and 
shaming” of states that obstruct agreement. In agenda setting, the European Council 
indicates directions of general policy development. It usually refrains from producing 
detailed policy decisions, which it delegates to the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers or other bodies. These matters are included in the “Conclusions of the 
Presidency”—the programmatic policy document issued after each formal meeting. 
Although Conclusions are drafted at an early stage before the meetings are held, the 
agenda remains responsive to major events that call the attention of the political 
leaders of the member states. 
Conclusions have been issued since the first meeting of the European Council in 
March 1975. They are the only written evidence of matters discussed and agreed by 
the heads of state and government, since meetings are held behind closed doors. The 
Conclusions include statements on international events, policy initiatives on a range of 
topics, delegation of work to other European institutions, evaluations of progress or 
stalemate of ongoing policies, etc. In general, Conclusions address a variety of issues 
within different policy domains, although a few documents adopted at extraordinary 
meetings have a specific focus (e.g., European response to 9/11, climate change, the 
economic crisis, and the revolutionary events in North Africa in early 2011). The 
annual output of Conclusions ranges over time (between two and five per year), as 
does the total volume of policy statements included in a single Conclusion. There is 
no clear link between the two. 
The openness of the agenda is facilitated by a flexible institutional framework, with no 
fixed time intervals between meetings and considerable discretion over the size of the 
agenda. While agenda composition is decided by consensus (Attinà, 2002), the 
presidency plays an important streamlining role by organizing the meetings and 
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carefully detecting those topics that the member states wish to address (or avoid). 
Moreover, until December 2009 when a permanent European Council president was 
appointed, the meetings were chaired by six-month presidencies, rotating among the 
member states. This could have added an erratic element to the agenda of the 
European Council, since different presidencies played their role with different styles 
and often also sought to uphold their own interests onto the EU agenda (Tallberg, 
2003a). However, despite institutional flexibility and even changes in rules to 
accommodate the increasing number of policy jurisdictions and member states, the 
growing complexity pushed the political costs of agenda setting and negotiation 
upward over time. 
 
Punctuated Equilibrium and Agenda Dynamics in the European 
Council 
The theory of punctuated equilibrium posits that agenda setting and policymaking 
show periods of stability and small adaptations but also involve larger shifts in which 
the agenda is reset more radically. Such shifts follow after information signals increase 
in magnitude and cascade in the social and political environment—just as happened 
with monetary and budgetary policy in the EU after national governments responded 
to financial market failure. As Jones and Baumgartner (2005a: 336) put it: “decision 
makers in politics will not cling forever to bad information, but they undoubtedly 
believe it far beyond its utility.” Disproportionate information processing adds an 
erratic element to the political agenda when analysed over longer time periods. 
Institutional friction may reinforce this episodic alternation between stability and 
drastic change. It occurs when the characteristics of a policymaking arena raise the 
political costs of changes in attention. Such costs stem from rules for making 
decisions, and negotiating and enforcing political deals (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005a; 
2005b). Institutional rules thus create thresholds for change; they are often designed in 
a way that prevents policymaking from becoming too volatile. Constitutional designs 
of separation of powers and rules of unanimity or qualified majority have precisely 




this function. Complex institutions involve institutional and political costs that inhibit 
easy disruptions of priorities once they are set. This may be enabled by design, but it 
also may be an unintended consequence of institutional development. 
While early studies of punctuated equilibrium were based on the U.S. case only, the 
more recent turn toward the comparative study of agenda setting allowed broader 
systematic analysis of the conditions for punctuated equilibrium, and shed new light 
on how institutional design may affect policy change (Baumgartner et al., 2009). 
Recent work has shown that increasing levels of friction downstream in the policy 
process make these agendas significantly more susceptible to punctuated equilibrium. 
Policy input agendas of media, interest groups, and public opinion generally involve 
lower thresholds for change. They are thus more adaptive than policy process agendas 
(parliamentary questions, hearings, debates in legislatures, and executive policy 
programs), while policy output agendas (legislation and budget decisions) are the 
stickiest. Therefore, changes in attention become increasingly deviant from the normal 
model of frequency distribution as agendas get closer to policy output (Baumgartner 
et al., 2009; Jones, Sulkin, & Larsen, 2003; Jones et al., 2009). 
The European Council is a complex body that sits not only at the input side of the 
European policy process—initiating new policies and expressing the “voice” of the 
Union—but also decides on institutional architecture, delegates tasks to other 
institutions, and takes a prominent role in policy coordination and conflict arbitration. 
For this reason, we may expect that the agenda of the European Council displays 
shifts in attention to problems comparable with policy agendas at the process stage in 
a political system, converting input signals into policy output. In particular, the long-
term policy agenda of the European Council should show a punctuated pattern of 
policy change, although these attention shifts should not be heavily punctuated. The 
degree of attention shifts is expected to be lower than for output agendas and higher 
than for input agendas. 
Hypothesis 1: The European Council agenda displays attention shifts involving a 




Furthermore, the institutional profile of the European Council as an agenda setter on 
matters of high politics involves marked choices and priorities. The carrying capacity 
of an agenda-setting institution for matters of dramatic content and expression is 
more limited than for matters that are low key. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) show 
how in the United States issue expansion from policy subsystems to “macropolitical” 
institutions sparks shifts from stability to dramatic change. The European Council 
absorbs such dramatic matters as it is the locus for coordination, arbitration, and 
redesign of vital institutional structures and rules in the EU. 
Prioritizing and redefining an issue involves actor mobilization (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2005). For the European Council, mobilization often increases the costs of coalition 
building. It can occur within the institution or be the outcome of complex two-level 
games between European institutions and member states (Moravcsik, 1993; Putnam, 
1988); or, conversely, it can be path dependent following previous choices in 
addressing the issue. However, coalitions usually are not stable over time; they are 
realigned frequently. This may lead not only to a pattern of rise and fall of issues on 
the agenda but also to issues entering and entirely leaving the agenda. For these 
reasons, despite the flexibility in agenda capacity, we expect that large attention 
changes are both positive and negative. If major topics are propelled to the top of the 
agenda, others are squeezed out. Thus, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: The European Council agenda shows both major positive and major 
negative attention changes. 
Recent research on agenda setting provided clearer evidence for varying levels of 
diversity and scope of policy agendas over time (e.g. Jennings et al., 2011; John & 
Jennings, 2010). Punctuated equilibrium theory posits that venues in a political system 
are linked, with policy ideas traveling across venue boundaries (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2005; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005b). This suggests that an expansion in the scope of 
issues relevant for any venue of the system is likely to spill over to other policy 
venues. In the EU, the expansion of the set of jurisdictions has followed successive 
“corridors” of treaty reform (see also Moravcsik, 1993; Wessels, 2008b), as well as 
European Court of Justice rulings and path-dependent institutional change (Pierson, 




1996). Beside shifts involving some topics being elevated and others crowded out, the 
political consequence of expanding jurisdictional boundaries in the EU is likely to be 
an increase in agenda diversity. 
Hypothesis 3: The European Council agenda shows increasing diversity over time. 
The analysis of agenda development in terms of expansion and concentration takes us 
right into the dynamics of European Council policymaking. The broadening range of 
EU decision-making powers and the growing number of member states following 
several rounds of enlargement brought more institutional complexity. While 
hypothesis 3 expects increasing diversity of the agenda over a long time period, rising 
complexity and institutional development are likely to add conflicting pressures. The 
multiple roles of the European Council in the EU political system involve not only a 
demand for attention to many issues and for policy coordination, but also the need for 
quick response to focusing events that give particular matters a sense of urgency. 
Institutional complexity limits the capacity to process many information signals in 
parallel. While many issues are expected to be addressed, not all of these matters can 
acquire urgent status in a complex institution where friction in information processing 
and costs of making decisions on priorities are high (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005a). 
For these reasons, we expect the European Council agenda to show a pattern in which 
expansion of the agenda to multiple topics alternates with concentration of attention 
on fewer topics. 
Hypothesis 4: The European Council agenda exhibits a pattern of alternation 
between concentration and expansion. 
Before testing the validity of these hypotheses, we describe the data collected for the 







Data and Method 
Our empirical analysis is based on an original dataset containing all European Council 
Conclusions issued since March 1975, when this body first met as a formal institution 
and produced a substantive Conclusion. The dataset consists of 112 Conclusions, the 
last one issued in December 2010. All documents were content coded using an EU 
version of the standardized codebook of the Comparative Agendas Project. The EU 
codebook contains 21 policy topics,13 and each of these a number of subtopics.14 All 
Conclusions were coded15 on the level of sentences and quasi-sentences, the latter 
being all parts of a sentence that include autonomous policy content and can be 
meaningfully split. One code is attached to each single unit of analysis.16 The codes 
make no reference to tone or direction of activity; they only denote the policy field 
discussed by the EU leaders. 
                                                          
13 The major policy topic codes of the EU codebook are: 1. Macroeconomics; 2. Civil Rights, 
Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties; 3. Health; 4. Agriculture and Fisheries; 5. Labour and 
Employment; 6. Education; 7. Environment; 8. Energy; 9. Immigration; 10. Transportation; 
12. Law and Crime; 13. Social Policy; 14. Regional and Urban Policy and Planning; 15. 
Banking, Finance, and Internal Trade; 16. Defence; 17. Space, Science, Technology, and 
Communications; 18. Foreign Trade; 19. International Affairs and Foreign Aid; 20. EU 
Governance; 21. Public Lands and Water Management; and 23. Culture. 
14 For example, the major category macroeconomics includes budget and debt, inflation, 
monetary policy, etc. 
15 The coding process was conducted simultaneously by two teams in Italy and the 
Netherlands. Student coders worked in pairs, coding each document first individually and then 
checking for disagreements and agreeing on final codes whenever differences existed. Finally, 
the supervisors of the project in both countries verified the assigned codes and discussed 
complex cases between themselves and in a broader group of scholars working within the 
Comparative Policy Agendas Project. 
16 Whenever possible, a subtopic code has been allocated, but in many cases due to the general 
ideas stated, major topic code has been necessary. For the purpose of this article, all subtopic 
codes have been aggregated to the major topic level in order to simplify the picture and allow 
for broad analysis. 




The dataset contains over 40,000 coded statements. Within this total volume, 97 per 
cent was actually content coded, while the remaining 3 per cent did not have any 
policy content. This proportion is comparable with the share of substantive content of 
policy documents found in analyses of national executive agendas (e.g. Breeman et al., 
2009; Jennings et al., 2011; John & Jennings, 2010). In choosing our time interval for 
measuring the allocation of attention, we had three possibilities: analyse single 
European Council Conclusions, aggregate documents for six-month presidency terms, 
or analyse from year to year. We study agenda development from year to year, which 
makes the results comparable with empirical work on other policy agendas. 
 
Attention Allocation across Topics 
The allocation of attention across topics (table 2.1) clearly shows some major 
emphases reflecting the nature of the European Council as an EU institution. Its 
foremost direction of activity—i.e., the adoption of common positions and 
coordination of activities in international affairs, as self-defined in the Paris 
Communiqué of 1974—is also the major topic on the agenda. Foreign affairs cover 
almost one fourth of the agenda space of the formal meetings of EU leaders. More 
than half of these references are general statements about EU relations with third 
states or international organizations. Other prominent issues are EU enlargement, 
international economic development, foreign aid, and human rights. Macroeconomics, 
the traditional field of European integration, comes second with approximately 15 per 
cent of the total attention. Here, again, general references are most frequent, but more 
specific mentions of budget and debt and monetary policy are also prominent. The 
third largest topic is governance, covering some 10 per cent of the agenda space. As 
the European Council also convenes Inter-Governmental Conferences to change EU 
treaties, having a significant stake in this domain is not surprising. The variety of 
governance issues on the agenda is wider than that within the fields of foreign policy 
and macroeconomics. The Conclusions make frequent references to EU treaties, 
government efficiency, institutions and intra-institutional relationships, and relations 




Policy field Frequency Percentage 
International affairs 9410 23,76% 
Macroeconomics 5853 14,78% 
Governance and government operations 4260 10,76% 
Defence 3000 7,57% 
Banking, finance and internal trade 2550 6,44% 
Employment 1671 4,22% 
Law and crime 1635 4,13% 
Environment 1620 4,09% 
Civil rights and liberties 1374 3,47% 
Immigration 1352 3,41% 
Remaining 11 policy fields (less than 3% each) 6880 17,37% 
All 39605 100% 
Table 2.1. Aggregated attention to policy fields (1975–2010) 
Taken together, the three topics of foreign affairs, macroeconomics, and EU 
governance attracted almost half of the whole attention of the European Council over 
the entire 36-year period. The remaining policy fields were given between 
approximately 7 and <1 per cent of the agenda space. 
Some topics are clearly much more prominent than others in the general picture of all 
aggregated agendas between 1975 and 2010. To consider continuity and change in the 
agenda of the European Council, we explore how the allocation of attention to policy 
fields varies from one year to the next. Figure 2.1 shows the proportion of attention to 
the three most prominent topics relative to all other topics, measured as a percentage 
of the total annual agenda. The share of attention attracted by the three dominant 
policy fields varies over time between 27 and 77 per cent. It was at points when these 
topics attracted less attention that space was opened for other themes—in particular 
energy, environment, transport, immigration, and internal trade. Among the remaining 
fields, some received more attention over time, others showed a pattern of rise and 
decline, and still others, notably agriculture, became less visible. A few topics, such as 
science and technology, social policy, and foreign trade, nearly always had low access 




to the European Council agenda. These observations seem to point to a punctuated 
pattern of issue attention change over time. 
 
Distribution of Attention Change 
In order to measure the degree of punctuation on the European Council agenda, we 
calculate change scores in the attention devoted to each of the policy topics from one 
year to the next. We use a “percentage-percentage method” and replicate this 
measurement for all years to generate the distribution of yearly change scores.17 Our 
first hypothesis is that the European Council should show a pattern of attention 
change similar to other “policy process agendas” of national executives, which is 
observed statistically as a mild level of leptokurtosis. Leptokurtosis is a change pattern 
in which very small and very large changes occur, while medium-size changes are less 
frequent. Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 posits that changes in attention involve both 
major negative and positive shifts. 
Table 2.2, which includes summary statistics about attention changes in the agenda of 
the European Council, shows that these range between a minimum of -1 (a 100 per 
cent decrease in attention to selected topics that we find when a topic which received  
                                                          
17 There are several ways to calculate change scores (see Jones et al., 2003: 168 for a 
discussion).We use the “percentage-percentage method”, that is, we calculate the percentage of 
the total agenda covered by a single issue area and then calculate the difference from the same 
percentage in the preceding year: (percentage at time 2—percentage at time 1)/percentage at 
time 1. In computing changes based on percentages rather than counts, we move from the 
assumption that the total size of the agenda is constant. Theoretical and empirical reasons 
could suggest differently, i.e., the size of the European Council agenda may well increase over 
time. However, we stick to percentage–percentage change because the results are more easily 
observable. It is worth noting that this choice does not invalidate our results; quite the 





Figure 2.1. Relative distribution of attention to policy topics per year (1975–2010) 
Min. -1.0000 
1st Qu. -0.4856 
Median  -0.1073 
Mean  0.5384 




L2 (l-scale) 0.8526169 
L3 (l-skewness) 0.4307864 
L4 (l-kurtosis) 0.3319330 
Table 2.2. Statistics on agenda change 




attention in the agenda at t0 goes out of the agenda at t1) to a maximum of 29.8 (a 
2980 per cent increase in attention). The mean change is 0.54, which indicates that 
attention shifts from one year to the next are 54 per cent on average, with a standard 
deviation of 2.46. 
The shape of a distribution can be estimated by calculating the level of kurtosis, which 
is a ratio between the fourth moment of a distribution and its squared variance. 
Following punctuated equilibrium theory, we should find a leptokurtic distribution of 
attention changes,18 and based on H1 we expect to find a mild level of leptokurtosis in 
the European Council agenda. To analyse the shape of the distribution, we use L–
kurtosis, a measure less sensible to extreme values (Breunig & Jones, 2011). A normal 
distribution has an L-kurtosis of 0.123, with lower values indicating platykurtic and 
higher values leptokurtic distributions. 
The value of L-kurtosis in the distribution of changes on the European Council 
agenda is 0.33, which denotes a mild level of leptokurtosis in comparison with other 
political institutions (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 612). In line with hypothesis 1, this 
level is higher than typical input agendas but lower than output agendas. The observed 
mildly leptokurtic pattern of attention change is similar to that of, for example, 
hearings in the U.S. House and Senate, parliamentary interpellations in Denmark, and 
also approximates the L-kurtosis level for interparty policy agreements in Belgium 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). Thus, the nature of attention change on the European 
Council agenda is comparable with that of other agendas located around the middle 
point of the policy process, where inputs are converted into outputs. 
By ranking changes in order of magnitude and plotting them in a histogram, we can 
observe the shape of the distribution of change scores (figure 2.2). The X-axis displays 
the scale of percentage changes, ranging between -1 (-100 per cent for issues entirely 
disappearing from the agenda) and +5 (showing all instances of attention shifts of 500 
                                                          
18 A leptokurtic distribution is a distribution that, compared with Gaussian distributions, has a 
slender peak with many very small changes or no change at all (0 points), weak shoulders 
(indicating a low number of moderate changes), and fat tails (a higher number of radical 




per cent or more). The bars in the histogram represent tabulated frequencies. The 
black line shows the normal distribution. 
As posited in hypothesis 2, the European Council agenda is expected to exhibit both 
large positive and large negative attention shifts. Figure 2.2 shows a high amount of 
changes at both ends of the scale, in line with our prediction. The occurrence of 
drastic cuts in attention, even back  to  zero (the left side of the histogram), cannot  be  
 
Figure 2.2. Distribution of percentage attention change 
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found in all types of policy agendas.19 With budgets, for example, it is quite 
exceptional to find cuts in spending on topics to zero from one year to the next 
(Breunig, 2006; Jones et al., 2009), and legislative production also displays fewer of 
such politically costly attention cuts (Brouard et al., 2009). In contrast, in European 
Council agenda setting, the frequency of issues dropping off the agenda entirely is 
quite high. Also, medium-sized cuts in attention (between -30 per cent and -80 per 
cent) from one year to the next are rather frequent. This gives the frequency 
distribution of attention change in the European Council a “Quasimodo” type of 
shape, with one shoulder peaking out.  
The policy agenda of the European Council seems more volatile than what is usually 
observed in other institutions. This may be related to specific institutional properties 
of the European Council such as the mechanism of the rotating presidency that can 
provide an incentive for resetting the agenda to uphold single member states’ 
priorities every 6 months. More generally, however, high agenda volatility seems 
consistent with the European Council as a high politics venue, where different 
coalitions are built among the EU leaders over time. Cutting policy areas out from 
budgets is politically costly because it involves terminating entire policy programs. 
Conversely, reallocating attention within European Council Conclusions may be 
positive sum because space is opened for “new” issues when “old” ones can just be 
delegated to the micro level and thus processed further by other institutions. Hence, 
in principle, issue disappearance from the European Council agenda may pave the way 
to an increase, rather than a reduction, of policy activity. The major three themes of 
international affairs, macroeconomics, and EU governance were never sacrificed 
entirely for other matters, but most of the remaining 18 topics disappeared from the 
agenda several times. Such resetting of issues allowed the large expansion of attention 
to topics visible in the right-hand tail of Figure 2.2. Increases of 500 per cent or more 
were made when issues intruded on the agenda with a particular sense of urgency, a 
feature common to almost all topics but at different moments. For making such 
                                                          
19 Due to the particular features of the model calculation, in mathematical terms the negative 
scores are limited to the value of -1 as the lowest, whereas the positive values can take any 




drastic emphasis choices, the political leaders of the EU member states often reduced 
the relative attention to several other topics substantially, or dropped topics entirely. 
 
Agenda Concentration and Diversity 
The interaction between cuts and increases of political attention to selected topics 
becomes more evident when analysed over time. The leptokurtic distribution of 
attention change presented above depicts only a generalized image of the shifts in 
emphasis on all policy fields from one year to the next. Thus, while punctuations can 
be seen as “significant break points in the degree of attention,” a different measure is 
required to get a more detailed view of how attention develops in the long run (John 
& Jennings, 2010: 579). 
Based on the institutional characteristics of the European Council and the wider 
framework in which it functions, and building on existing research on punctuated 
equilibrium, we formulated two hypotheses on agenda development over time. Our 
third hypothesis states that expanding policy jurisdiction since 1975 has pushed the 
European Council agenda toward more diversity. Yet EU enlargements, the position 
of the institution with its radar for matters of high politics, and the need to show 
responsiveness to incoming information and focusing events also involve a pressure 
for focus, which should push the agenda toward more concentration. While state and 
government leaders assembling in the European Council may attempt to balance these 
different forces, our fourth hypothesis is that agenda diversity and concentration 
occur in alternation. 
To test these two hypotheses, we measure the level of agenda entropy. Derived from 
Boltzman’s work on thermodynamics and statistical mechanics and Shannon’s 
information theory, the measure of entropy has been applied to a number of fields 
(for an overview see Bailey, 1983). In agenda-setting research, entropy captures the 
degree to which attention to problems is concentrated on one (low entropy) or 
dispersed among many different topics (high entropy). Policy agendas researchers 




have applied the concept using the Shannon Diversity Index (H)20 (Jennings, Bevan, & 
John, 2011; Jennings et al., 2011; John & Jennings, 2010). Shannon’s H (also known as 
Shannon-Wiener Index) is considered a powerful measure of entropy for data with 
low levels of concentration (John & Jennings, 2010: 579), as is expected to be found in 
the agenda of policymaking institutions.21 The higher the value of entropy, the more 
attention is spread in equal portions between different topics. The maximum value of 
the Shannon’s H statistic depends on the total number of categories used for 
measuring diversity. Our analysis includes 21 policy fields, which renders a maximum 
entropy value of 3.0445 that would be found in case of equidistribution of attention 
across policy sectors.22 Conversely, an entropy value of 0 would be observed if the 
whole attention was concentrated on a single issue. Both the minimum and the 
maximum possible values are extremes, which are rarely observed in social systems; 
entropy mostly fluctuates around intermediate levels (Bailey, 1983). 
Figure 2.3 shows change in entropy over time in the agenda of the European Council 
from 1975 to 2010. The average entropy score is 2.25, but the trend line shows a rising 
average entropy level from below 2 to above 2.5 in recent years. This provides 
empirical support for our third hypothesis expecting increasing issue diversity in the 
European Council over time. The number of topics on the agenda rose up as the EU 
political system evolved. 
                                                          




where p(xi) is the probability function of an outcome xi (i being a integer from 1 to n), and n is 
the number of policy topics. Since the probability function is always negative, the product of pi 
and the natural logarithm of pi is multiplied by minus 1. The total entropy of the agenda in a 
given point of time is the sum of all H-calculations for every policy topic. 
21 Another possible way of measuring agenda diversity is through the Herfindahl index 
(Breeman et al., 2009). 
22 The maximum value is achieved when all probabilities are the same and represents the 





Figure 2.3. Agenda entropy per year (1975–2010) 
While the scope of the European Council agenda increased, sharp rises and falls in 
attention to single topics also occurred. Our fourth hypothesis goes into the dynamics 
of the European Council experiencing conflicting pressures for spreading and 
focusing (or refocusing) attention. From its establishment until the adoption of the 
Single European Act in 1986, the European Council was subject to increasing 
institutionalization. In this period, new policy topics were added to the agenda and, as 
Figure 2.3 displays, entropy increased overall—reaching a score of 2.68 in 1986, the 
highest point for the entire period. Then, in 1987, the agenda showed a drastic but 
temporary concentration, as visible in the lowest entropy score of 1.64. This was a 
year of major political disagreement within the European Council, as state and 
government leaders were focusing on distributive and redistributive matters—such as 
general budgetary policy, structural funds, and spending on agriculture—and could 
agree on just one issued Conclusion. Attention to international affairs was low in this 
year (less than 1 per cent). This concentration on EU distributional policy showed 
major political concerns with the implementation of the Single European Act. 
Since then and even more after the Maastricht Treaty establishing a formal Union in 
1992, the distribution of attention shows an oscillating pattern: it evolved from 
concentration to diversity and then back to concentration. Agenda concentration, 
however, involved fewer instances of topics being dropped entirely from the agenda. 




This suggests that expanding jurisdiction required the EU to deal with a wider agenda, 
while the successive rounds of enlargement in 1995, 2004, and 2007 increased the cost 
of drastic cuts. Nonetheless, episodic shifts in attention occurred, leading to periods 
where the agenda concentrated more. From the early 1990s, three patterns of 
increasing and decreasing agenda diversity appear in cycles of 6–9 years. In this period, 
the general trend is still toward rising entropy, but the weaving pattern oscillates 
around this trend. In recent years, the slope of the trend line was reduced to become 
almost flat, indicating that the expansion of the policy scope of the EU reached its 
political endpoint so far. We can thus conclude that our findings provide partial 
support for hypothesis 4. Indeed, the agenda exhibited a pattern of alternating periods 
of concentration and expansion, yet it did so only since the 1990s. In earlier years, 
European Council Conclusions rapidly became more diverse, which speaks to the 
expansion of policy jurisdictions of the European institutions culminating in an 
apparent “normalization” of agenda-setting processes after dramatic changes affected 
the design of the EU political system in the early 1990s. 
An increase in the frequency of European Council meetings and the subsequent 
production of more Conclusions, in particular since the 2000s, allowed this body to 
become more responsive to events while limiting the number of topics that were 
dropped and remained unattended for entire years. However, despite this increased 
capacity of varying and shifting topics within years, the oscillatory nature of agenda 
diversity may indicate that, as an institution for high politics, the European Council 
has become more exposed to pressures for absorbing many matters to meet member 
states’ expectations and incoming information calls for resetting policy priorities. 
Institutional flexibility thus facilitated parallel processing and a spread of attention, as 
visible in our findings. Yet, at different points in time, the European Council had to 
shift to serial processing in order to address issues of particular urgency. 
 
Diversity and Issue Competition 




further explanation. Could specific topics be responsible for this pattern? Recent 
analysis of national executive agendas shows that some “core” issues condition 
attention to other matters: when core issues become highly salient, little space is left 
for other problems (Jennings et al., 2011). In this sense, noncore topics must compete 
for attention amongst themselves, but they need to compete with core issues in the 
first place. Our findings on the European Council agenda suggest a similar effect: in 
the competition for agenda space, economics, foreign affairs, and EU governance 
condition the access of other topics to the agenda. 
Figure 2.4 shows the pattern of relative attention to the three major topics (left scale) 
plotted against the entropy graph (right scale). Although the two represent different 
measures, a comparison is justified as entropy considers the dispersion of attention 
across the whole agenda and not topic by topic. For example, suppose that in 2 years 
the agenda contained just two policy fields: A and B. In year0, topic A gained 20 per 
cent of the attention and B 80 per cent, whereas in year1 the reverse occurred—A 
getting 80 per cent and B getting 20 per cent. Eventually, the entropy score for both 
years is the same, even though different topics occupied more and less attention in the 
two cases. Therefore, juxtaposing the entropy values to the share of attention spent to 
the core issues versus the remaining ones allows us to draw conclusions on the 
relationship between the two. Moreover, while for some agendas, changes in entropy 
and relative attention may still be inversely related almost by definition, this is not the 
case for the European Council because its agenda is extremely flexible in length: if the 
European Council wants to expand agenda space for all topics, it can just issue longer 
Conclusions—as sometimes actually happened. It is the consequence of a political 
choice when this does not occur, and attention is reallocated onto some issues to the 
detriment of others. 
In most of the years displaying increasing entropy, the total attention captured by the 
three core issues went down on the European Council agenda. The decline of core 
issues left more space open for the other topics to compete for attention and, 
eventually, a higher number actually reached the agenda. The opposite also seems to 
hold: at times when entropy scores were low, macroeconomics, foreign affairs, and 
governance were  quite  dominant together,  taking half  of  the agenda or even  more.  





Figure 2.4. Entropy and proportion of attention to the three core topics  
When core issues were relatively less prominent, they opened space for noncore 
issues, although some benefited more than others. During years of high saliency of the 
economy, foreign affairs, and governance, competition between noncore issues 
became more intense, and some topics were even entirely squeezed out. A closer look 
at the data shows how, since the 1990s, the core topics went up and down in salience 
together. The proportions of attention did not vary much between them; it was the 
other topics that contributed mostly to the variation in entropy over time. 
Recurring shifts from less diversity to more and then back to a more concentrated 
agenda may also stem from the institutional characteristics of the European Council 
and its leeway in setting the size and content of the agenda. Our data tell us that 
reduced diversity appears at times when the total volume of the agenda contracts. 
Increases in diversity occur when the production of statements in written Conclusions 
goes up. Thus, the more words the EU leaders are devoting to matters placed on the 
agenda, the broader the variety of the issues on this agenda. Conversely, as the 
political leaders of the EU member states decide to limit the agenda, they also make 




when the total space for items on the agenda goes up or down, in general, the 




Shortly after its first meeting in 1975, the European Council was recognized as the 
central venue for European high politics (Wessels, 1980). Its agenda has several 
functions in EU institutional design and policymaking that underline its central 
position between other European policymaking bodies (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987). 
Studies of the EU often emphasize the special or even “unique” character of its 
political system and the policymaking institutions of which it consists. Do the 
institutional properties of the European Council as it evolved set this agenda-setting 
body apart as a special case? Or does it show patterns similar to national policymaking 
institutions, on which empirical analyses thus far provide evidence for the theory of 
punctuated equilibrium?  
In this article, we systematically analysed the European Council agenda from the 
moment this institution became operative until the end of 2010. In this entire period 
of incumbency, the European Council experienced significant expansion of policy 
jurisdictions and considerable enlargement, from 9 member states in 1975 to 27 
member states in 2010. Institutional redesign of the European Council was an 
important topic on its own agenda between other matters of high politics, most of all 
international affairs and macroeconomics. We categorized these three and 18 other 
major topics represented on the agenda and placed them in a long-term perspective in 
order to analyse agenda dynamics. We presented four hypotheses to examine the 
overall pattern of changes in attention and to see how the composition of the agenda 
evolved over time along with the growing complexity of the European Council and its 
political environment in the EU. Table 2.3 summarizes our hypotheses and findings. 
 




Hypothesis: The European Council’s agenda… Test Result 
1 
…displays a medium level of kurtosis, similar to 









...involves both positive and negative big attention 
changes in its pattern of punctuations. 
confirmed 





...exhibits a pattern of alternating periods of 
concentration and expansion. 
partially 
confirmed 
Table 2.3. Summary of expectations and results 
Most of the time, the European Council discussed issues of foreign policy, 
macroeconomics, and EU governance—core issues that relate to basic functions of 
government. In this sense, the European Council mirrors national executives. The 
remaining part of the overall volume of attention—at times less than half of it—was 
distributed to many other policy topics. It did this in portions that varied from one 
year to the next. Observing both large increases and decreases of attention to topics 
on the European Council agenda, we found strong evidence for the theory of 
punctuated equilibrium. The degree of kurtosis corresponds to other recent findings 
on policy process agendas such as hearings in the U.S. Congress and parliamentary 
debates and coalition agreements in multiparty parliamentary systems (Baumgartner et 
al., 2009). 
We also observed something less visible in policy agendas research thus far. While 
policy agendas in countries often display a high frequency around the zero point—
small or very small change—this was not very prominent for the European Council. 
There were far more medium-sized negative changes than medium-sized positive 
changes. The leptokurtic frequency distribution of attention changes on the European 
Council agenda not only shows fat tails but also one peaking shoulder. By analysing 
agenda concentration and diversity over time, we followed the pattern of topic 
attention and attention change in the 36-year period more closely. Using an entropy 




Act of 1986, and especially since the early 1990s, agenda composition began to 
alternate between more and less diversity in an oscillating pattern. In periods of higher 
diversity, the core topics of economics, international affairs, and European 
governance were less salient, leaving agenda space to other matters. While not all of 
these attention shifts were marked punctuations, the findings on the frequency of 
change and the oscillating pattern over time are consistent. 
Thus, while the European Council is part of a political system with institutional 
features not existing elsewhere, these features channel rather than suppress the forces 
at work in information processing and setting the policy agenda. The theory of 
punctuated equilibrium helps us to get a better understanding of formal and informal 
mechanisms in agenda setting in the EU venue. Our measure of entropy for analysing 
trends over time extends this theoretical lens. We see several further steps in this 
direction of research on the policy process in the EU. In what ways do presidencies 
affect the European Council agenda in the long run? What is the effect on the formal 
agenda of the increased practice of organizing informal meetings to address specific 
and often urgent problems? What is the role of the European Council in delegating 
issues to other policy venues? At which times during issue attention cycles does such 
delegation happen—and appear effective or ineffective? Further research on these 
questions involving systematic empirical analysis will contribute significantly to a 






3. Explaining Political Attention Allocation 
with the Help of Issue Character: 
Evidence from the European Council 
 
Abstract 
Policy issues compete for the attention of political actors and the size of the agenda an 
issue can occupy is largely determined by the way in which it is defined. This logic 
constitutes a simple agenda-setting model in which factors related to the participants 
in the policy process and their context influence the attention a single issue receives 
after being problematised. In order to be able to apply this model to the construction 
of a whole agenda, we need to incorporate an intermediate step. This study proposes 
to do so by incorporating the notion of issue character and offers an empirical 
application of the adapted model to the European Council, a crucial informal player in 
EU agenda setting. Using a dimensionality reduction technique, the composition of 
the agenda is broken down to two constitutive dimensions – core vs. non-core themes 
of government and economic vs. non-economic character. Since the first structuring 
element is in line with existing knowledge and the role expectations for the European 
Council, the analysis concentrates on the second type. Changing levels of saliency of 
economic issue character of the agenda are used as a dependent variable in a model 
including predictors related to the nature of the institution and contextual factors. The 
results show that leftist European Council party ideology and growing government 
deficit in the EU contribute to increasing prominence of the economic dimension, 
which in turn explains rising levels in attention to various issues, especially of the non-







A key notion of agenda-setting theory holds that attention of political actors is always 
scarce and issues compete for access to the agenda (Jones, 2001; Kingdon, 1984). This 
results in erratic pattern of attention shifts across topics over long time periods and 
disproportionate representation of various matters on the agenda. The chance of 
success of a single issue is seen as conditional upon various factors, ranging from 
preferences of political actors, through institutional architectures, to external events 
(see e.g. Birkland, 1997; Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2010; Talbert & Potoski, 
2002). The mechanism via which changes on the agenda occur is rooted in recognition 
and interpretation of new information, or in other words the intrusion of new issues 
or new attributes of existing issues (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005b). Attribute intrusion 
in practice means redefining an issue in light of the emergence of a dimension of 
policy making, which has previously not been considered relevant. This can be seen as 
a synonym of framing – the primary framework through which an issue is perceived is 
used to describe this issue (Goffman, 1974).   
The idea that every matter placed on the political agenda is wrapped in attributed 
meanings, ascribed by the actors involved in the agenda setting battle, has been 
intensively analysed across various domains (e.g. Jeon & Haider-Markel, 2001; Plein, 
1991; Scholten & Timmermans, 2010; Strom & Cook, 2004). Within the EU context a 
number of case studies have explored linking of different types of frames to issues, 
struggles for imposing particular frames, and the effects thereof on policy choices 
(Candel et al., 2014; Cerna & Chou, 2014; Daviter, 2001; Littoz-Monnet, 2012; 
Moschella, 2011; Princen, 2010; Rhinard, 2010).. But all of these studies focus on 
particular issues and their journeys throughout the agenda-setting stage of the policy 
process. While the issue definition literature is reconciled with the idea of issue 
competition, it has failed to theorise on a macro perspective to framing, in terms of an 
overall agenda. On the other hand, the policy typology literature has proposed the 
concept of issue character, developed on the basis of cross-sectional issue 
comparisons, to explain different modes of policy making via inherent structural 
differences between policies. This strain of thought is not directly associated with the 
concepts agenda setting and framing. But as Baumgartner and Jones (2005) note, with 




their focus on the logic behind topics appearing in public debates scholars in this field 
in fact study agenda success. Such topic typologies have so far been applied to the 
public, the media, or interest groups’ agendas (see e.g. M. A. Baum, 2002; Carmines & 
Stimson, 1980; Sigelman, Sigelman, & Walkosz, 1992), while the agendas of political 
institutions, which are subject to the same behavioural patterns (Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005b), have generally stayed beyond the focus. This is also true for the EU, where 
research on organised interests is most advanced in this respect and features of policy 
issue context are seen to have effect on lobbying achievements (Klüver, 2011; 
Mahoney, 2007).  
This study presents an attempt to bridge these two strains of literature by proposing 
to use the notion of issue character as an intervening element between the factors 
which potentially affect agenda setting and the structure of the overall agenda of 
political institutions. The focus of the chapter is on a single EU institution – the 
European Council. With its crucial role in determining the overall agenda of the EU 
(Eggermont, 2012; Nugent, 2010; Werts, 2008), understanding how the European 
Council distributes its attention and why it follows particular lines has implications for 
the broader EU agenda-setting processes. Recent research has demonstrated that core 
themes of governance seem to gain more attention than all other topics (Alexandrova, 
Carammia, & Timmermans, 2012). But we need additional research before we can 
assume that this is the only issue character typology that explains the allocation of 
attention.   
The chapter proceeds as follows: after elaborating on the role of issue character as the 
a missing component in the theory of political attention allocation, and discussing the 
existing knowledge of agenda dynamics in the European Council, the structure of 
analysis is spelled out. The study assumes a two-step backward-moving approach. 
First, it uses longitudinal data on allocation of attention in the European Council to 
disentangle the dimensions of issue character which determine the levels of attention. 
Two dimensions are discovered, one of which corresponds well with existing research. 
The second issue character type is less important overall but shows a fluctuating 
pattern of saliency over the years. After interpreting its meaning, the second step of 




its saliency. The study concludes with a discussion of the implications of the empirical 
findings and the use of the new theoretical model.  
 
From Attribute Intrusion to Issue Character 
The definition of an issue is one of the crucial determinants of the level of attention 
allocated to it (Baumgartner & Jones, 2005). Peters (1994; 2001) argues that the EU is 
a political system different from those of nation states in many respects as far as 
agenda setting is concerned. Notably, issue definition is even more important in the 
EU because it determines the way and level on which the issue will be tackled. In 
particular, ‘[t]he internal fragmentation, overlapping competencies and multiple logics 
of political representation of supranational actors regularly ensure that alternative issue 
definitions remain in play simultaneously’ (Daviter, 2001). These peculiarities have 
made the EU’s political system an attractive arena for scholars, who focus on the 
effects of unclear or changing jurisdictional boundaries and venue interactions on 
issue attention and problem formulation or framing (see e.g. Princen, 2010; Rhinard, 
2010; Sheingate, 2000; Wendon, 1998). 
The most common approach to the empirical study of framing consists of a focus on 
a single issue or larger topic, which is subject to different frames over time and 
exploration of how these frames have evolved and competed across venues. To take 
an EU example, Daviter’s (2001) study the European Commission’s biotechnology 
policy discovers three dominant frames. A struggle between an environmental and an 
economic frame results in subsequent success intervals for each of them, and is finally 
overturn by a third frame of consumer choice. These findings, while incredibly 
insightful for scholars interested in biotechnology policy, bare the usual pitfalls of 
case-study research – they are not generalizable to all issues on the political agenda. 
This shortcoming has long-ago been recognised by Theodore J. Lowi in his critical 
review of ‘the problem of uniqueness’ (1964: 311). Lowi (1964; 1972) advocated that 
in order to understand political conflict fully, we need to consider characteristics 
related to the type of issue. And these characteristics should be formulated in such a 




way that they can apply to all points on the agenda. While his proposed solution, 
namely the use of a distinction between distributive, (constituent23,) regulatory and 
redistributive policies has encountered critique and been subject to revisions (e.g. 
Kjellberg, 1977; Wilson, 1973; 1980), the notion that there are certain types of issue 
characteristics, which structure overall political debates and agendas, merits attention. 
Markedly, Lowi’s approach does not speak of exclusive categories of policy types but 
rather hints at latent dimensions of policy24 (Lowi, 1972). 
The issue character concept can be a useful tool for expanding the framing literature 
towards studies of overall agenda dynamics rather than evolutionary monologues of 
single topics. In order to grasp its place in the agenda-setting process we should start 
with examining the standard logic of explaining the level of political attention on a 
single issue within a single policy venue. Figure 3.1 A presents this in a simplified 
model. Political attention is determined by factors associated with the participants in 
the policy process (e.g. party ideology, preferences, etc.) and the context (e.g. issue 
development indicators, institutional architecture, focusing events, etc.) Some of these 
factors are activated by the agenda setter(s) to produce problematization of an issue, 
i.e. to convert an issue into a policy problem. This process involves issue definition, or 
as Baumgartner and Jones (2005) conceptualise it, attribute intrusion25. An example of 
this agenda-setting model can be found in a study of the effect of economic 
conditions, public opinion (most important problem measure) with respect to the 
economy, and congressional ideology on attention to economic issues in US 
congressional hearings (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005b).  
                                                          
23 This category was added in Lowi’s later work of 1972. 
24 The four categories are a matrix based on two dimensions: likelihood and applicability of 
coercion. 
25 Generally, this can be expected to go hand in hand with issue expansion, but such a prospect 





Figure 3.1. Agenda-setting models for a single issue (A) and a whole agenda (B) 
However, when we move to the whole agenda both conceptually and 
methodologically it is impossible to use the factors to directly predict agenda 
composition. One solution would be to analyse all topics on the agenda separately and 
then induce general findings. But such an approach is inherently flawed foremost 
because it infringes on the core assumption in agenda-setting theory that attention is 
scarce and allocating more of it to one issue means depriving another one. Therefore 
we need an intermediary step in the model that represents a unifying (clustering) 
aspect for all policy areas. Such an option can be derived from the notion of issue 
character as a structuring inherent dimension of policies. Thus, in the agenda-setting 
model which corresponds to the whole agenda the distribution of attention will be 
explained by issue character the prominence of which is a function of factors related 
to the participants in the policy process and the context. Figure 3.1 B displays this 
model. 
Issue character is a way of describing the underlying line of classification which 
divides and brings together matters on the agenda. The concept does not assume a 
static phenomenon; over time an issue can exhibit stronger or weaker degree of the 
same trait. In other words, the saliency of a particular issue character can very over 
time and the extent to which one type of character is stressed has consequences for 
attention patterns. The prominence of a character type is determined by the desires 
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environment and interactions between the two. Thus, these two groups of elements 
do not determine issue character itself, they only influence the extent to which a 
certain type of character will be emphasised. 
Besides Lowi’s original conceptualisation of distributive vs. regulatory vs. 
redistributive policies, other classifications of issue character are possible. For 
example, Wilson (1980) speaks of costs and benefits and the extent to which each of 
them is concentrated or diffused as two structuring elements of politics. Yagade and 
Dozier (1990) distinguish among concrete and abstract issues, referring to the degree 
of difficulty to conceptualise a topic. An analysis of voting patterns by Carmines and 
Stimson’s (1980) suggests another typology – easy versus hard issues. The first type 
comprises symbolic matters which are often related to political goals, whereas the 
second refers to technical aspects, requiring expertise and associated with policy 
means.  
 
European Council Agenda Dynamics 
The European Council is an official EU institution since the Treaty of Lisbon but it 
has been conducting regular meetings ever since March 1975 and acting as the key top 
arena for political negotiation. It has been responsible for setting the direction of 
European integration via defining the general political guidelines for the Community, 
which more than once resulted in initiation of new common policies (Werts, 2008). 
Due to its impenetrable discussions, consensus decision-making method, and until 
recently informal status, studying agenda setting in the European Council has been 
difficult, and seemingly worthy only for scholars of law and institutional structure. 
Research on framing and information processing dynamics in the EU also tends to 
overlook the role of the European Council, although the importance of informal 
decision making is nowadays stressed (for an overview see Daviter, 2001; 2014). 
Yet, this body has affected the development of the European integration process 
more than any other Community institution (Eggermont, 2012; Wessels, 2008a). Over 




beyond the EU’s competence framework (de Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002; Werts, 
2008). The expectation that the European Council’s role will continue to become 
bigger (van Grinsven & Melissen, 2002) has already begun to materialise. An example 
thereof is the vital decisions the institution took in its attempts to counteract the 
recent financial crisis and mitigate the consequences of it. 
Few recent studies reveal that the catalogue of themes discussed by this top EU body 
is extremely diverse, covering both issues within and outside EU jurisdictions 
(Alexandrova et al., 2014; Nugent, 2010; Wessels, 2008a; Wessels, 2008b). And yet, 
some issues appear to be overrepresented. The domains of foreign affairs, governance 
and macroeconomics are not just the group occupying the highest proportion of 
attention but they are said to be able to condition attention to other issues 
(Alexandrova et al., 2012). The common feature of these policy fields is that they all 
constitute core themes of governance. Thus, the continuum of core vs. non-core 
matters to the functioning of a polity appears to be a driving line behind attention 
allocation. The finding is in line with research on executive agendas in five different 
European countries and the USA (Jennings et al., 2011). This suggests that particular 
types of agendas might be prone to similar character structures, giving additional 
leverage to the importance of empirically exploring issue character. 
But is the suggested core–non-core themes dimension the only latent character 
explaining the allocation of attention in the European Council? If it were so, some 
critical moments in agenda setting dynamics would be hard to explain. For example, 
why did the launching of the Social Agenda (more widely known as the Lisbon 
Agenda) gain so much attention at the European Council meetings in the year 2000? 
The employment and social policy matters contained in it cannot be classified as core 
themes, and did not appear to rise up to such a status during that time. The same can 
be said for the discussions of climate change (with a special reference to the EU 
position on international climate finance) in the second half of 2009. Therefore, more 
systematic analysis of the nature of issue character behind the agenda of the European 
Council and the factors that influence character salience is needed. The following 
analysis makes a step in this direction. 




Data, Approach, and Methods 
The starting point of the backward-moving analysis is the agenda of the European 
Council, derived from the Conclusions circulated after the end of almost each 
meeting.26 This empirical material is utilised to disentangle issue character as a 
determinant of attention allocation in the European Council. The second step in the 
study explores changes in the salience of the discovered lines of issue character over 
time. Lastly, this information is used as a dependent variable in the final stage. Data 
on characteristics of the participants in the policy process and the context is employed 
to explain variation in saliency. 
The dataset of European Council Conclusions consists of 126 documents covering 
the period 1975–2012. The texts are coded at the quasi-sentence level following the 
EU codebook of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), which categorises issues in 
policy themes irrespective of tone and direction. The policy topics are classified in 19 
general fields: agriculture, business and internal trade, civil rights, defence, education, 
employment, energy, environment, foreign affairs, foreign trade, governance, health, 
immigration, law and crime, macroeconomics, regional policy, science and technology, 
social policy, and transport.27 The total number of quasi-sentences amounts to 43587, 
excluding statements without policy content.  
The method applied to derive issue character dimensions is metric multidimensional 
scaling (MDS), since this technique aims to produce a spatial map of the ‘hidden 
structure’ of a dataset on the basis of which the nature of the derived dimensions can 
be interpreted (Kruskal & Wish, 1978). For this purpose the documents are combined 
into 74 equal periods of six months, corresponding to the Presidency chairmanships.28 
                                                          
26 Conclusions are not always published following an informal meeting. 
27 The original coding scheme includes two more categories. Since the total attention to each of 
them represents less than 1 per cent of the agenda, they have been merged with other topics. 
Culture (0.5 per cent of the total attention) was combined with education, and public lands and 
water management (0.1 per cent) was merged with environment. 
28 The total number of Presidencies in this 37-year timeframe is 76 but two of them did not 




MDS uses proximities (i.e. differences or similarities) between objects to identify their 
position on the map. Since the attention of political actors is always scarce (Jones, 
2001), emphasising one issue will inevitably result in deemphasising another one. This 
implies inseparability of the dimensions, wherefore the Euclidean MDS measure is 
used (Steyvers, 2002). The computation of the similarity matrix used to extract the 
MDS solution will be based on the proportions of attention to each of the 19 policy 
themes per six-month term in the 74 identified Presidency periods.29 The choice of 
the MDS method is motived by the fact that the technique allows to infer dimensions 
without having pre-defined attributes of these dimensions.30 Furthermore, its 
application appears suitable for data comprising relative emphasis on policy issues (see 
Veen, 2011).31 
After performing MDS on the full dataset and identifying the nature of the extracted 
lines of issue character, temporal MDS is carried out. This allows us to evaluate 
changes in saliency of the latent dimensions. Building on the work of Van der Brug 
                                                                                                                                                    
Council in December 2009, the same time slots are used for the remaining three years in order 
to make the periods comparable to the rest. Presidency half-annual planning appears to be the 
most appropriate temporal structuring element consisting of equal intervals. 
29 Count data instead of proportions could also be used. However due to the changing length 
of the Conclusions over time, shares are considered a more appropriate point of departure. 
30 The formula for Euclidean distances between shares of attention to policy themes is: 
	, ′
 = 	 −	′  
where D is the distance between the agenda at time t and the agenda at t’, tp is the proportion 
of attention allocated to policy topic p at time t, t’p is the proportion attention allocated to 
policy topic p at time t’, and n is the number of variables (74 half-annual agendas). 
31 Note that classical MDS based on Euclidean distances yields the same results as Principal 
Component Analysis (Cox & Cox, 2001: 43-44). Factor analysis would not be appropriate to 
use here, since in it the matrix for the calculation of factors consists of correlation or 
covariance estimates between attributes, whereas the matrix used in the MDS approach is 
based on dissimilarity in attributes (i.e. the differences between attention fractions at t0, t1, t2… 
tn). 




(1999) and Baumgartner and colleagues (2008) temporal developments are evaluated 
with the help of subsequent overlapping time windows. Each time window consists of 
three consecutive half-annual terms. An example of two periods where substantial 
changes in dimensionality are detected will be analysed qualitatively in order to explore 
the logic behind the change modes and confirm the utility of the dimension labelling.  
The last stage attempts to explain the rises and falls of a second latent dimension. 
Data on the ideological composition of the European Council and indicators 
theoretically related to the nature of the discovered issue character line are used as 
predictors of the saliency fluctuations. A tobit regression is computed due to the 
limited nature of the dependent variable and short time frame. 
 
Analysis of Issue Character 
A first step in the analysis is to determine the number of character lines ‘hidden’ in the 
data. The MDS solution produces 18 dimensions32, with the first two having much 
higher eigenvalues. The squared eigenvalue accounts for 97.91 per cent of the total 
dissimilarity. These results suggest that it might be sufficient to consider a two-
dimensional space, and an inspection of the scree plot of eigenvalues encourages this. 
Kruskal’s Stress 1 test shows that the total stress of the two-dimensional solution is 
0.1533, which is acceptable although somewhat low. A move to a three-dimensional 
structure will only reduce the stress to 0.13 (i.e. within the same acceptability range) 
and lift up the cumulative per cent explained by the squared eigenvalue to 99.03. 
Therefore, the choice for a two-dimensional framework seems reasonable. In order to 
confirm that the dimensionality structure is not due to one or a few outliers, validation 
                                                          
32 The maximum number of dimensions equals n-1, where n is the smaller of the number of 
rows and columns. 
33 A stress of 0 denotes perfect match between the data structure and the represented 




of the results displayed in the map is crucial.34 A split-sample check was performed on 
two samples of data including the agendas of every second and every third Presidency 
respectively. Both new maps (not shown) are very similar to the original one, thus 
validating the results of the MDS structure on the full data. 
 
Figure 3.2. Classical metric MDS on European Council Conclusions, 1975-2012 
                                                          
34 There are two main approaches to validation – regression of the ‘attributes’ on the 
dimensional coordinates or a split-sample check. The second approach involves conducting an 
MDS on one or more samples of the attributes and comparing the samples to the original 
model. It is considered a better validity check (Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). 




The first dimension (D1) explains 90.17 per cent of the dissimilarity in attention to 
topics on the European Council agenda (squared eigenvalues), and is thus the main 
type of issue character that determines the level of attention across issues. As figure 
3.2 shows, this dimension corresponds well to the findings of previous research 
(Alexandrova et al., 2012; see also Jennings et al., 2011). The key determinant of the 
allocation of attention in the European Council is the classification of topics as core 
vs. non-core functions of government. Core themes – foreign affairs, 
macroeconomics and governance – occupy the positive extreme of the spatial map. 
Defence appears as an intermediary category on the continuum, suggesting that it can 
rise to a core function status but does not always do so. This seems logical considering 
the less crucial location of this domain as a government function within the EU 
competency framework compared to its member states. The non-core functions end 
of the dimension contains the rest of the issue categories. The distances between 
topics there are small, considerably smaller than these between the core themes, 
suggesting that changing the focus from one topic to another here is quite easy. 
The second dimension (D2) explains 7.74 per cent of the attention dissimilarity in the 
Conclusions (squared eigenvalues). Reading the dimension from top to bottom, the 
line starts with macroeconomics, and moves to a mix of expenditure and regulatory 
domains at some distance, then continues with interior policies – civil rights, law and 
crime, and immigration – and ends with defence and foreign affairs at the other 
extreme. This dimension seems to reflect the presence or lack of an economic 
character of the discussed issue. It follows Nugent’s (2010: 281-282) crude 
classification of EU policies in two groups: economic and non-economic ones. This is 
a simplified version of the typology of EU policies proposed by Hix and Høyland 
(2011) consisting of five categories: expenditure (distributive and redistributive), 
macroeconomic, regulatory, interior, and foreign policies. The close positioning on the 
MDS map of many topics of expenditure, regulatory and interior policy types suggests 
that the crude generalisation of issues within a policy area might conceal blurring of 
policy types. For example, while in the EU agriculture would be foremost considered 
an expenditure policy, it also contains many regulatory aspects. Or the topic of foreign 




also features political aspects such as measures towards a fair international trade 
system. An exploration of the longitudinal developments of this dimension can shed 
better light on the plausibility of the interpretation.  
 
Temporal Changes in Dimensionality 
The next step in the analysis is to conduct MDS on subsequent overlapping time 
windows of three terms in order to explore how the salience of issue character has 
evolved over time. Figure 3.3 displays the share of dissimilarity in attention explained 
by the first two dimensions.35 The temporal MDS analysis shows that the distinction 
between core and non-core themes has permanently been the most dominant type of 
issue character determining the allocation of attention. The second dimension 
underpinned by the economic character of issues has also continuously played a role 
even if mostly a minor one. In a few periods though it has demonstrated rises in 
importance, accounting for over 10 or 15 per cent of the dissimilarity in attention. The 
highest peaks were in the first half of 1985 and second half of 1988, where economic 
character explained 28 and 45 per cent of the attention dissimilarity. Thus, it seems 
that more often than not economic character has played a role in the motivation to 
distribute attention across issues in the European Council. While most of the time its 
role has been negligible, in a few cases it has enjoyed stronger saliency, reducing the 
explanatory power of core themes as a characteristic driving attention size. Before 
delving further into the reasons behind these shifts in the prominence of D2, let us 
explore the placement of issues on it in two periods of high fraction of explained 
dissimilarity – the first halves of 1985 and 2001.  
During the period January-June 1985 (Presidency 21) the European Council held 2 
meetings. The temporal dimensionality plot measuring the dissimilarity between this 
six-month term and its subsequent and preceding ones, shows that the salience of D2 
increased  to 28.31  per  cent. Figure  3.4 A  shows  the placement  of  issues  on   the 
                                                          
35 The sum of the two does not equal 100 percent whenever additional dimensions account for 
the total explained variance.  





Figure 3.3. Temporal changes in prominence of issue character of the European 
Council agenda 
economic character line. Several topics, in particular governance, business and science 
and technology demonstrate a more pronounced economic character. A closer look at 
the specific issues discussed in the Conclusions confirms this logic. Two major aspects 
of governmental affairs were the reports by the ad hoc Committees on People’s 
Europe and Institutional Affairs. Both of them had a strong focus on completing the 
Internal Market. This was the central topic within the category business as well. The 
theme science and technology featured a commitment to increasing the Community 
resources for research and development and also showed a link to the Common 
Market. Thus, the prominence of the Single Market issue and linking of other topics 
to it reflected an emphasis on the economic character of the agenda. Notably, the 
economic dimension was accentuated in reference to matters of both core and non-
core themes. 
Figure 3.4 B presents D2 for the time window around the 53rd Presidency, covering 





Figure 3.4. Economic issue character (D2) on temporal windows for presidencies 21 
(A) and 53 (B) 
rising elements of economic character in the areas of social policy, employment, 
business and environment. Exploring the nature of the issues discussed at the two 
meetings, a special focus on modernising the European Social Model is visible. This 
framework included adaptation of social protection systems in the context of ageing 
populations, promotion of social inclusion, modernisation of labour markets, 
A B




improvements in employment mobility, etc. The need to meet employment targets 
was also stressed. The acceleration of economic reform was envisaged first of all via 
exploiting the potential of the Internal Market. Besides that, the EU Sustainable 
Development Strategy set a focus on coordinating economic, social and employment 
policies. In short, various topics became more prominent because they were presented 
in economic light – drawing on economic targets and goals, leaning to use of 
macroeconomic instruments, and linking performance in other sectors to the 
economic policy.  
Thus, the overall dimensionality structure of the European Council agenda constitutes 
a rather fixed space of two lines of issue character, the saliency of which however 
varies over time. While core issues always receive more attention, adding a stronger 
economic connotation to topics can also lead to higher attention. The key question is 
under what conditions the second dimension can rise in prominence. The next section 
proposes an answer to this question.  
 
Explaining Salience of Economic Issue Character 
In order to understand what drives the changing mode of salience in economic 
character, we need information about the European Council and its context, 
associated with economic matters. First relevant factor could be the ideological 
composition of the body, measured in terms of overall left-right preferences. While 
exiting research shows that most of the issues discussed by the European Council cut 
across the traditional party line, party politicization in this institution is possible 
(Tallberg & Johansson, 2008). It seems logical to expect ideology to have an effect 
exactly on the economic character of the agenda, with a stronger emphasis of this 
dimension during stronger left-wing orientation periods. In order to measure the left-
right position of the European Council at a given moment, a variable is constructed 
on the basis of the data in the Comparative Manifesto Project classifying the position 
of political parties on this continuum (Volkens et al., 2011). Using information from 




member state (Döring & Manow, 2012), the left-right standing of each individual 
government can be determined. The mean value of all member states is recorded as a 
general score for the right-left position of the European Council, available up to the 
first half of 2006.36 The overall expectation for ideology is the following: 
H1. The more left-wing the European Council, the more salient the economic character of its agenda. 
Other factors with potential influence on the saliency of economic character of the 
agenda can be derived from indicators for the state of the economy. In particular, it 
would be relevant to consider GDP growth, level of government deficit, 
unemployment and consumer confidence in the economy. While the first measure is a 
standard way of estimating how well or bad the economy is doing overall, government 
deficit and unemployment have been relevant keywords in EU jargon over the course 
of the integration project viewed with a sense of urgency. Adding consumer 
confidence includes a citizens’ estimation of how well the economy is performing. 
Data on GDP growth of the EU is available via the OECD and for the other three 
indicators via Eurostat. Unfortunately, the some estimates (government deficit and 
consumer confidence) are available after 1995 only. Due to the annual availability of 
two indicators (government deficit and GDP growth), the yearly scores are assigned 
corresponding to each of the two half annual terms. The general expectation for all 
indicators is based on a problem – solution logic, with the European Council 
emphasising agenda items in economic terms whenever exacerbation of economic 
problems take place and avoiding to do so in times of   economic advance. In 
particular, this suggests the following hypotheses: 
H2. Rising GDP growth results in less salient economic character of the agenda. 
H3. Rising government deficit leads to more salient economic character of the agenda. 
H4. Rising unemployment brings about more salient economic character of the agenda. 
H5. Rising consumer confidence results in less salient economic character of the agenda. 
                                                          
36 Due to missing data on some of the new member states and Greece since July 2004, the 
average calculation includes less than all countries. 




Last but not least, we need to control for changes in the institutional leeway in 
addressing issues, which can be measured via the total number of meetings per 
semester. The final dataset covers 23 semesters in the period 1995 – mid-2006. Before 
estimating the regression equation a number of data checks are performed, confirming 
normality and homoskedasticity of the residuals37, stationarity of the data, lack of 
autocorrelation of the errors38, and no multicollinearity across the independent 
variables. Therefore, an analysis via an OLS regression would have been justified. 
However, our dependent variable is bound between the theoretical values of 0 and 
100 (minimum and maximum explained variance in MDS), which might yield 
inconsistent OLS regression estimates. A solution for this problem is to use tobit, a 
censored regression where the upper and lower limits of the dependent variable can 
be pre-set.39 Table 3.1 presents the results.40  
Two of the predictors – ideology and government deficit – have significant effects on 
the economic character of the agenda in the expected directions. For a one unit move 
towards the right side of the left-right ideological dimension of the European Council, 
the economic character of the agenda becomes less prominent with 1.51 per cent. 
One unit increase in the government deficit (measured in net lending/borrowing as a 
per cent of GDP) of the EU is associated with 2.29 units growth in the predicted 
value of economic character. GDP growth, unemployment and consumer confidence 
do not have a statistically significant effect, and neither does the frequency of summit 
meetings.  
Despite some inefficiencies in the data, especially the short time frame, the fact that a 
significant relationship with some predictors is found is remarkable. Overall it seems 
that political ideology matters in the European Council when it comes to politicising 
                                                          
37 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity is used. 
38 No serial correlation was detected applying the Durbin-Watson statistic, as well as the 
Durbin’s alternative and the Breusch–Godfrey tests. 
39 Fractional logit is another possibility but due to the low numbers of observations vis-à-vis 
dependent variables, tobit is preferred. 
40 Applying the linktest and ovtest commands in Stata, the model appears to be correctly 




issues in terms of economic character. One specific indicator also has an effect, but a 
range of others   do not. Notably, government deficit, which has become a keyword in 
EU political rhetoric in the last few years, has had an agenda-structuring effect already 
since at least the mid-1990s. The different patterns in the dependent variable until the 
early 1990s and ever since suggest that we should be careful with generalisations over 
the full time period. The early years of the European Council when its agenda-setting 
role was less noticeable and the Community did not have so large competences might 
be subject to different explanations.  
 
 Tobit 
Right-Left -1. 505*** 
 (.363) 
GDP Growth 1.048 
 (2.150) 




Consumer Confidence -.173 
 (.540) 








Standard errors in parentheses 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3.1. Explaining variation in the economic character of the European Council 
agenda, 1995-2006 
 





The central claim of this chapter is that it is possible to unravel the factors 
determining the overall composition of political agendas if we rely on the notion of 
issue character as an intermediary step. The empirical value of this claim was 
presented on the basis of an analysis of political attention in the European Council, a 
crucial informal player in the EU with strong agenda-setting powers. The approach 
consists of two steps. It starts by examining the longitudinal spread of attention to 
policy topics across equal time periods via a dimensionality reduction technique with 
the aim of extracting the types of issue character that structure the level of attention. 
In the second phase temporal changes in the salience of issue character are used as a 
dependent variable vis-à-vis a number of theoretically relevant predictors associated 
with the participants in the policy process and their context. Finally, the model 
consists of endogenous and exogenous factors which influence the saliency of issue 
character over time, which in turn determines the overall level of attention allocation 
to various topics on the agenda. 
Analysing the content-coded Conclusions of the European Council, two issue 
character lines appear to structure the attention: core – non-core themes and 
economic – non-economic ones. The first dimension corresponds with findings of 
previous research and is in line with the primary role expectation for the institution – 
to draw the political framework for development of the EU. The second dimension is 
the real discovery, since although being mostly low-key sometimes it rises in saliency 
at the expense of its stronger counterpart. Thus, problematizing certain issues in 
economic terms has led to more attention to these matters, even when they were non-
core themes. The emphasis of economic elements in various issues is a reflection of 
the rising prominence of an economic issue character dimension of the agenda. The 
changing saliency in economic issue character can be explained by factors related to 
the participants in the agenda-setting process and their context. For the European 
Council, the political ideology of the body was used as a relevant example of the first, 
and a range of economic indicators as instances of the second. The results show a 
positive effect of left-wing positioning in the European Council and rising 




indications, such as GDP growth, unemployment level, or consumer confidence 
might not play a role.   
The empirical application of the two-step agenda-setting model demonstrates well the 
utility of using this approach in order to understand the logic behind overall agenda 
composition. But foremost it reveals vital new information about the functioning of 
the European Council and its motives in discussing policy matters. We know now that 
the EU top does not only dedicate substantial attention to the issues core to the 
functioning of the Community and its institutions, and their survival. Non-core 
themes can be defined as problems on another dimension – emphasizing elements of 
economic character – and in this way gain prominence. The two brief case 
descriptions demonstrated how this happened for social policy, employment, 
environment, and other matters in two different periods. The necessary conditions for 
such issue character emphasis are found in pro-leftist orientation of the European 
Council and increasing government spending resulting in deficit.  
Our knowledge of how to bridge issue attention determinants with the broad 
composition of political agendas has moved a step ahead. Using the notion of issue 
character as a bridging component appears a theoretically viable and empirically 
justifiable tool. Future research should expand the study of the functioning of the 
two-step agenda-setting model towards other EU institutions in order to see whether 
the same dimensions play a role there and to what extent. This can enable more fined-
grained analyses of institutional interactions and informal distribution of tasks across 
EU levels. The approach should also be applied to non-EU venues, as this can give 






4. National Interest versus the Common 
Good: The Presidency in European 
Council Agenda Setting41 
Co-authored with Arco Timmermans 
 
Abstract 
The European Council is an institution which brings together the Heads of State, or 
Governments of the EU Member States. For the Presidency, preparing the agenda of 
European Council meetings involves a tension between loyalties. Existing research is 
divided over the question whether the Presidency pushes its domestic policy agenda 
on the EU level. Using empirical data on the Conclusions of European Council 
meetings, and national executive speeches presented annually in five Member States, 
this article investigates the relationship between the policy agendas of the EU and its 
constituent countries. It tests whether national issue attention of the Presidency holder 
dominates the European Council agenda. The findings suggest that having the 
Presidency does not provide a de facto institutional advantage for agenda-setting 
power for any of the countries in the sample. The analysis points out that normative 
and political constrains limit the leeway of presiding Member States to push for 
domestic agenda preferences in the European Council. 
 
  
                                                          
41 Reprinted from Alexandrova, P., & Timmermans, A. (2013). National Interest versus the 
Common Good: The Presidency in European Council Agenda Setting. European Journal of 




The European Council Presidency and Agenda Setting 
When in December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, a ‘permanent’ 
President of the European Council was appointed for a renewable term of 2.5 years. 
This institutional change was seen as the removal of the opportunity to hoist the 
‘national flag’ in the European Council (Wessels & Traguth, 2010). Until the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Presidency of the EU rotated every half year between Member States. 
This office entailed a set of tasks, responsibilities and costs that each Member State 
took upon itself when its turn had come. The symbolic meaning of chairing the 
European integration process for half a year was mixed with hopes and expectations 
for exercising influence and leaving a mark on the agenda. Some even saw abuse of 
the institutional privilege of the Presidency for domestic interests. This article analyses 
the extent to which the Presidency actually entailed such advantage in agenda setting. 
A key venue of attention and agenda setting during the term of a Presidency is the 
European Council. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council was an unofficial 
institution where EU leaders met, but it had, and still has, remarkable powers. The 
Council became operative in 1975 as an intergovernmental body composed of the 
Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the EU.42 It does not have a 
formally fixed term of office, and its composition changes constantly as executives in 
the Member States change. As the highest body of political decision making in the 
EU, the European Council is expected to express the common interest and unity 
among its members on a broad range of topics. It also takes the lead in designing the 
institutional architecture of the EU. The number of meetings during each six-month 
Presidency initially fluctuated between one and two, but since the late 1990s, having 
three or four meetings (some of them usually informal) also became common. 
The use of the institutional position of the EU Presidency received some scholarly 
attention, but only rarely with a focus on the European Council as opposed to the 
Council of Ministers. This is surprising given the central role of the former in EU 
agenda setting and influence in other Union institutions (Princen & Rhinard, 2006; 
                                                          




Werts, 2008). Much of the existing work analyses single Presidencies held for six 
months and considers success or failure in terms of leadership, ambition, skills of 
negotiation and brokerage, as well as the ability to implement the initial programme.43 
These evaluations sometimes focus on particular issues pushed up or down the 
agenda during a Presidency term. For example, in a study of the Portuguese 
Presidency in the second half of 2007, Ferreira-Pereira (2008: 69) observes that ‘the 
Portuguese government succeeded in uploading certain specificities of national foreign 
policy to the European level’. Accounts of single Presidencies, however, may not be 
representative of the level of national influence whenever the institutional privileges 
associated with the Presidency are used. As Schout and Vanhoonacker (2006: 1073) 
note, assessments of single terms often are ‘strongly influenced by the heat of the 
moment’. 
Beyond such evaluations, there are a few general studies analysing Presidencies across 
countries.44 Research on the three Scandinavian Member States suggests that the 
Presidency functions mostly as an amplifier of national interests (Bengtsson, 
Elgström, & Tallberg, 2004). Likewise, in a study on Presidencies held by seven 
countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Elgström and Tallberg (2003: 193) 
conclude that ‘the core property of Presidency priorities [is that] they constitute 
national interests’. These observations suggest that Member States holding the 
Presidency, first of all, use this position of institutional privilege to influence the EU 
agenda. However, other studies emphasise the limits of Presidency agenda-setting 
power. Behavioural norms of neutrality, consensus-building and effectiveness are 
considered to be constraints on the possibilities for agenda influence (Niemann & 
Mak, 2010). Similar effects are ascribed to unfavourable domestic political conditions 
(Bunse, 2009; Kirchner, 1992; Quaglia & Moxon-Browne, 2006) or to factors related 
to the nature of the European Council – in particular the inheritance of items from 
                                                          
43 See, e.g., Peter Ludlow’s Briefing Notes, Presidency evaluations in the Journal of Common 
Market Studies Annual Reviews, occasional papers of the Swedish Institute for European Policy 
Studies (SIEPS) and some others cited in this article. 
44 Several cross-country comparative analyses of Presidency power exist with respect to a single 




previous meetings and the attention given to focusing events (Bunse, 2009; Hayes-
Renshaw & Wallace, 2006a; Princen & Rhinard, 2006; Thomson, 2008; Voss & 
Bailleul, 2002; Warntjen, 2008a; 2008b). 
The existing literature thus presents conflicting views on the agenda-setting power of 
the Presidency. This article empirically juxtaposes the two rival claims on the use of 
this institutional venue for agenda setting by the presiding country. Using data on 
policy agendas of the European Council and the governments of five Member States, 
we analyse whether holding the Presidency makes a difference for a Member State’s 
influence over the European agenda. The analysis comprises the entire period of 
existence of the European Council. The article proceeds as follows. First, we discuss 
the institutional properties of the European Council and its Presidency. Second, we 
depict two rival hypotheses for Presidency effect. After describing our methods and 
data, we present a survey of existing case studies on Council Presidencies and relate 
the findings to our data. Next, we conduct fractional logit regressions in order to 
answer our main research question, and analyse the results. Finally, we discuss 
implications of our findings and indicate ways for further research. 
 
Institutional Properties of the European Council and its 
Presidency 
The European Council came into existence in 1975 after some twenty years of 
irregular summitry (von Donat, 1987). The office of the Presidency45 dates further 
back in time. It is one of the oldest structural elements in the Community, first 
referred to in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which stipulates that the ‘office of President 
shall be held for a term of six months by each member of the Council in turn’. As 
Werts (1992) argues, the establishment of the European Council created a new 
function – the President-in-Office of the European Council – a crucial role, which 
entailed a position of spokesman for the Member States and chief person in charge of 
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the meetings organised by this new body. Thus, with the introduction of regular 
meetings of the Heads of State and Government, in 1975, the status of the EU 
Presidency was elevated further (von Donat, 1987) and acquired more responsibilities 
(Kirchner, 1992). The European Council meetings became ‘the president’s show’ 
(Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006a: 178).With growing enlargement, it became 
increasingly difficult to take the positions of all leaders into account and countries had 
to wait longer for their turn in office. This led to worries about the Presidency 
becoming overburdened, or even inert, and prompted the Heads of State and 
Government to seek a better solution for chairing meetings. With the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon, a ‘permanent’ President was introduced for the European 
Council, while the rotating Presidency system was maintained for meetings of the 
Council of Ministers. 
The European Council is considered the informal agenda setter of the EU (Werts, 
1992; 2008) and an institution at the ‘heart of EU decision making’ with respect to the 
‘overall parameters of the EU system’ (Nugent, 2010: 162-163). Although the 
European Commission has a monopoly over legislative initiatives, the impulse for 
legislative proposals often comes from the European Council. At their meetings, the 
Heads of State and Government are free to discuss any issue they consider relevant 
(Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006a; Nugent, 2010; Werts, 2008).The functions of the 
European Council may lead us to expect a bias towards foreign policy, EU 
institutional architecture and economic development, but in reality a broad range of 
topics within (and beyond) Community decision making is addressed (Alexandrova et 
al., 2012; Werts, 2008).The ‘European Council Conclusions’46 are the instruments 
through which the institution exercises its agenda-setting power (Hayes-Renshaw & 
Wallace, 2006a).These documents contain the issues that have been discussed by the 
Heads of State and Government and the agreements that have been reached. The EU 
leaders often directly delegate a task to the institutions and even Member States: they 
ask the Commission to investigate a problem or make proposals, urge the Council to 
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The terms ‘European Council Conclusions’, ‘Presidency Conclusions’ and ‘the Conclusions’ 




speed up decision making, establish a new committee to draw a report on a hot topic 
(e.g., the Committee of Wise Men), encourage Member States to coordinate their 
policies in a particular field and so on. However, the European Council also acts as a 
final arbiter on complex questions and solely takes decisions on key appointments and 
changes in the institutional infrastructure of the Community. Therefore, the 
Conclusions represent an agenda at midpoint of the policy process – receiving input 
signals from other institutions, but also producing output decisions (Alexandrova et 
al., 2012). In short, the Conclusions have both a direct and an indirect impact on the 
agenda of the EU at different stages of the policy process. 
The ways in which the Presidency can leave its mark on the Council are diverse as the 
office includes multiple functions. Existing research on the EU Presidency points to 
four categories of functions: administrative, leadership, coordinating and 
representative (Elgström, 2003b; Kirchner, 1992; Niemann & Mak, 2010; Quaglia & 
Moxon-Browne, 2006; Tallberg, 2006). They are all relevant for the European Council 
Presidency (Werts, 1992; 2008). In practice, they involve the preparation of meetings 
and the discussion agenda, as well as technical organisation of the summits 
(administrative role), chairing the meetings and ensuring consensus in decision making 
(leadership and moderation roles), cooperation with the Union institutions – in 
particular the European Commission and the European Parliament – and 
representation of the EU position in relation to third countries, international 
organisations and the media (coordinating and representative roles). 
In agenda setting, the Presidency can use various mechanisms to promote topics that 
are of major domestic importance. First, it can propose political initiatives, press for 
the inclusion of discussion points and structure the agenda. The drafting and 
finalisation of European Council Conclusions play a key role here. For example, 
Sweden – a promoter of environmental issues – managed to achieve an agreement on 
an EU strategy for sustainable development at the Göteborg European Council in 
June 2001, which received broad attention in the Conclusions (Bjurulf, 2003). Second, 
during meetings, the Presidency can moderate the discussions and allocate time for 
addressing different topics. This may even involve pushing a topic away from the 




leads to minimal attention to the topic in the Conclusions. For example, in its focus 
on a single core priority – enlargement – the Danish Presidency of 2002 managed to 
‘put on the backburner’ a pressing and recurring issue: the Convention on the Future 
of Europe (Bengtsson et al., 2004; Friis, 2003).Third, since the 1990s it is common for 
the Presidency to organise informal and special (thematic) European Council meetings 
besides the general ones.47 These special summits are held in order to address specific 
topics, as was the case with the Birmingham European Council of 1992, which 
adopted a declaration on ‘community close to its citizens’ and the November meeting 
of the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, which produced an agreement on 
employment. While informal meetings usually do not produce Conclusions, they are 
convened in order to create a comfortable atmosphere for building consensus in 
formal summits that follow. 
 
Two Rival Expectations about Presidency Agenda Setting 
While the office of the Presidency provides opportunities for leaving a national mark 
on the European Council agenda, the literature disagrees over the de facto utilisation 
of this institutional advantage. One expectation about the actual agenda-setting power 
of the Presidency is the exploitation of the office for the pursuit of national goals. 
Tallberg (2008b) suggests that agenda management is one of the core powers of the 
Presidency. This includes possibilities for influencing the agenda via introduction of 
new issues, placing emphasis on particular issues and excluding issues from the agenda 
(Tallberg, 2003a). Such agenda management possibilities may lead Member States in 
charge of the office to promote and push national interests (Sherrington, 2000; van 
Grinsven, 2003). Some empirical evidence exists in support of this view (Elgström & 
Tallberg, 2003). A number of case studies present examples of countries that managed 
to upload national interests and shift attention to domestically preferred topics on the 
EU agenda (Garel-Jones, 1993; Manners, 2003; Morata & Fernández, 2003). Particular 
utilisation of the office even made some scholars suggest that expression of national 
                                                          




interests is among the tasks of each Presidency (Schout & Vanhoonacker, 2005). 
Although this notion is generally contested (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; Kietz, 2007), it 
suggests there is no clear division between the political position of the Member State 
and the institutional logic of appropriateness for holding the Presidency. Often, 
attempts are made to present initiatives and preferred policies as European – that is, as 
benefiting the whole Community. Wessels (2008a) notes that the Presidency always 
provides political impulses by linking domestic interests to EU plans and projects. 
This increases the chances of getting a proposal accepted and allows for integrating 
national priorities. For an issue to be discussed in the EU arena it needs to be framed 
as an EU problem in need of EU action, and not just national consideration (Princen, 
2009).Yet a ‘truly European’ policy image may be a cover for what is actually a 
national interest.48 While the Presidency may be tempted to influence agendas on 
various levels in the EU, the politically elevated position of the European Council 
means that its agenda would be the primary target. As an intergovernmental 
institution, the European Council typically is an arena associated with the national 
interests of Member States (Tallberg & Johansson, 2008).The informal nature of the 
Conclusions, and their important implications for EU policy making, add to this 
choice of venue for promoting topics of national importance when a Member State 
controls the Presidency. 
A rival expectation about the effective agenda-setting power of the Presidency is that 
common matters prevail over topics derived from the national political agenda. This 
expectation is based on the neutrality norm, codified in the Presidency Handbook of 
the Council Secretariat (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 
1997), and the assumptions that the Presidency should strive for consensus building 
and effectiveness in joint action (Elgström, 2003b; Niemann & Mak, 2010). These 
norms are meant to help avoid national interests from becoming dominant during a 
Presidency term, even though no formal sanctions are applied in case of violation. A 
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Presidency may observe the norms in order to present itself as a reliable partner, 
committed to the goals of European integration (see e.g. Verhoeff & Niemann, 
2011).It also may trade off issues of lesser importance and consider it in its national 
interest to smooth the process of agreement within the European Council (Bunse, 
2009; Niemann & Mak, 2010). Such process goals differ from pursuing substantive 
policy interests upon which other Member States may disagree. Finally, the neutrality 
norm also appears by default when a presiding country simply is unable to construct 
the agenda in its preferred way as other Member States do not support the priority list 
or openly disagree with it. For this reason, Presidency norm compliance sometimes 
may be seen as contingent on the Member State’s ‘individual will’ and the ‘ability to 
violate’ (Niemann & Mak, 2010: 733-734). 
Besides norms, two other sets of factors may constrain the Presidency and its use of 
the institutional advantage. One is related to domestic political conditions, the other to 
the nature of the European Council as an institution in the EU policy process. 
Elections and subsequent problems in forming coalition governments, or unstable 
cabinets, hinder strategies of national interest. If national actors, such as coalition 
parties, fail to agree over a common agenda, or even fail to build a viable government 
to begin with, the ‘national interest’ in agenda setting and prioritising matters for 
immediate consideration acquires little meaning (Bunse, 2009; Kirchner, 1992). 
Referenda on EU issues or Eurosceptic public opinion may have similar distorting 
effects on setting clear targets of national interest. Furthermore, it is argued that at 
European Council meetings items often are inherited from previous summits 
(Thomson, 2008; Warntjen, 2008a) and drafts of the Conclusions are prepared at 
lower levels beforehand, making the European Council a rubber-stamping device 
(Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006a). In addition, focus events such as international 
conflicts, disasters and major political or economic shocks limit the agenda space for 
the Presidency to address those issues listed according to its preference (Bunse, 2009; 
Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006a; Princen & Rhinard, 2006; Princen, 2009; Voss & 
Bailleul, 2002).Time and attention of EU leaders is always scarce. Thus, domestic 




to events are said to limit the freedom of manoeuvre and the strategic opportunity for 
a Member State holding the Presidency.49 
In short, there are two distinct expectations on how EU Member States perform when 
in charge of the Presidency of the European Council. Whether the position of 
institutional advantage is exploited for pursuing topics of national importance, or is 
used for consensus building and the common good as Presidency norms prescribe 
also depends on other conditions relating to domestic decision capacity and the 
agenda space of the European Council in the broader EU policy process. The 
Presidency is potentially a powerful position in EU agenda setting, but expectations 
about the actual exercise of this power need more confrontation with systematic 
empirical data. We turn to this task in the next sections. 
 
Analysing Agenda Impact 
If the Presidency is used to follow topics of national importance in European Council 
agenda setting, we may expect that the Member State holding the office tries to dictate 
what issues get attention within its six-month term. We prefer to speak of ‘topics of 
national importance on the domestic agenda’ rather than use the rather ambiguous 
term ‘national interest’. How is it to be determined whether this type of agenda effect 
actually happens? Analysis of Presidency programmes may reveal some of the national 
priorities, but these are only the input to European Council meetings. Moreover, the 
programmes have changed over time and since 2003 they officially come in form of 
multi-annual strategic plans and annual operational programmes, involving more than 
one country in the agenda schedules. A more systematic approach to measure 
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for venue access in the EU. In general, however, they are considered constraints on the 




Presidency influence on the European Council agenda requires analysis of the national 
policy agenda relative to the immediate output of European Council meetings. 
Topics of major national importance emerge when domestic preferences are 
aggregated and presented in the view of the political leadership of the country. Useful 
indicators of this kind of national expression are the executive policy agendas that are 
produced annually. These agendas often are presented in speech form to the broader 
public, and this underlines government commitment to their content beyond the 
symbolic, and sometimes ceremonial, aims of the event of presentation. Executive 
speeches are, for the most part, containers of substantive policy and legislative 
intentions (Breeman et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2011; John & Jennings, 2010).The 
European Council agenda is formalised in the Presidency Conclusions. Recent 
research shows that these Conclusions are an agenda containing both input elements, 
and items further in the policy process, towards producing output decisions 
(Alexandrova et al., 2012). This research shows also that attention shifts on the agenda 
occur with a magnitude similar to executive policy programmes in nation-states. While 
there are differences between the institutions, the agendas they produce are indicators 
of attention to policy topics at both national and European level that allow 
comparison. 
We use a dataset of European Council Conclusions covering the entire period since 
this institution became operative in 1975.A Presidency semester contains between one 
and three Conclusions, which we aggregate per half-year term. To estimate national 
agenda effects, we analyse national executive speeches presented immediately before a 
Presidency term (see Appendix 4.1).50 We take a sample of five EU Member States for 
which systematic data on annual executive policy agendas are available. The five 
countries are: Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
These countries represent variation in size and length of EU membership, and each 
has taken the Presidency of the Council several times. We exclude two Presidency 
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terms in the analysed period: Denmark in 1987, which produced no written 
Conclusions; and Spain in 2010, when the permanent President of the European 
Council was already active as the Lisbon Treaty took force the year before. The 
analysis covers a total of 25 Presidency terms over the period 1976–2008.  
All documents are content coded at quasi-sentence level by different national teams 
using country and EU versions of the codebook developed in the Comparative 
Agendas Project, which contains some twenty major policy topic categories and over 
200 subtopics.51 In this analysis we use only the major topics. Some adjustments of 
categories were made.52 The final coding scheme includes 22 policy fields (see 
Appendix 4.2). The length of national executive speeches varies, as does the volume 
of text in the Conclusions. Therefore, we analyse attention to policy topics as shares 
of the whole agenda, and not in terms of absolute numbers of statements. While the 
minimum attention given to a single topic is 0 per cent, the maximum varies between 
27 and 66 per cent (see Table 4.1).The mean topic attention on each agenda is 4.54 
per cent and the standard deviation ranges between 4.3 and 8.3 per cent. Jurisdictional 
boundaries do not affect the types of agendas we are studying. The European Council 
often discusses issues beyond the decision-making powers of the EU institutions, and 
national executives also experience no constraints in this respect. While there is 
variation in the attention to topics across the agendas, the functional similarity 
between the executive speeches and the Conclusions is manifested further in general 
attention scores. The two most prominent themes on the European Council and all 
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52 Most significantly, the topic ‘immigration’ was created (initially not present as a major topic 
in all country codebooks) out of the subcategories ‘migrant workers’ and ‘immigration and 
refugees issues/rights’. Also, in order to be able to account for domestic views on the 
European integration process, and make this comparable to EU-level discussions of the same 
issues, a new topic – ‘European institutional design’ – was created, which corresponds to EU 
issues in the country data and a few subtopics in the European Council data – namely 




the national executive agendas, except Spain,53 are foreign policy and 
macroeconomics. Topics such as agriculture, energy, science and technology, and 
culture rarely attract much attention from national leaders in the policy agendas they 
compose annually, in their home countries and at the summits. Each of these topics 















Mean .045 .045 .045 .045 .045 .045 
Standard 
deviation .071 .055 .065 .080 .043 .049 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum .470 .315 .325 .659 .273 .246 
Table 4.1. Summary descriptive statistics 
We test whether the attention to major topics on the agenda of a Member State can 
predict the attention given to these topics on the European agenda. This does not 
mean that we expect specific issues belonging to main policy fields to be exactly the 
same on both agendas, but if a topic is important at home, a country in pursuit of 
such national topic during its Presidency term may be expected to advocate broad 
attention to it on the European Council agenda. For example, if Denmark stresses 
environmental issues domestically and seeks to influence the European Council 
agenda in line with this national priority, this behaviour may be visible in more 
attention to the environment in the Conclusions. If no such effect occurs, this 
indicates absence of national topic driven influence on the European Council agenda. 
It must be appreciated that absence of effects of domestic topic pursuit may point to 
failing attempts to exploit institutional privilege, but such attempts are not given. As 
we mentioned above, the behavioural repertoire of the Presidency also includes 
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adherence to norms and rules as they emerged with the office. Member States taking 
the Presidency may refrain from pursuing domestic topics and interests and decide to 
act otherwise in agenda setting. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we conduct a survey of all available case 
studies on the 25 Presidencies held by the five countries in our sample. The case study 
selection is only based on studies discussing the use of the Presidency office for 
domestically important policy themes. Then we calculate simple Pearson correlations 
between the European Council agenda and the executive agenda of the Presidency 
holders. We match the main results of the case studies with the correlations in order 
to see how much the findings from individual case studies correspond to the 
correlations derived from our data. This first step is used for data validation. Then we 
proceed to the actual test for Presidency effect and conduct fractional logit 
regressions. Our dependent variable is the share of attention spent on a single topic 
on the agenda of the European Council. Since the agenda consists of 22 topics and 
the total attention for each time period is 100 per cent, the share of attention to a 
given topic can range between 0 (no attention to this topic) and 1 (all attention given 
to it). It is very unlikely that the agenda ever contains just one topic, but it may not 
always contain all topics at the same time. Some may not get any agenda space at 
different points in time. We use a fractional logit regression model, as proposed by 
Papke and Wooldridge (1996). This technique is developed specifically for dependent 
variables which represent proportions: range from 0 to 1 and can take many 
observations at the two extremes.54 
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which would allow us to systematically exclude observations below or above a certain 
threshold. However, this requires a normally distributed dependent variable – a condition 




Testing for Institutional Advantage in Agenda Setting 
Table 4.2 shows the Pearson correlations between the European Council agenda and 
the executive agenda of the country in charge of the Presidency. It also shows 
summarised findings from existing research addressing the actual level of pursuit of 
nationally important policy topics in the EU. Comparing the correlation scores with 
the results of these case studies, we can see high correspondence, validating our data. 
The survey of case studies shows that Presidencies with a reputed strong national 
imprint on the European agenda are the ones for which we find high agenda 
correlation levels. The reverse also appears true: lower correlations match with case 
study findings of Presidencies that did not, or could not, push for domestic 
preferences.55 Besides pointing out the relevance of our data for the comparative 
quantitative analysis we intend to undertake, these findings suggest some variation in 
the extent to which the two types of agendas are related during Presidency terms, and 
more often display low correlations. While sometimes a Presidency holder succeeds in 
advocating a domestic agenda in the European policy arena, this success is quite 
limited and occurs infrequently. 




Committed to efficiency and ‘tempered 
by cautious realism’ 




Leading goal of the Presidency – to 
present itself as a reliable and efficient 








Presidency accused of drift and 
pursuing of national agenda at the 







Attempting to profile Spain as a big 








Modest approach: no attempts to realise 
national priorities, acting rather as 
facilitator and honest broker 
van Keulen & 
Rood (2003) 
.336 
                                                          







Strong attempt for agenda-shaping: 
quite some level of achievement of 
domestic priorities, higher than during 
the previous British Presidency of 1992 




Absence of priorities and ambitious 
agenda: a Presidency overshadowed by 
one goal – signing the Treaty of Nice; 









Strategic player approach: trying to 
push for national interests within the 
limits of the institutionally designated 
role of a Presidency-holder; not 
managing to present its interests in a 
way that would seem acceptable for 







Double-sided goal: to convince the 
domestic public of the merits of 
European integration and the European 
partners in the European commitment 
of Denmark; successful in achieving 
major priorities (especially 
enlargement), while leaving other issues 








More stress on 'process management' 
than national priorities as a mean to 
increase Dutch standing internationally 
and 'feed' Europeanisation at home 






Not much leeway for initiative: a 
Presidency under the stamp of the 
negative referenda on the EU 
Constitution, expected to bring back on 







A 'hectic agenda' oriented towards 





Notes: * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed); ** significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) 
Table 4.2. Case study survey of national agenda effect of the Presidency and Pearson 
correlations of the European Council agenda and the national executive agenda of the 




We now turn to the fractional logit models for each of the five countries in our 
sample. Our independent variables are the proportions of attention to topics on each 
of the national executive agendas. We have created dummy variables to distinguish for 
each of the semesters in the analysed period, whether a country was presiding or not. 
By looking at the interaction effects between a national agenda and a Presidency 
dummy, we can see whether holding the Presidency makes a difference in influencing 
the European Council agenda. We report coefficients and marginal effects with robust 
standard errors and significance levels in Table 4.3. 
Model 1 shows that the national agendas of each of the five countries can significantly 
predict some share of the attention on the European Council agenda (at the 0.01 
level). When an interaction of the national agenda with the Presidency dummy is 
considered, significance drops far beyond any accepted level for all of the five 
countries, suggesting that there is no interaction. This means that overall, holding the 
Presidency does not make a difference in the influencing of the agenda of the 
European Council. The relatively low deviance of the logits suggests good model fit. 
Model 2 includes one additional variable – the count number of the Presidency – in 
order to control for the possible effect of changes in the European Council agenda 
over time. The variable is not significant in any of the five regressions, which indicates 
that the agenda did not change in a systematic way during in the analysed period. 
The coefficients of a fractional logit regression are hard to interpret directly; it is more 
meaningful to consider marginal effects. The marginal effect of the predictor variable 
is the derivative of the conditional probability of predicting the dependent variable. In 
our case, the marginal effects show how much change in the proportion of attention 
on the European Council agenda will be caused by a unit (i.e., 1 percentage point) 
attention change on any of the national agendas,56 measured at the average predicted 
mean for the European Council agenda. For example, the marginal effect of 1 unit 
increase of the share of attention to a single topic on the Danish executive agenda, 
                                                          
56 They also show how much change on the European Council agenda has been caused by the 





leads to a 0.33 percentage point increase in the share of attention to a given topic on 
the European Council agenda at its predicted mean of 4 per cent average topic 
attention. Similarly, a 1 percentage point attention share increase on the Spanish 
agenda produces a 0.23 percentage point rise in attention on the EU level at a 
predicted European Council attention mean of 4.3 per cent. For France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, a 1 percentage point increase of attention on 
their national agendas will lead to 0.20, 0.44 and 0.42 percentage point attention 
increases in the European Council at predicted average means of 4.1, 4.0 and 3.7 per 
cent, respectively.57 
While the separate models cannot be directly compared since they include different 
independent variables, considering the similar results of the predicted average mean 
for the EU agenda does allow us to draw conclusions. The findings suggest that some 
variation exists between the five countries in the extent to which the national 
executive agendas of each of these countries are related to the European Council 
agenda. A higher level of agenda-setting impact is observed for the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands, Denmark shows medium values, whereas Spain and France have 
the lowest impact. These cross-country differences, however, are small and thus 
should not be over-interpreted. 
 
 
                                                          
57 We have also conducted the analysis on a slightly modified dataset, where we divided the 
attention to one of the most prominent topics – foreign affairs – into four subcategories: 
foreign aid and human rights; international terrorism; international economic development; 
and other foreign policy and international affairs issues. This increased the N of our sample 
and allowed for a more fine-grained distinction of the themes within a contestably wide policy 
theme. The overall results of the fractional logits are the same: we find no support for the 
Presidency impact thesis and significant individual impact of each of the national agendas on 
the European one. Small differences exist in the size of the marginal effects. Conducting the 




 Coefficients RSE P-value Marginal effects RSE P-value 
AgendaDK 8.619 (.853) .000 .330 (.035) .000 
PrDK -.090 (.207) .664 -.003 (.008) .655 
AgendaDK*PrDK 1.045 (1.781) .558 .040 (.068) .558 
Constant -3.567 (.089) .000    
Deviance 35.236    
Pseudo-LL -75.809    
N 550    
AgendaES 5.365 (1.057) .000 .221 (.045) .000 
PrES .140 (.252) .578 .006 (.011) .593 
AgendaES*PrES -2.237 (1.767) .206 -.092 (.074) .212 
Constant -3.352 (.108) .000    
Deviance 23.701    
Pseudo-LL -50.447    
N 352    
AgendaFR 4.796 (.741) .000 .188 (.030) .000 
PrFR -.167 (.188) .375 -.006 (.007) .355 
AgendaFR*PrFR 2.772 (1.718) .107 .109 (.067) .105 
Constant -3.363 (.081) .000    
Deviance 36.831    
Pseudo-LL -76.607    
N 550    
AgendaNL 11.435 (1.102) .000 .437 (.046) .000 
PrNL -.045 (.198) .818 -.002 (.007) .816 
AgendaNL*PrNL .558 (2.283) .807 .021 (.087) .807 
Constant -3.698 (.095) .000    
Deviance 35.759    
Pseudo-LL -76.071    





AgendaUK 12.918 (.959) .000 .460 (.036) .000 
PrUK .122 (.199) .540 .004 (.008) .553 
AgendaUK*PrUK -1.759 (1.954) .368 -.063 (.070) .369 
Constant -3.857 (.095) .000    
Deviance 30.246    
Pseudo-LL -73.314    
N 550    
Notes: The table includes 5 separate models for each of the 5 countries.  
RSE = Robust standard errors, given in parentheses.  
Table 4.3. Fractional logit: predicting the European Council agenda by the national 
executive agendas and testing for Presidency effect 
 
Reconsidering the Image of the Presidency 
Our findings do not provide clear evidence for the expectation that the office of the 
Presidency of the European Council has induced incumbent Member States to pursue 
topics of national prominence in agenda setting in the EU. For the five countries 
included in this analysis, we did not find systematic increases in attention to topics on 
the European Council agenda, if such topics had gained prominence on the domestic 
executive agenda of the country taking the Presidency. If there is an effect on 
European Council agenda setting by Member States, this does not appear to depend 
on taking the Presidency position. But generally, such effects are also relatively limited. 
The analysis, covering more than thirty years, shows that Member States try and do 
influence the European Council agenda, but the observed pattern mostly contradicts 
the idea that the institutional advantage of the Presidency provides a special access 
point for such influence. In European Council agenda setting, until the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Presidency has hardly signified a primus inter pares position in the case where the 
Member State, in charge of this office, intended to elevate topics of national 




This result suggests that the alternative expectation about the institutional position of 
the Presidency is closer to the reality of European Council agenda setting. This rival 
expectation includes an emphasis on common problems, not on matters that have 
high priority on the national executive agenda. The Presidency is thus not capable, or 
simply has no intention, of leaving a strong national mark on the European Council 
agenda. The potential for influencing the agenda is attuned by the norms of neutrality, 
effectiveness and consensus building, enshrined in this office as well as by external 
constraints on agenda control. These constraints can be inherited topics waiting to be 
attended to, focus events that create a sense of urgency around issues not scheduled 
for broad consideration, domestic political instability, or stalemate hindering national 
priority setting and creating agenda ambiguity. Some of these factors may work as a 
constraint relative to other Member States raising matters for attention at the 
European Council agenda, from a position outside the spotlight of the Presidency. To 
what extent each of these factors is an obstacle, and under what conditions one is 
more important than another, remains to be studied. We found support for the claim 
that the institutional design of the European Council Presidency has not granted 
effective agenda-setting powers to single Member States during the semester term of 
this office. Instead, this office provides collective benefits to all Member States. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the launch of the office in 1975, the Presidency of the European Council has 
attracted the attention of academics and practitioners. The multiplicity of functions 
connected to it has opened possibilities for Member States, beginning a Presidency 
semester, to leave a mark on the office. Through the agenda-setting powers vested in 
this office, the Presidency may introduce new issues on the agenda, remove others or 
attribute salience. Some studies of specific Presidency terms contain empirical 
indication of the use of the office for the promotion of domestic interests and topics 
on the European agenda. Other work points to rather limited possibilities for national 
agenda influence on the Council when the country is the incumbent of the Presidency. 




In this article, we analysed 25 Presidency semesters of five different EU Member 
States throughout the period 1976–2008 in order to confront the different 
expectations with systematic empirical data. While for each country there is some 
effect from the national executive agenda on the first of the next following agenda of 
the European Council, the Presidency office does not appear to make a difference. 
The alleged institutional advantage of the Presidency in agenda setting has more 
diffused benefits which are not concentrated in the hands of the Member State in 
charge of this office. Political conditions and institutional norms further diffuse these 
agenda benefits. This may be good news for the balance of powers across Member 
States in setting the agenda of the EU, which is delicate and always sensitive to 
political disruption. It also means, however, that national influence on the European 
Council agenda is less structured by institutional design, and more by actual political 
power relationships between Member States. The European Council displays its 
intergovernmental nature. Our findings in this analysis also indicate that the 
introduction of a permanent President of the European Council has not removed a 
venue previously exploited for directing the European policy agenda towards domestic 
goals. In this sense, then, the agenda effects of the Presidency must be seen more in 
terms of balancing a diversity of national interests and topics raised by the Member 
States. 
This contribution focused on the recurring expectation in the literature that national 
priorities drive the formation of the European Council agenda when Member States 
are in charge of the Presidency. We must be cautious with empirical generalisation, 
but the variation in the sample of five Member States, and the long time frame of our 
analysis, provides good reasons to conclude that the institutional advantage hypothesis 
is not well grounded empirically. Our findings suggest some ways for further research 
on agenda setting in the European Council. Empirical work may be done to analyse 
how behavioural rules lead Member States taking the Presidency to perform the roles 
of balancing and diffusing benefits of attention to problems. What topics are sensitive 
to agenda inheritance, how do new issues intrude on the agenda, and what is the role 
of focus events that may propel issues that were not anticipated? Thus, the role of the 




and topics that were not foreseen within the time horizon of national leaders gathered 
in the European Council. Which issues are stickier on the agenda than others? Further 
empirical work also may link the study of agenda setting in the European Council and 
the actual leadership and negotiation powers manifest in the meetings held by this 
institution. How do informal meetings play a part; what is the composition of the 
agenda of such meetings compared to the formal Conclusions that are published? 
Finally, if national priorities to problems in the country with the Presidency are not 
imposed on the European Council agenda, is this maybe because policy agendas are 
converging between EU Member States? These types of analyses may help us to better 
understand how the EU, as a multi-layered political system, addresses major policy 
problems and to see how responsive it really is in the face of so much critique of 
democratic deficit. It also may help us understand how the Presidency is, above all, an 







Appendix 4.1. Timing of executive speeches and Presidencies  






July-Dec. 1976 7-10-1975 31-12-1975 16-9-1975   19-11-1975 
Jan.-June 1977 5-10-1976 31-12-1976 21-9-1976   24-11-1976 
Jan.-June 1978 4-10-1977 31-12-1977 20-9-1977   3-11-1977 
Jan.-June 1979 3-10-1978 31-12-1978 19-9-1978   1-11-1978 
Jan.-June 1981 7-10-1980 31-12-1980 16-9-1980   20-11-1980 
July-Dec. 1981 7-10-1980 31-12-1980 16-9-1980   20-11-1980 
July-Dec. 1982 6-10-1981 31-12-1981 15-9-1981   4-11-1981 
Jan.-June 1984 4-10-1983 31-12-1983 20-9-1983   22-6-1983 
Jan.-June 1986 1-10-1985 31-12-1985 17-9-1985   6-11-1985 
July-Dec. 1986 1-10-1985 31-12-1985 17-9-1985 15-10-1985 6-11-1985 
Jan.-June 1989 4-10-1988 31-12-1988 20-9-1988 24-2-1988 22-11-1988 
July-Dec. 1989 4-10-1988 31-12-1988 20-9-1988 24-2-1988 22-11-1988 
July-Dec. 1991 2-10-1990 31-12-1990 18-9-1990 4-12-1989 7-11-1990 
July-Dec. 1992 1-10-1991 31-12-1991 17-9-1991 20-3-1991 31-10-1991 
Jan.-June 1993 6-10-1992 31-12-1992 15-9-1992 24-3-1992 6-5-1992 
Jan.-June 1995 4-10-1994 31-12-1994 20-9-1994 19-4-1994 16-11-1994 
July-Dec. 1995 4-10-1994 31-12-1994 20-9-1994 19-4-1994 16-11-1994 
Jan.-June 1997 1-10-1996 31-12-1996 17-9-1996 3-5-1996 23-10-1996 
Jan.-June 1998 7-10-1997 31-12-1997 16-9-1997 11-6-1997 14-5-1997 
July-Dec. 2000 5-10-1999 31-12-1999 21-9-1999 22-6-1999 17-11-1999 
Jan.-June 2002 2-10-2001 31-12-2001 18-9-2001 26-6-2001 20-6-2001 
July-Dec. 2002 2-10-2001 31-12-2001 18-9-2001 26-6-2001 20-6-2001 
July-Dec. 2004 7-10-2003 31-12-2003 16-9-2003 30-6-2003 26-11-2003 
July-Dec. 2005 5-10-2004 31-12-2004 21-9-2004 15-4-2004 23-11-2004 
July-Dec. 2008 2-10-2007 31-12-2007 18-9-2007 4-7-2007 6-11-2007 
Note: Countries holding the Presidency indicated in light grey boxes. Executive 
agenda of Spain considered only after the country became a member of the EU (i.e. 





Appendix 4.2. Matched policy agendas codes 
Macroeconomics  









Law and Crime  
Social Welfare 
Regional Policy and Housing Issues 
Banking, Finance and Domestic Commerce 
Defence 
Space, Technology and Communications 
Foreign Trade 
Foreign Affairs 
Government Operations  
Public Lands and Water Management 
Culture  








5. Political Responsiveness in Multi-Level 
Systems: The case of the European 
Union 
Co-authored with Anne Rasmussen 
 
Abstract 
Political responsiveness in multi-level systems is complex due to difficulties in 
transmitting information between voters and politicians but has received sparse 
attention. We conduct the first study of rhetorical responsiveness in the EU by 
relating the public’s prioritization of policy issues to the European Council’s agenda. 
Our analyses show aggregate evidence of political responsiveness despite frequent 
criticism of the EU’s democratic deficit. However, after applying Granger causality 
testing in a cross-sectional framework, this effect appears on only four out of ten 
examined issues in the 2003–2012 period. The results illustrate the value of combining 
pooled and individual-level analyses of policy areas in studies of political 
responsiveness and lay the ground for further theorizing about the conditional nature 
of political responsiveness between issue areas in the EU and other contexts. 
 
Introduction 
One of the central concerns in democracy is whether government policy is responsive 
to citizen preferences (see e.g. Dahl, 1956). Electoral competition encourages 
politicians to enact policies in line with public opinion to secure re-election and 
prevent civil disobedience and protests (see e.g. R. D. Arnold, 1990; Downs, 1957; 
Fiorina, 1973; Geer, 1996; Mayhew, 1974; Sen, 1970). An extensive literature has 




& Wlezien, 2004; 2005; Weakliem, 2003). It predominantly focuses on the US even if 
recent years have witnessed an increase in research on political responsiveness of 
selected advanced, industrialized countries and a few comparative analyses (see e.g. 
Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010). 
Studies have grown in sophistication and focused on when and how public opinion 
affects public attention and policy, e.g. by considering how different political 
institutions influence responsiveness by affecting the degree of political contestation 
(Bevan & Jennings, 2013; 2014; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Jones & Baumgartner, 
2004; Jones, Larsen-Price, & Wilkerson, 2009; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien & 
Soroka, 2011; 2012).  
One of the institutional factors investigated is the distinction between federal versus 
unitary states. One view argues that federalism may increase political responsiveness 
by providing opportunity for executives to “attend to issues outside their core 
functional policy responsibilities” (Bevan & Jennings, 2013: 13). Another emphasizes 
how the complexities in transmitting information between voters and politicians in a 
multi-level system may affect political responsiveness negatively. The vertical division 
of competences makes it harder for the public to acquire accurate information 
regarding what decision makers are doing (Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien & 
Soroka, 2011). Such lack of civic awareness of policy outputs is likely to affect the 
ability of politicians to respond to public desires negatively.  
The latter description of the complexities of political responsiveness in a multi-level 
context could not be a more accurate portrayal of the quasi-federal system of the 
European Union (EU). The EU is widely accused of suffering from a democratic 
deficit or a lack of linkage between what the public wants and what the system delivers 
(see e.g. Føllesdal & Hix, 2006; Jolly, 2007). At the same time, existing research has 
actually found a link between public preferences on European integration and overall 
volume of EU outputs up until the middle of the 1990s (Toshkov, 2011). The reason 
may be that these findings are based on analysis conducted at the aggregate rather the 
policy area level. In fact, the results of a recent paper linking public preferences for EU 




(C. Arnold, Franklin, & Wlezien, 2013). While a pooled effect exists, it breaks down 
almost completely when policy fields are examined individually.  
However, politicians do no only address public concerns by producing concrete acts, 
but also by giving attention to these concerns. Taking a policy agendas approach, we 
examine rhetorical rather than effective responsiveness (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). 
Through a process referred to as ‘dynamic agenda representation’ (Bevan & Jennings, 
2013; 2014), the public’s issue priorities may be translated into policy priorities (see 
e.g. Chaqués-Bonafont & Palau, 2011; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004; Jones et al., 2009; 
Lindeboom, 2012). More specifically, our study examines whether there is a link 
between how highly the public and the European Council prioritize certain policies. 
Such a focus on rhetorical responsiveness is crucial in order to understand political 
responsiveness in the EU and other multi-level contexts, where the decision makers at 
the central level have limited competences to issue legislation in many areas.  
We match half yearly Eurobarometer data on the public’s prioritization of policy 
topics to detailed coding of the attention drawn to these themes in European Council 
Conclusions over the last ten years. Hence, rather than analysing the time series for 
each policy area separately, we perform time series cross-sectional regressions 
followed by a vector autoregressive Granger analysis (Hood, Kidd, & Morris, 2008). 
The last allows us to test the assumption of causal homogeneity across cross sections 
and to conduct tests of the direction of the relationship between opinion and attention. 
Our analysis covers ten issue areas over the period 2003–2012.   
The distinctiveness of this contribution stems from conducting the first study of 
rhetorical analysis in the EU and presenting a design at the policy area level which 
scrutinizes the direction of relationship between opinion and attention. Moreover, we 
discuss the implications of our results for future theory building on differences in the 







Since the 1970s, a body of “political responsiveness literature” on the relationship 
between public opinion and policy has emerged (for reviews see Burstein, 2003; 
Manza & Cook, 2002; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004; 2005; Weakliem, 2003). This literature 
has found evidence of links between what the public wants and public budgets, policy 
agendas, and policy outputs (Jennings & John, 2009; Jones et al., 2009; Page & 
Shapiro, 1983; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1995; 
Wlezien, 1995; 2004).  
Recently, a couple of studies on EU political responsiveness have been conducted, 
which deliver a somewhat mixed message on the extent to which the decision makers 
respond to public demands in this system. Toshkov (2011) shows that there is a 
relationship between public support for European integration and important EU 
policy output, but points out that the relationship breaks down in the middle of the 
1990s. Using vector autoregression methodology and Granger causality tests he 
demonstrates that it is public opinion that triggers legislative output and not the other 
way around. Arnold, Franklin, and Wlezien (2013) examine the effect of public 
opinion on counts of a broader range of EU legislative acts than directives58 and 
weigh the different acts by the number of lines they contain. No matter whether they 
look at the public preferences towards EU integration or EU membership, they do 
not find a significant relationship between public opinion and EU policy outputs on 
the aggregate level or in specific issue areas. Instead, they discover a link between 
questions on whether common EU action in specific areas is desirable and their 
weighed measure for legislative activity in a stacked regression of 14 policy areas. 
However, in analyses of the five areas containing a sufficient number of cases to 
estimate individual models the relationships breaks down in all but one area.  
At first outset, this is not exactly good news from the perspective of democratic 
legitimacy. Yet, even if producing policy output is no doubt an important part of 
                                                          
58 Strictly speaking, Toshkov (2011) looks at “non-Commission directives” but these are 




effective responsiveness, using volume of legislative activity is also a somewhat crude 
measure. Requiring that the volume of everyday legislative outputs coming from the EU in 
a given policy area should be linked to the overall preferences of the public for using 
common action in this area for the EU to be politically responsible may be demanding. 
By focusing on directives in this aggregate analysis of EU level responsiveness, 
Toshkov (2011) gets closer to a measure of “important legislation”. This makes his 
assumption that each new piece of legislation contributes to integration more 
convincing even if his measure still cannot capture all aspects of responsiveness.  At 
the same time, it neglects rhetorical responsiveness (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008), i.e. 
how politicians address public concerns by giving attention to and discussing these 
concerns rather than producing concrete acts.  
Rhetorical responsiveness can be expected to be particularly important in a multi-level 
system where politicians need to share competences with other decision-making levels 
and often do not have jurisdictions to address the public’s worries by producing actual 
legislation. EU politicians can for example not issue laws in areas of exclusive Member 
State competence just as decision makers at the US federal level need to respect that 
certain issues are within state jurisdiction. Such divisions of competence will not 
necessarily restrain them from responding to public views but they will have to do so 
rhetorically: i.e. by discussing issues which the people care about. These discussions are 
not just “cheap talk” but set out political directions and serve as crucial instruments of 
policy planning. They can lead to legislative responses at both the central and lower 
decision-making levels. Research on the US shows how agenda-setting activities are 
linked to responsiveness by signalling priorities, which are translated into effective 
responses at later stages of the policy process (Jones et al., 2009). Moreover, political 
discussions and prioritization in multi-level systems can have other far-reaching 
consequences, most notably related to the redrawing of jurisdictional boundaries. 
Therefore, our approach to studying political responsiveness differs from the most 
dominant one in the literature, which focuses on the relationship between the positions 
of the public and decision makers on various issues. We analyse dynamic agenda 
representation (Bevan & Jennings, 2014) , or the transmission of the priorities of the 




seen as the first stage of representation and necessary step before hard laws can be 
made. Responding rhetorically constitutes a political signal to the citizens that their 
demands are taken seriously and likely to be dealt with, possibly in the form of 
political action. 
 
The Case of the European Union 
In many ways, the EU can be seen as a hard case for detecting political responsiveness 
even within the broader category of multi-level systems. Discontent with the 
European project has been prominent, including examples of failing referendums 
where EU questions were put to a vote, strong support for anti-EU parties, and 
declining turnout in the European Parliament elections. No matter whether the 
judgment comes from academics, policy practitioners or citizens, a large share of them 
agree that the EU constitutes a system where the decisions taken do not represent the 
views of the people and which demonstrates low capacity to solve their problems 
(Scharpf, 1999). Many of the decision makers are not democratically elected and the 
links between them and their constituencies are relatively weak (Lindberg, Rasmussen, 
& Warntjen, 2008). 
We focus on how the European Council devotes its attention. Consisting of the 
Heads of State or Government from all Member States, it is the top informal agenda 
setter in the EU. Around its establishment in 1975 the European Council was 
conceived as a regular coordination arena at highest political level, which shall guide 
the development of the Community and resolve conflicts. Over the course of its 
existence the body has gradually moved away from an arbitrative function towards 
setting the agenda for important aspects of the work of the EU (Nugent, 2010; 
Rasmussen, 2007; Werts, 2008). It has become a body of political leadership which 
pulls the strains of the integration process to the extent and in the direction of activity 
it desires. These developments have recently resulted in a long-needed spur in 
attention to the European Council in EU scholarship (Eggermont, 2012; Foret & 




Due to its informal nature 59 and lack of formal legislative functions the European 
Council is hardly held accountable by the other EU institutions60. It can act as a 
formation of the Council but only exceptionally does so. Yet, the European Council 
often places issues on the agendas of other EU bodies: requests the Commission to 
undertake research on a topic or the Council to speed up decision making in a certain 
direction. Due to the underlying power relationship these institutions are informally 
bound to consider such requests (de Schoutheete & Wallace, 2002). Thus, holding the 
Commission or the Council accountable for certain actions could in practice mean 
attacking the messenger.  
The European Council is free to set its own agenda. Even if this agenda experiences 
virtually no restrictions in scope and content, especially since the 1990s (Alexandrova 
et al., 2012; Wessels, 2008b). it is not entirely clear what determines how the European 
Council allocates attention and prioritizes issues. The national interest is said to be a 
dominant drive behind the individual positions of Member States’ leaders, 
overshadowing party family linkages and rendering issue-specific coalition building 
(Tallberg & Johansson, 2008; Tallberg, 2008a). Scholarship has also pointed to the 
importance of focusing events and “issue inheritance” from previous meetings 
(Bonvicini & Regelsberger, 1991; Princen & Rhinard, 2006; Westlake & Galloway, 
2004). However, whether the views of the public affect the decision of the EU Heads 
of State or Government to address an issue collectively we still do not know. The lack 
of academic interest in this topic is surprising and worrisome considering the huge 
agenda-setting power of the European Council and the ambiguity as to what its 
discussion points are motivated by.  
 
  
                                                          
59 The body was listed among the EU institutions only in the Lisbon Treaty, which entered 
into force in December 2009.  
60 It is only required to present reports to the European Parliament after its meetings, as well as 




EU Political Responsiveness? 
At first outset, it may seem somewhat paradoxical to expect political responsiveness in 
the multi-level context of the EU. In a federal, multi-level system, it is harder for 
voters to stay informed about political decision making, which may prevent them 
from formulating straightforward preferences that decision makers can respond to 
(Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien & Soroka, 2011). According to Soroka and 
Wlezien, ‘there is good reason to think that we will have clear policy responsiveness 
only when we observe clear public responsiveness to policy’ (2010: 52-53).  
Moreover, even if the voters could formulate clear preferences on EU policy, the EU 
literature contains no lack of arguments that it may not pay off for national politicians 
participating in EU policy either at home or at the EU level to translate such citizen 
preferences into EU policy. If they are interested in seeking re-election, national vote 
choice is much more dominated by the positions citizens hold on the left-right 
dimension than attitudes towards European integration. Quite a long time ago, Reif 
and Schmitt (1980) developed the notion of ‘second-order elections’ referring to the 
fact that elections to the European Parliament were used by voters to punish or 
reward the current governing parties rather than driven by attitudes towards European 
integration. Their argument was subsequently extended to EU referendums (see e.g. 
Franklin, Van der Eijk, & Marsh, 1995). At the same time Franklin and Van der Eijk 
(2004) have pointed out that, even if elections are often not about the EU, Europe 
may still be ‘a sleeping giant’ of public opinion scepticism towards the European 
project, which could be woken up by political entrepreneurs politicizing the issue. 
However, according to Green-Pedersen (2012), we need not worry too much about 
this scenario. Based on a study of Denmark, he argues that those politicians who 
would potentially have an incentive to wake up the sleeping giant cannot, whereas those 
who can do not want to. In such a world where the issue of Europe is unlikely to be 
heavily politicized, we would not expect EU decision makers to have an incentive to 
be very responsive to what the public wants.  
Opposed to this view stands an alternative scenario, which gives more ground for 




Government in the European Council, to indeed have an incentive to act in line with 
the wishes of the citizens. First, the political leaders may do so because they have 
preferences which are in line with those of the citizens. Second, even if this is not the 
case, they may have a range of other reasons to be responsive. Research shows that 
European integration exerts an independent impact of voter placement on the left-right 
dimension on electoral choice in domestic elections (see e.g. Evans, 1998; Gabel, 
2000), even if this impact may be of a conditional nature (De Vries, 2007). Moreover, 
several authors have argued that we have seen an increased politicization of the issue 
of European integration since Maastricht, often emphasizing the role of extreme 
parties in driving these processes (see e.g. Hooghe & Marks, 2009).  
Finally, no matter whether “the EU issue” is salient and politicized, we can still expect 
political responsiveness at the EU level. European policy today is about a lot more 
than deciding on the direction and speed of European integration. Europe deals with 
a range of every-day policies of a regulatory and sometimes distributive nature, which 
are similar to the issues dealt with in more traditional political systems (Hix & 
Høyland, 2011). Whether anyone will want to (or can) wake up “the EU giant” is 
therefore not a precondition for whether we can expect national leaders to be 
responsive to their citizens in the conduct of EU policy. They need not do so. Instead, 
what they need is to have an incentive to devote their attention at the EU level among 
issue areas in line with the policy priorities of their citizens. Such incentives might 
exist for at least a couple of reasons. First, national politicians have constrained 
themselves by delegating the competence for many policies in full or in part to the 
EU. In a number of areas, the only arena for national politicians to respond to citizen 
concerns is the European one. Second, in an increasingly globalized and 
interdependent world we can expect national leaders to be faced with a number of 
citizen concerns, which will be difficult to address at the domestic level only. 
Externalities put pressure on them to come up with a European response in order to 






Analysis Design and Data 
The dependent variable in our study is attention to a thematic policy area. We rely on 
a new dataset of all European Council Conclusions, coded via the EU Policy Agendas 
Project Codebook. The last represents an adapted version of the Policy Agendas 
coding system developed by Baumgartner and Jones (2005; Jones & Baumgartner, 
2005b), which aims at capturing policy content in political agendas. The Conclusions 
constitute a list of the issues, which have been discussed by the EU leaders: 
evaluations of on-going EU activities, attention to relations with third countries and 
the EU’s position in the world, aspirations for and announcements of actions or 
policy plans, etc. They are content coded at the quasi-sentence level, representing the 
most fine-grained level of detecting policy content in texts.   
Our core independent variable represents a measure for public opinion on a given 
policy theme derived from the so-called ‘most important problem’ (MIP) question 
from Eurobarometer surveys. The exact formulation of the question is: ‘What do you 
think are the two most important issues facing (our country) at the moment?’ It 
presents the respondents with a catalogue of issues; they can select from the list up to 
two items, which they perceive as the most important policy concerns at the moment. 
The data for our public opinion measure is available on half annual basis since 2003, 
which provides us with 20 time points until end 2012.  
We have selected ten topics from the European Council’s agenda, on which public 
opinion data on the relative importance attached to these topics by the public across 
time is available. The policy fields are: economics, education, employment, 
environment, health, immigration, inflation, law and crime, taxation, and terrorism. 
The core independent variable is related to the attention of the European Council in 
the models with a half year lag. A half year lag in response time seems most 
reasonable in the case of the European Council, which is dealing with current events 
that often involve a high degree of urgency. Since 2003, it has conducted between 2 
and 4 meetings per semester. Thus, in case the European Council responds to changes 




relatively short span of time.61 In addition, the first lag of preferences is the standard 
lag used in political responsiveness studies on spending and government activity and 
policy (Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien, 1995).  
Our models include several control variables to ensure that any correlation between 
opinion and policy is not driven by other factors. First, a lagged version of the EU 
agenda as an independent variable allows us to estimate whether and how strongly 
attention in two consecutive time periods is related as a result of agenda inheritance. 
We also consider mean government positions on the left-right continuum and on 
European integration. These controls are important because party positions on these 
two scales might potentially influence the willingness of EU leaders to respond to the 
public’s priorities in the different issue areas. The two variables are measured using 
data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which classifies attention to a 
list of themes in electoral party programs (Volkens et al., 2011). On the basis of this 
attention the CMP develops measures of positions on left-right and European 
integration, which we have extracted for the governing parties in each Member State. 
In order to come to a general score of the governing parties in the EU at a given 
point, our main models control for the mean value of all Member States whereas 
subsequent models use a measure where countries are weighed according to their vote 
share in the Council of Ministers. The data on both variables is again presented in 
half-annual terms. In addition, we include different measures of the overall state of 
economic development of the community since the economic situation might affect 
the ability of political leaders to respond to the public’s priorities. We consider GDP 
growth, government debt and unemployment. Table 5.1 presents detailed information 
on all of these variables, including the sources of the data, the way the values have 
been calculated (where relevant), and descriptive statistics.  
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1.665 2.682 2.132 0.279 
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gross debt as percentage 
of GDP, half annual data 
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Eurostat 59.45 85.05 68.855 8.849 




Figure 5.1 shows the relative share of attention allocated by the European Council to 
the different policy areas over time as well as the relative prioritisation by the public. 
Since we have time-series data on ten different policy areas, we conduct the analysis 
using time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) methods. By doing so, we scrutinize the 
cross-sectional effects of our independent variables on attention towards different 
policy areas both at a given point of time and over time. Attention to all policy topics 
at a given point of time is pooled and predicted by the same regression equation.  This 
model allows us to incorporate more observations and generate meaningful and 
efficient results despite the relatively short time span of the individual time series.  
 
Figure 5.1. European Council half-annual attention patterns to 11 policy areas (2003 – 
2012) 
Finally, we conduct vector autoregressive Granger tests for TSCS data, following the 
approach developed by Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2008). This technique has two 




potentially endogenous variable (opinion and attention) on past values of itself and the 
other endogenous variable in single simultaneous system of equations. In our case, we 
cannot rule out that rather than opinion casing attention, the relationship may work 
the other way around, meaning that that the attention of politicians could affect the 
views of the public. Second, the model allows us to deal with causal heterogeneity 
across subunits. Even if fixed effects TSCS models can account for differences across 
subunits via different intercepts, they assume that the causal relationship across units 
is the same. Thus, such a model cannot rule out that the relationship between opinion 
and attention works differently in different policy areas. The method developed by 
Hood, Kidd, and Morris (2008) enables us to explicitly test the assumption of causal 
homogeneity and specify whether and in what possible ways the relationship between 
opinion and attention differs between policy areas.  
Even if Granger tests are commonly referred to as “causality tests” it should be noted 
that causality is employed as a methodological concept and as such is not equivalent to 
theoretical causality. The Granger test only examines the direction of relationship 
between two variables and is not able to account for the potential impact of 
unobserved variables in a scenario where the true relationship involves three or more 
variables. This mean that, even if employing Granger tests represents a significant 
improvement over conventional tests, we bear in mind that the Granger estimation 
does not provide complete certainty of a theoretical, causal link. Importantly, we 
therefore begin with a full model specification before performing Granger causality 
tests in order to also consider other theoretically relevant variables. 
 
Analysis 
We begin with the simple TSCS OLS regression model predicting the share of 
attention that the European Council allocates to a given issue area. We use a fixed 
rather than a random effects model because figure 5.1 indicated that there are 
systematic differences in the share of attention which the European Council pays to 




order to focus on the effect of the independent variables of interest. This choice is 
further supported by the Hausman test, which indicates that a fixed effects regression 
is also statistically superior to one with random effects (the last aims to take unit 
variance into account by including it in the error term). Table 2 shows the results of 
two fixed effects TSCS OLS regressions: model 1 containing only public opinion and 
the lagged agenda, whereas model 2 adding the controls for government position (left-
right and European integration) and state of the economy.62 Due to multicollinearity 
between especially unemployment and government debt we cannot include all three 
economic controls in a single model. Therefore, we proceed with GDP growth and 
unemployment in the reported tables but also comment on a model with GDP growth 
and government debt. 
Both model 1 and 2 show a relationship between the public prioritization of a given 
policy area and the attention towards it in the European Council Conclusions. 
However, before drawing any conclusions from these OLS models we need to assess 
whether the core assumptions for a TSCS analysis – homoscedasticity, lack of 
autocorrelation and lack of cross-sectional correlation – are met. Otherwise, we might 
be making wrong conclusions, since their estimates are not best, linear, and unbiased. 
We use model 2 as the basis for a number of tests. According to the modified Wald 
test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, as suggested by Baum (2001), we find that we 
must reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity in our model. Moreover, after 
conducting a Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data (Drukker, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2002) we also see that our model displays serial correlation of the error 
terms. Finally, we test for the presence of cross-sectional correlation using the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence, since it is more suitable for datasets where 
the number of time points is higher than the number of groups (C. F. Baum, 2001). 
The results show that the null hypothesis of cross-sectional correlation is confirmed. 
In other words, all three assumptions of the TSCS OLS regression are violated, 
indicating that we need a model that can correct for all three.  
                                                          





This leaves us with two options: a model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors 
(DKSE), or one with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck & Katz, 1995; 
Hoechle, 2007).63 We perform both in order to confirm the robustness of our 
findings. Before proceeding with this we also tested whether we need to control for 
fixed effects of the time points, which yielded negative results, wherefore we proceed 
with fixed effects for policy areas only. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  DKSE PCSE 
Lagged European Council 
agenda 
.255*** .061 .061 .071 
(.074) (.093) (.220) (.123) 
Lagged Public opinion .295*** .273*** .273* .272*** 
(.071) (.080) (.123) (.083) 
Left-right government 
position (averaged) 
 -.000 -.000 .000 
 (.002) (.001) (.002) 
Anti-/pro-EU government 
position (averaged) 
 .005 .005 .005 
 (.018) (.009) (.016) 
GDP growth  .000 .000 .000 
 (.002) (.001) (.002) 
Unemployment  .004 .004 .004 
  (.005) (.002) (.005) 
Constant -.021 -.055 -.055 .003 
 (.012) (.059) (.033) (.055) 
Note: Values for fixed effects not reported; Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 5.2. Pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) OLS regressions with fixed 
effects (for policy area) 
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Models 3 and 4 replicate model 2 with the DKSE and PCSE respectively64. Despite 
the differences in the way these models adjust the standard errors in practice, they 
show similar results. Again we find support of a significant relationship between how 
strongly the public prioritizes a given issue and how much attention the European 
Council spends on the policy theme. To find an effect of public opinion in a model 
that controls for the systematic differences in attention between policy areas is quite 
remarkable since differences between these policy fields account for a substantial 
share of the variation. In fact, the fixed effects model has been criticized for eating up 
too many degrees of freedom and eliminating too much variance.   
Interestingly, the party positions of the governments in the European Council on the 
left-right continuum and towards European integration do not matter. Neither do the 
economic controls GDP growth and unemployment.65 There is a significant negative 
effect of the lagged European Council agenda in the uncontrolled OLS model only. 
The fixed effects (not reported in the tables) show quite some differences in the 
attention of the European Council towards different policies exactly as we would 
expect based on the descriptive overview in figure 5.1. 
We proceed further with a causality test to check whether public opinion indeed 
predicts the level of attention or whether the relationship actually (also) works the 
other way around. First we examine whether the variables are stationary by 
performing the Levin-Lin-Chu test for unit root, which is appropriate for datasets that 
have higher number of time points than sections.66 The positive results for both 
public opinion and European Council attention allow us to continue with the Granger 
causality tests. The first step here is to determine whether one of the variables 
Granger causes the other for all policy areas collectively. We do this by estimating the 
F1 statistic, which compares a sum of squared residuals from an unrestricted model 
                                                          
64 The R-squared is not reported in the model with PCSE since the statistic is calculated for the 
entire system of equations, which can be considered 'meaningless for either equation 
individually' (Blackwell III, 2005: 205-206). 
65 Running models 3 and 4 with the other pair of economic controls, GDP growth and public 
debt, yields the same results. 




(RSS1) to the sum of squared residuals from a restricted model (RSS2).67 Table 5.3 
presents the results. The significant F1 statistics indicates that for at least one (and 
possibly all policy fields) public opinion Granger causes the level of political 
attention.68 The opposite does not hold: the attention spent by the European Council 
does not Granger cause the preferences in public opinion.  
Having confirmed the expected directionality of the relationship, the second step is to 
conduct a test for its homogeneity across sections, i.e. whether public opinion causes 
attention in all the examined policy areas. We perform the F2 test, in which the sum of 
squared residuals from the unrestricted model (RSS1) is again used, this time together 
with the sum of squared residuals from a restricted model in which the slope terms are 
constrained to be equal for each cross section in the sample (RSS3).69 An insignificant 
F2 statistic would be an indicator of homogeneity and we could stop our tests here. 
The F2 statistic for the effect of public opinion on the European Council’s political 
agenda is, however, significant. This means that the causal link between opinion and 
attention does not hold across all policy areas in the sample. Therefore, we perform 
further tests to estimate whether public opinion Granger causes the level of attention 
for each separate policy area. To do so, we calculate the F3 statistics for all 10 policy 
areas using the sum of squared residuals from the unrestricted model (RSS1) and the 
sum of squared residuals from a restricted model where the slope coefficient of the 
cross section at hand is constrained to zero (RSS2,i).70 A significant value indicates the 
presence of a causal relationship. The results, reported in table 5.4, show that public 
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opinion Granger causes attention in the European Council in four out of the ten 
policy areas: economics, environment, immigration, and law and crime.  
 
 F1 test statistic F2 test statistic 
Public opinion granger causes European Council 
attention 
4.993*** 3.395*** 
European Council attention granger causes  public 
opinion   
.473 – 
Notes: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 5.3. Granger causality tests (half year lag) 
 F3 test statistic 
Economics  35.467*** 
Education  .003 
Employment  .001 
Environment  3.256*** 
Health .009 
Immigration 4.353*** 
Inflation  .009 
Law and crime 10.697*** 
Taxation .003 
Terrorism .91 
Notes: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01 
Table 5.4. Granger causality tests (half year lag), F3 test statistic 
Relying on the Granger causality estimation, it seems that we have neither uniform 
responsiveness nor a total lack thereof in the multi-level system of the EU.  Instead, our 
results suggest differentiated responsiveness across policy areas when we look at the 
link between opinion and attention.  
As a final step, we examine whether the degree of responsiveness differs between the four 




dataset of the four policy fields where causality is present.  The restricted dataset of 
these four policy fields displays no heteroskedasticity or cross-sectional correlation, 
but serial correlation is still present. Therefore, we proceed with a model with panel 
corrected robust standard errors.  
 
 Model 5 Model 6 
Lagged European Council agenda -.085 -.086 
(.209) (.189) 
Lagged public opinion .808** .806** 
(.156) (.143) 
















GDP growth .001 -.001 
(.004) (.003) 
Unemployment .015** .015** 
(.004) (.002) 
Constant -.222* -.232* 
(.078) (.040) 
N 60 60 
R2  .310 .319 
Note: Values for fixed effects not reported; Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < 0.1 
Table 5.5. Pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) OLS regressions with fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors (for policy area) on a restricted dataset of four 





Model 5 (table 5.5) displays the results. Not surprisingly, we find a strong and 
significant effect of public opinion on political attention in the European Council in 
this restricted dataset. A one unit increase in the public’s prioritization of any of these 
issues causes a 0.81 unit points increase in attention. The political control variables 
and GDP growth still show no effect but unemployment becomes significant.71  
In order to perform a further robustness check we run the same regression with 
different specifications of the party ideology variables (left-right and anti-pro-EU). 
Rather than deriving a score from the average position of all Member States (like in 
the models so far), we weighted the positions of each country by voting shares in the 
Council of Ministers. Decisions in the European Council are taken by consensus, but 
it could be argued that not all countries have equal negotiating power. Model 6 
presents this alternative specification with ideology weighted per seats in the Council. 
The results confirm the predictive power of public opinion and the role of 
unemployment but also present a significant effect of the left-right ideology at the 10 
per cent level. The negative sign indicates that when weighted by voting shares in the 
Council, the more leftist the position of the European Council, the more likely the 
body is to discuss issues of economics, environment, immigration, and law and crime. 
We also performed model 5 with interaction effects for policy area. The overall 
interaction of the model is significant and there is some difference in the level of 
responsiveness across policy areas. In particular, the effect of public opinion on 
political attention is significantly higher on environment than on any of the other 
three policy domains, as figure 5.2 shows. However, the confidence intervals for 
economics, immigration, and law and crime largely overlap, suggesting that we cannot 
infer difference in effect size among these three fields.72  
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the debt variable is not significant. 





Figure 5.2. Predictive margins for policy area with 95% confidence intervals for model 
5 
Discussion 
Even if public policy literature argues that policies generate different levels of conflict 
and controversy (Lowi, 1972; Wilson, 1974), many of the most prominent studies of 
political responsiveness are conducted at the country level (see e.g. Hakhverdian, 
2010; Kang & Powell, 2010; Percival, Johnson, & Neiman, 2009; Stimson, 1991; 
Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1994; 1995). Even the studies that do include data at 
the policy domain level and find variation in degree of opinion–policy linkage often 
do not theorize what it is about issue character that explains the differences (Erikson, 
1976; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Jennings & John, 2009; Soroka & Wlezien, 2010; 
Wlezien, 1995). This is understandable since policy fields are simply units of analysis 




the differences in responsiveness identified here between policy areas deserve further 
attention and the potentially conditional nature of responsiveness between policy 
fields is one of the matters that could be explored further in the responsiveness 
literature. Only a minority of studies have made a step in this direction and no 
consensus has emerged (Brooks, 1985; Edwards III, Mitchell, & Welch, 1995; Jones, 
1994; Jones et al., 2009; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Percival et al., 
2009; Wlezien, 2004).  
In a multi-level system it would seem logical that the division of competences between the 
different levels would affect whether politicians are responsive. All things equal, we 
might expect decision makers at a given level to be more responsive to claims in areas 
where they are competent to act. Just as in a national federal system, a responsibility has 
been delegated to the central, EU level in some areas in contrast to others. According 
to such an argument, federalism may not only make a difference for political 
responsiveness in comparisons between federal and non-federal system, but also for 
comparisons between policy areas within a given political system where the degree of 
federalism varies. In practice, we do not find responsiveness in areas where the EU 
has no or limited treaty competences, like taxation, health or education. In contrast, 
we do find responsiveness in fields with strong EU competences, like environment. 
But the policy areas which constitute a much more fuzzy mix of competences in terms 
of scope and level do not fit such an explanatory logic in a straightforward way. For 
example, in both crime and terrorism there is some level of EU involvement but we 
find the European Council to be addressing the public’s priorities only on the first 
issue. Hence, using competences alone to predict the differentiated pattern of 
rhetorical responsiveness provides only a partial account of the reality. An important 
reason may be that the policy responsibilities of the EU go far beyond what was above 
referred to as “hard law” and also include "soft law" and other types of competences. 
Even if the EU cannot produce legislation in a specific policy area, this does not mean 
that it has no instruments to act and react. In fact, EU politicians – and those 
operating at the federal level of national multi-level systems – can in principle talk 
about anything they want. Their agenda is not dictated by whether something is a 




However, if we consider the differences in the levels of responsiveness in the four 
policy areas where the Granger causality tests indicated evidence of a link between 
public opinion and attention, the competence logic gains some additional leverage. On 
environment, a domain of shared jurisdiction between the EU and its Member States, 
the European Council’s attention appears to be more strongly influenced by the issue 
priorities of the citizens than in the three other areas: immigration, crime and 
economics. In these fields, the EU can be considered to have lower level of 
competences (see e.g. Börzel, 2005) as well as weaker policy involvement (see e.g. 
Nugent, 2010). While in environmental matters the Union relies on legal regulation, 
inter-state cooperation is more prominent on issues related to law and order matters 
and a mixture of the two is used in macroeconomics.  
An important additional consideration than competences when it comes determining 
dynamic agenda representation is the character of the institution whose 
responsiveness we analyse. The role perception of the European Council is somewhat 
different from the remaining core institutions (the European Commission, the 
Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament). Even if it can in principle 
deliberate upon any topic it wants, it is first of all responsible for discussing overall 
political developments of the Community, whereas the remaining institutions are 
supposed to act as the day-to-day executive and legislative bodies respectively. The 
perception is that the European Council plays a prominent role in what Hoffman 
(1966) referred to as high politics themes (Wessels, 2008b) related to the basic 
existence of the political system (e.g. foreign policy, defence, and monetary matters). 
And indeed such issues have occupied more extensively the attention of this 
institution and conditioned the space available on the agenda for other issues 
(Alexandrova et al., 2012). On topics of vital importance to the existence and survival 
of the state, the public may be less of a determinant of issue attention. Executives 
have to deal with such topics anyway whereas they can have freedom to display 
varying levels of attention to areas outside their core portfolio (Bevan & Jennings, 
2013). But when the agenda is already much loaded with high politics themes in the 






Political responsiveness is a complex issue in a multi-level context due to the 
difficulties in transmitting information and keeping political leaders responsible. Yet 
we have few studies that systematically examine political responsiveness in such 
contexts outside the US. We focused on the EU system, which could be seen as a 
particularly hard case for detecting political responsiveness due to its distance between 
voters and political decision makers, many of whom do not have a democratic 
mandate. Our study adds to the limited body of existing literature by conducting the 
first analysis of rhetorical responsiveness in this context, focusing on the link between 
public opinion and attention rather than actual policy outputs in a study of dynamic 
agenda representation. We connected a new dataset on the European Council’s policy 
agenda with public opinion data and a range of other sources. Attention is particularly 
important in a multi-level context, such as the EU, where decision makers at the 
central level may not have the competence of responding to citizens in many areas by 
issuing hard law.  Moreover, rather than linking aggregate attitudes to European 
integration to total volume of outputs we conduct our analysis at the policy field level. 
The EU has gradually become more similar to a domestic political system and daily 
adopts many different kinds of specific policies (Hix & Høyland, 2011). Therefore, 
reacting to the public is not necessarily about integrating more or less, but about 
paying attention to the range of everyday policy issues which the citizens care about.  
Despite the negative prospects of achieving high political responsiveness in multi-level 
systems in general and in the EU in particular, it is noteworthy that we find a general 
link between opinion and attention in our cross-sectional time series analysis. 
However, after introducing vector autoregressive Granger tests into our TSCS 
framework, we see that responsiveness is not uniform but present only in a subset of 
policy areas consisting of economic, environmental, immigration- and crime-related 
issues. Furthermore, public prioritization has a stronger effect on the European 
Council’s agenda on environment compared to the other three areas.   
These results provide scope for theorizing about the potential variation in the link 




including data at the policy areas level do not attempt to do so since policy areas 
mainly serve as units of analysis in research with explanatory focus on something else. 
Moreover, among those that do no consensus has emerged on the logic behind the 
differential pattern of responsiveness found in the policy areas up to now.  
Our discussion indicates that the distribution of policy competences within a multi-
level system may provide important insights into how levels of responsiveness vary 
between policy areas. However, they also underline that a competence explanation 
alone is unlikely to be sufficient. Instead, we suggest that explanations of variation in 
political responsiveness should also be sensitive to the way responsiveness is measured and 
the kind of institution whose responsiveness we examine. The fact that we find 
relationship outside core areas of EU legislative jurisdiction is not too surprising since 
we analyse the link between public opinion and policy attention rather than effective 
responsiveness through for example legislative production. This rhetorical type is 
likely to be much less influenced by the portfolio of competences legislators possess 
than effective responsiveness. Many political institutions have the opportunity to 
define their own agenda and to debate issues irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries. 
This is not least the case due to the special character of the European Council. 
In this way, reasoning which always requires responsiveness to follow a fixed pattern 
within a given policy field may be less appropriate. Instead, a prominent avenue might 
be to explore more dynamic explanations, which would allow for variations in 
responsiveness on issue domains. At a given point of time, policy areas include a mix 
of topics of varying character and even a specific issue can inhibit variation in its 






6. Upsetting the Agenda:  The Clout of 




Focusing events are sudden striking large-scale occurrences which attract political 
attention. But not all potential focusing events appear on the agenda, and the attention 
they eventually receive also differs. Combining data from multiple sources, this study 
conducts the first systematic analysis of determinants of attention to focusing events 
in the EU over a period longer than two decades. The results demonstrate that 
decisions regarding the overall placement of crises on the European Council agenda 
are underscored by event typology and geopolitical considerations. Man-made 
incidents are more likely to be discussed than natural disasters, as are focusing events 
taking place in neighbouring countries than elsewhere in the world. The level of 
attention each event receives depends on geopolitical and economic ties. Focusing 
events in neighbouring countries receive a higher portion of attention, as do also 
crises in states having larger trade exchange with the EU. 
 
Introduction 
Focusing events are by default magnets for attention by everyone, often on a global 
scale. Political leaders regularly need to respond to such dramatic occurrences within 
and more often outside the territory of their polity. They do so first and foremost by 
spending part of their time on the event. This can come in the form of condolences, 
expression of sympathy with victims and suffering populations, condemnation of 
inhumane acts, etc. The initial reaction can later bring about more substantial policy 




coalition. Disasters and incidents abroad can also trigger rethinking of domestic 
policies and materialise in substantial changes. In the EU, the top institution which 
can transmit the single voice of the Union to its citizens and the rest of the world is 
the European Council. On its regular meetings, which over the years have grown in 
number, the Heads of State and Government have addressed a multiplicity of issues 
and the agenda in many cases had to be readjusted to reflect focusing events. The 
recent European Council in October 2013 includes an example of this kind – a 
statement on intelligence concerns in relation to the USA after a scandal on this 
matter erupted. 
Not all focusing events are equal, and their power to elicit attention and potentially 
modify the course of policy varies tremendously.  While there is some evidence on the 
conditions under which dramatic sudden occurrences exercise influence over policy, 
their relationship with political attention is generally taken for granted. Yet, some 
phenomena seem to have easier time in resetting the agenda, while others are passed 
by with silence. For example, the European Council came up with a declaration on the 
devastating Iranian earthquake of June 1990 but did not mention even a word about 
the recent disaster of the same type in Haiti in January 2010. While the cost of both 
events was estimated to be relatively similar, the number of causalities and people 
affected was more than five times bigger in the second case.73 Another example can be 
traced in two terrorist attacks with comparatively similar number of injured and killed 
hostages in Russia during the first half of the 2000s. The Beslan school siege 
(September 2004) was not mentioned in any way in the official account of European 
Council meetings, whereas the Moscow theatre hostage crisis (October 2002) 
provoked a declaration full of shock and condemnation. 
The logic of reasoning when making the political decision to discuss a disaster, 
accident or violent attack is largely unexplored. This chapter aims at making a step in 
this grey area of research by theorising on the conditions under which responsiveness 
can occur in the first place and subsequently more attention can be allocated. It 
utilises a number of existing datasets, combining data on different kinds of focusing 
                                                          




events with data on political attention in the European Council. The analysis covers 
the period 1975–2012, with data on some of the independent variables beginning in 
1988/1989 only. The chapter proceeds with an elaboration on the concept focusing 
event and its relation to attention in political institutions, followed by a theoretical 
discussion of the factors that could underline in this relationship. Afterwards the role 
of the European Council in addressing urgent matters is explained and the hypotheses 
are presented. Further on the data are described and the analysis is conducted. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings. 
 
Focusing Events and Agenda Setting 
Focusing events occupy a special place in political agenda setting. They are powerful 
occurrences which can disturb the priorities of the day. Their power is often derived 
from a background of deterioration on a specific issue to which they add urgency by 
acting as a trigger for attention (Kingdon, 1984), leading to what Downs (1972) 
conceptualized as ‘alarmed discovery’. A focusing event can serve to underline the size 
of a given problem, unlock mismanagement in prevention mechanisms or signal at 
distance for potential future failures. It can present the necessary conditions for 
redefining an issue, which would then allow it to appear on the top political agenda 
(Princen, 2011). The crucial traits of focusing events are suddenness and rarity. They 
usually affect a large amount of people and become known to the general public and 
key members of the policy community simultaneously (Birkland, 1997).  
Based on the attributes identified by Birkland, many events can be classified as 
focusing. The classical types are natural disasters and industrial accidents but this 
scope has been broadened to what Birkland calls ‘deliberately caused catastrophes’ 
(2006), such as terrorist attacks or civil wars. Some authors claim a distinction between 
crises and focusing events (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010) but a dividing line between the 
two is usually hard to draw, and crises are more often considered a subcategory of 




al., 2005).74 A focusing event can come in any form: from a blast of a nuclear reactor, 
like the Fukushima disaster in March 2011, to a piece of investigative journalism that 
reveals a hideous story, such as the recent eavesdropping scandal that shook the 
relationship between Germany and the USA (see e.g. Alink, Boin, & t'Hart, 2001). 
Some scholars suggest that crises tend to involve a sense of threat, urgency and 
uncertainty (Boin et al., 2005). Yet, these features can be considered common but not 
necessary conditions for focusing events and therefore should not be included in a 
definition of the concept. Dramatic events usually involve some threatening aspects 
but they can also be reverted, signalling enthusiasm. The fall of the Berlin Wall, giving 
way to the end of communist regimes in Eastern Europe & the USSR is such an 
example from a Western perspective. In short, a focusing event can be defined as a 
striking sudden occurrence of a large scale disturbing simultaneously the daily routine of individuals 
and the policy status quo, and carrying the potential of emotional appeal. 
Focusing effects are prone to attracting vast attention by the public, politicians and 
policy makers due to the mechanism of disproportionate information processing 
which is a guiding factor both for humans and organisations (Jones, 2001). We tend to 
stick to the status quo in decision-making processes because a step aside involves 
additional investment of time and potentially other resources. This creates conditions 
for reacting to incoming information signals as little as possible, which in practice 
means underreacting. But while negative indicators build up and organisations ignore 
most of the signals delivering this information, a striking piece, coming in the form of 
a focusing event can shake the stability of the status quo. In turn, this will result in 
overreaction aimed to compensate for the missed opportunities (Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2005b). The described mechanism presents a long term perspective on 
the policy agenda as a sum of many small incremental changes and a bunch of very 
large punctuations in attention. 
The reaction can have long-term consequences and materialize in policy changes, 
usually involving multiple instruments. However, before having repercussions for 
policy, it first affects attention. The manner of triggering attention and possible 
                                                          




overreaction is straightforward and logical. Yet this does not mean that all potential 
focusing events will materialise as points on the agenda. Scholars have so far shown 
interest in disentangling the reasons behind one crisis resulting in policy change and 
others not (e.g. Nohrstedt, 2008; Walgrave & Varone, 2008) but the consequences for 
attention which forms a stage before policy change have largely been taken for 
granted. An exception to this is a recent study by van Assche (2012) on the Belgian 
executive agenda, who finds that some 40 per cent of the large punctuations in 
attention are related to focusing events (whereas elections and leadership change seem 
not to matter). The study however stops there and does not dig deeper into the 
reasons behind why some focusing events made it to the agenda and contributed to 
the significant increases in attention.  
Thus, the question what determines the fact that some sudden striking large-scale 
occurrences are attended to and others ignored remains a puzzle. The purpose of this 
chapter is to shed more light on it by considering various characteristics of focusing 
events and relating those to the presence of events on the agenda and level of political 
attention. In this way it constitutes a first attempt to draw parallels between attributes 
of focusing events and the immediate consideration these occurrences receive. The 
chapter tests hypotheses explaining the overall ability of focusing events to upset the 
European Council agenda and the extent to which this takes place. 
 
The European Council as a Venue for Focusing Events 
Agenda setting in the EU can follow two logics – from below and from above. In the 
latter, issue initiation is triggered by agreement between the Heads of State and 
Government in the European Council who recognise a ‘shared political problem’; this 
problem is ‘often highlighted by a symbolic event’ (Princen & Rhinard, 2006: 1121). 
Response to a crisis is inducing higher involvement from this institution compared to 
the European Commission (Bocquillon & Dobbels, 2014). Thus, the European 
Council, as the top political body in the EU, is the most suitable arena for addressing 




the single voice of the community. Moreover, as an institution which has continuously 
expanded the jurisdictional boundaries of the Union (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987), the 
European Council can use a dramatic occurrence to propose policy initiatives that 
eventually deepen integration further. 
Focusing events have triggered increased attention and policy changes in various 
sectors in the EU – from sports (García, 2007) to energy security (Sauter, 2008; see 
also Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Moschella, 2011). The involvement of the Union in 
responses to international crises has increased in recent years (Boin, Ekengren, & 
Rhinard, 2013). It is largely recognised that important current events constitute a key 
element on the European Council agenda (Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; Princen, 2012; 
Wessels, 2008b). Discussion of unexpected issues of high urgency is a common 
phenomenon. With the expansion of the number of addressed topics and the burden 
of extremely overcrowded agenda throughout the 1990s, a need for more regular 
meetings was witnessed and some of those meetings were converted into informal 
ones. Notably, the European Council invented an instrument of last resort which 
could allow it to address unexpected matters of high priority almost immediately – the 
calling of an extraordinary meeting (Werts, 2008). The first such summit was held in 
April 1990 in relation to the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the prospect 
of German Unification. By the end of 2012 there have been 7 extraordinary meetings. 
This institutional innovation only underlined the important role of the European 
Council in addressing focusing events in the EU, which from an international relations 
perspective corresponds well with the Union’s ambition to be a global power. 
 
The Logic of Reaction to Focusing Events 
A focusing event involves an exogenous and an endogenous aspect. The occurrence 
itself comes from ‘outside’, strikes as lightening and carries a number of 
characteristics, such as a perpetrator type, scale of affected people and infrastructure, 
location. These are all exogenous features for the political elite, which takes the 




become an effective focusing event, attention with a high emotional load is needed. This 
element is endogenous to the reactant because attention is always venue-bound. 
Therefore, an analysis of reasons for responsiveness to focusing events needs to 
consider internal properties of the latter, as well as features of the venue that relate to 
the focusing events’ properties and the overall nature of the agenda.  
Exogenous characteristics of focusing events comprise type and magnitude. Focusing 
events can be classified in two groups – natural and man-made disasters (Birkland, 
1997; 1998). Faulkner (2001) elaborates on the meaning of this distinction, 
discriminating between events induced by the actions or inactions of organisations 
versus such induced by natural phenomena or external human action. The distinction 
is also similar to Deborah Stone’s (1989; 2002) classification of human actions as 
unguided or purposeful in her analysis of causal stories.75 For example, the recent 
tsunami in the Philippines in November 2013 can be regarded as a natural disaster. A 
terrorist attack, like the Madrid train bombings in 2004, on the other hand, represents 
a purposeful human action that envisaged reaching particular effects.76 The basic 
typology of focusing events can have consequences for political attention due to the 
repercussions on policy. Spending attention is a first step in signalling that policy-
makers are determined to prevent potential future similar cases, and prevention seems 
more likely to succeed in man-made accidents. Moreover, purposeful human actions 
are often discussed with the purpose of allocating blame, which can later be used in 
sanctioning or policy development.  
                                                          
75 Stone draws a second line of distinction on the extent to which an event is amenable to 
human intervention, or its consequences are intended versus unintended (see also Gundel, 
2005 for a similar distinction). 
76 Even if it seems straightforward, the distinction between natural and man-made focusing 
event is not undisputed, because as Stone points out different actors attempt to portray the 
problem associated with the dramatic occurrence via different lenses.  While accounting for 
such volatility in depiction is crucial when analysing the development of a single issue across 
venues, considering a fixed typology from the perspective of a single institutional venue, such 
as the European Council, does not involve bias. Moreover, most sudden events with large scale 




Although by definition the magnitude of a focusing event is considered to be high, 
even a substantial scope varies (Faulkner, 2001). The extent of harm can be measured 
in number of casualties (dead and injured), damage to property and infrastructure, or 
total cost to the economy (see e.g. Alexander, 1997). A catastrophe might strike really 
hard both when it is caused by human beings and by nature. This determinant should 
be expected to play a role irrespective of whether the event is domestic or occurs in a 
distant country, since loss of people’s lives infringes upon the most basic human right. 
Events with high number of casualties also have strong emotional appeal to the public 
which might additionally induce a reaction from political elites. Studies on media 
coverage of various events (e.g. natural disasters or hazard events) have found an 
effect of the number of casualties and extent of damage on the level of reporting 
(Freudenburg et al., 1996; Van Belle, 2000). A similar logic can be applied to political 
agendas.  
Endogenous factors which could influence attention allocation to focusing events 
consist of two categories. First, they can reflect a certain relationship between the 
venue addressing the occurrence or its political system broadly and the country/region 
in which the event takes place. Most studies on focusing events analyse domestic 
catastrophes as these are the ones with direct impact on policy learning (Birkland, 
1997; 2006; Jensen, 2011; Suarez, 2011). However, it is recognised that ‘geographically 
distant crises can also cast shadows on polities in which they did not occur’ (Chien, 
2013: 118). While this does not necessary materialise in policy changes, external 
focusing events do increase attention to problems (Chien, 2013; Nohrstedt, 2008). 
Spending attention to foreign crises might depend on geopolitical or economic 
considerations. Evidence from media research demonstrates that geographical 
proximity plays a role in the size of news coverage on natural disasters (Adams, 1986; 
Boydstun, 2013). Trade flows between countries are found to be a determinant of 
overall foreign news reporting (Pietiläinen, 2006; Wu, 2000), which can potentially 
have an impact to the subset of news including focusing events only. In this respect 
attention allocated in policy venues should be similar to media attention since the logic 
of geopolitical proximity and economic ties is applicable to a polity rather than a single 




A second type of endogenous factor relates to the nature of a venue’s agenda with its 
capacity to incorporate more issues and extend discussion time. As agenda setting 
theories pose, issues compete for attention (Baumgartner & Jones, 2005; Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2005b) and focusing events represent issues with potential to disturb the 
pre-scheduled agenda. But the possibility of addressing a specific crisis might be 
expected to depend on the number of last-minute intruding elements and the free 
space for additional agenda points. The latter is a reflection of the composition of the 
agenda and the conflict over the issues present there. 
To sum up, the factors which potentially influence the choice for spending attention 
to a particular focusing event and its level can be classified as exogenous and 
endogenous. The first category encompasses the type and magnitude of the event. 
The second one involves two elements – the relationship between the spatial contexts 
of the event and the venue allocating attention (for foreign cases), and the agenda 
capacity.   
 
Expectations for Responsiveness 
This section presents the hypotheses derived on the basis of the theoretical discussion 
above. Each hypothesis applies to both research questions of the study. The 
exogenous and endogenous factors are expected to relate to political attention in the 
European Council in two ways – exercise effect on the likelihood of an issue (a) to 
appear on the agenda and (b) to receive more attention in relative terms. It is 
important to consider these two questions separately as the reasons which play a role 
in the political decision making on each of them do not to follow the same logic.  
Exogenous factors consist of type and magnitude of the focusing events. Following 
the basic distinction between human-caused and natural occurrences, response should 
be more prominent is in the first case due to two reasons. First, incidents occurring 
with human intervention, such as eruptions of civil wars or terrorist attacks have a 




Second, acts committed by people involve political blame allocation, and possible 
sanctioning in the longer term.  
H1a: Man-made incidents are more likely to appear on the agenda than natural 
disasters.  
H1b: Man-made incidents are likely to attract more attention than natural disasters. 
The magnitude of a focusing event can be expected to have a positive relationship 
with attention dynamics. Magnitude can be measured in total number of direct human 
victims, amount of people affected, or incurred costs. Considering vast differences 
across specific focusing events, the number of deaths is probably the most 
comparable indicator. While not encompassing all potential focusing events, it relates 
to a broad range of cases, such as incidents in conflicts, terrorist attacks, most types of 
disasters, etc.  
H2a: The higher the number of killed human beings as a consequence of a focusing 
event, the higher the chance for it to feature on the agenda. 
H2b: The higher the number of killed human beings as a consequence of a focusing 
event, the higher the chance for this event to attract more attention. 
Spending attention to foreign crises might depend on geographical/geopolitical or 
economic considerations regarding the relationship with the foreign country in which 
the event occurs. In terms of geopolitics, it seems plausible to expect that catastrophes 
in immediate or close neighbours have an easier time making it to the agenda, since 
the repercussions of dramatic events can be easily felt close to the border. For 
example, the EU should care more about the wars in former Yugoslavia than civil 
wars in sub-Saharan Africa due to the proximity of the treat and consequences of the 
conflict, such as refugee flows. Thus, we could expect that:  
H3a: The closer the country of the focusing event geographically, the higher the chance 




H3b: The closer the country of the focusing event geographically, the higher the chance 
more attention to be dedicated to the event.  
A geopolitical line of reasoning suggests that the EU should be caring more about 
countries with which it has a special kind of relationship. Thus, rather than to 
geographical neighbours, proximity to strategic partners might be important. For 
example, while the USA is not a geographically close neighbour, it is a crucial political 
partner for the EU in many areas not least by being a member of NATO.  
H4a: Focusing events in countries involved in a strategic partnership with the EU are 
more likely to appear on the agenda than those occurring in the rest of the world.  
H4b: Focusing events in countries involved in a strategic partnership with the EU are 
more likely to attract more attention than those occurring in the rest of the world.  
A second type of territorial logic might concentrate on economic conditions, since the 
wellbeing of citizens at home can be threatened by destabilising events in particular 
key countries. This explanatory line can be operationalised in two manners – in terms 
of trade exchanges or strategic raw materials. Trade flows between the EU and the 
country in which a disaster, vast-scale accident or conflict happens can be disrupted or 
in any case put in danger do to the occurrence.  
H5a: The higher the trade volume between a state and the EU, the stronger chance of 
appearing on the agenda a focusing event occurring in that state will have.  
H5b: The higher the trade volume between a state and the EU, the greater the level of 
attention a focusing event occurring in that state will gain.  
Besides overall economic ties, a more specific criterion might account for 
responsiveness. The EU is largely dependent for energy imports on third countries. 
The first and second oil crises have shown how disturbing real and perceived 
shortages of the ‘black gold’ can be for the economy at large. More recent disputes 
between Russia and Ukraine demonstrated the crucial role of gas imports for some 
member states. Thus, maintaining stability in countries importing oil, gas and related 




H6a: The higher the imports of energy-related products to the EU from a given 
country, the more likely it is for a focusing event occurring in that country to appear on 
the agenda. 
H6b: The higher the imports of energy-related products to the EU from a given 
country, the more likely it is for a focusing event occurring in that country to receive 
more attention. 
Another type of endogenous factor that needs to be controlled for is agenda capacity 
constraints, in particular diversity of the agenda and the level of competition between 
events. Crises are always addressed as shortly as possible after they happen. For the 
European Council this means spending attention to the issue on the next possible 
meeting or in exceptional circumstances calling a summit earlier. But the pre-planned 
agenda which could be upset by the sudden critical event could be more or less 
receptive to new items depending on the amount of issues already present. Very few 
discussed points are mostly a reflection of complexity in reaching agreement on a 
single issue (i.e. leaving no time for additional matters). A generally broader range of 
topics for deliberation suggests lower costs in switching between issues and leaving a 
bit of space for new ones.  
H7a: The more diverse the agenda, the higher the chance focusing events to be 
addressed. 
H7b: The more diverse the agenda, the higher the chance focusing events to receive 
more attention. 
Focusing events do not happen one at a time. Certain periods feature a lower number 
of crises which in turn reduces the pool from which decision makers can select 
matters. When events occur in vast quantity at the same time, the probability of 
addressing each of them individually should be lower as a result of the fierce 
competition.  
H8a: The higher the number of focusing events occurring at a particular point in time, 




H8b: The higher the number of focusing events occurring at a particular point in time, 
the lower the likelihood for any of them to receive more attention.  
 
Data and Approach 
No unified collection of focusing events exists, but various documented records of 
specific types of crises have been compiled. Combining elements of them allows 
creating a pool approximating a database of possible focusing events in the world. 
This study proposes combining three such collections. The International Emergency 
Disaster Database (EM-DAT)77 is used to record natural disasters and industrial 
accidents. For measuring the eruptions of violent conflicts, the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Programme/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset is 
utilised.78 The RAND Database on Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) 
provides a list of terrorist attacks.79 All three data sources contain information on the 
number of people killed in a focusing event and the geographic location of the crisis, 
and overall cover the period 1975–2012. Exceptions to this constitute the terrorism 
data, ending in 2010, and the records on number of people killed in violent conflicts, 
commencing in 1989. 
Since these databases are not developed to trace focusing events as such but any 
historical event within the domain of its type, the amount of entries is in some cases 
quite large and not all events listed can be considered focusing. In particular, many 
incidents are not of large scale which is one the characteristics of a focusing event. 
Therefore, the extraction of the data from two of the sources has been based on scale-
related conditions. Disasters have been considered when the number of killed was at 
least 1000 or the people affected at least 10.000, yielding 3676 cases. Terrorist attacks 
have been included when the causalities (injured or killed humans) have reached the 
                                                          
77 Available at: http://www.emdat.be/database. 
78 Available at: 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/. 




number 100, providing us with 189 events. The armed conflicts database has been 
used in full, with its 1488 cases.80 The total number of focusing events in the final 
database is 5353.  
In order to identify the presence focusing events on the European Council’s agenda 
and the attention spent to them, a new dataset of the Conclusions issued by this 
institution after its regular meetings is utilised.81 Developed within the EU Policy 
Agendas Project (Alexandrova et al., 2014), it covers the period 1975–2012 and 
includes the full text of all Conclusions coded for policy content.82 The dataset has 
been extended for the purpose of this chapter to signify the sections dedicated to or 
based on the occurrence of focusing events.83 This allows creating a pool of all 
focusing events referred to by the European Council, as well as detecting the extent of 
attention each of them has received as a share of the whole agenda of a particular 
meeting.  
It should be noted that not all items classified in the European Council Conclusions 
could be found in the constructed focusing events database. For example, the Tanker 
Amoco Cadiz crash (1978) and Prestige wreck (2002) causing large oil spills were not 
present in the disasters dataset. Another example can be seen in international crises, 
such as the financial crisis of 2008 or the oil crises of the 1970s. While these 
unintended exclusions limit the pool of focusing events discussed in the European 
Council, the reduction in data is systematic and should not affect the final results. 
Moreover, most of the excluded events are of such types that they do not correspond 
to the overall measurements of effects. The oil spills, for an instance, do not have 
human casualties but environmental impact and the two are clearly not directly 
comparable.  
                                                          
80 Only one entry has been excluded due to overlap with the RDWTI data. 
81 Available at: http://www.policyagendas.eu/data.html.  
82 The European Council began regular meetings in 1975. 
83 A section is not always fully dedicated to the occurrence of the focusing event but often 




Besides these data a few additional sources are consulted on order to classify the EU 
relationship with countries in the world for the purposes of hypotheses 3-6. As 
neighbouring countries are considered all EU member states prior to the date of their 
accession (e.g. Sweden before 1995), the current countries within the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, EFTA members, and the states of the Western Balkans. For 
categorising strategic partners the current classification of the EU on this term is 
applied.84 The total volume of external trade between the EU and third countries is 
recorded on an annual basis from Eurostat (available since 1988).85 Also from 
Eurostat, yearly data on imports of energy-related products, i.e. oils, gases and similar 
products from all third states is gathered (available since 1988).86 The two agenda 
capacity measures are calculated on the basis of the existing data. The number of 
focusing events constitutes a measure of all events contained in the 5353-cases 
database calculated per year. Agenda diversity is estimated via the Shannon’s H index, 
also measured on an annual basis.  
It should be noted that the entries in database correspond to single events in the case 
of terrorist attacks and disasters but constitute annual entries for conflicts. Therefore, 
attention has been aggregated in the latter case to reflect yearly discussions. While this 
might seem to suggest lack of systematicity, in fact it does not pose a real problem 
since yearly violent conflicts represent a sum of a range of incidents. Table 6.1 
presents descriptive statistics for all variables. It does so for the full dataset (used in 
hypotheses a) and a subset of it containing only the pool of entries corresponding to 
focusing events discussed by the European Council (used in hypotheses b). 
 
                                                          
84 It covers 10 states: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South 
Korea, and the USA. See http://strategicpartnerships.eu/. 
85 Derived from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/international_trade/data/database. 
86 Chapter 27 of the Harmonised System of tariff nomenclature (HS2-HS4): Mineral fuels, 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Attention to Focusing Events in the European Council 
The total number of unique focusing events identified in the European Council 
Conclusions is 114. Figure 6.1 displays the frequency of all of them per meeting. On 
over half of all summits (55 per cent) a crisis of some kind triggered attention. More 
often a single event was mentioned but in substantive amount of cases the number 
went up to between 2 and 5. Some focusing events were addressed more than once on 
consecutive meetings because of the prominence of the issue, its evolving nature (e.g. 
escalation of a conflict), or both. This pulls up the total number of events (unique and 
repeated ones) discussed in all meetings to 257.  
 
Figure 6.1. Frequency of unique focusing events on the European Council agenda, 
1975-2012 
Ten per cent of all the text in the European Council Conclusions is associated with a 
focusing event.87 Within this share most of the attention (some 70 per cent) goes to 
external or international events, covering especially the domains of general foreign 
affairs and peace and security but touching upon a range of other issues, in particular 
                                                          




civil rights and immigration. The crises occurring within the EU or seen through the 
prism of domestic effects are related to a range of themes, the most prominent of 
which being law and crime, energy, and business and finance. Considering the 
typology of focusing events, it appears that four fifths of the unique cases are man-
made. They feature eruptions of violent conflicts and wars, terrorist attacks and a few 
specific cases like invasions, assassinations, nuclear tests, etc. Natural disasters (floods, 
tsunami, and earthquakes) and famine are among the most common kinds of 
unguided actions with unintentional consequences. 
The quantity of attention received by different crises and catastrophes also varies. On 
six summits the whole agenda of the European Council consisted of issues stemming 
directly from a focusing event. These meetings were extraordinary (4), informal (1), or 
both (1). The events comprised the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq disarmament crisis, 
the start of the Russia-Georgia war, the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Second 
Intifada in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Fall of the Berlin Wall. All of these 
besides the key step in the Middle East conflict were powerful enough to require the 
calling of an extraordinary meeting. Had there been a meeting scheduled shortly 
afterwards the attention would probably have been lower in relative terms. For the 
rest of the summits attention fluctuated between a tiny portion and a substantive 
amount. The mean share of attention to focusing events at all meetings including at 
least one occurrence is 23 per cent with a standard deviation of 24. 
The total number of focusing events incorporated in the final dataset – 134 (as 
presented in table 6.1) – differs from the frequency of focusing events addressed in 
the Conclusions – 114 unique cases, or 257 in total including repeated ones. Besides 
the already mentioned exclusion of some events (like oil spills) this discrepancy is due 
to two other reasons. First, in the final dataset, some events that were mentioned as a 
single case in the European Council are included as multiple entries because the 
discussion on the agenda referred to a region, rather than a country. Examples include 
hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 and famine in the Sahel region in 1983. 
Third, some conflict-related events that were repeatedly discussed in the European 
Council are reduced to a single annual entry due to the structure of the conflict data. 




discussed on 3 meetings in 2002, and the Syrian Civil War present on the agenda of 4 
summits in 2012. Therefore, the final dataset covers 184 focusing events found in the 
Conclusions, 62 of which are unique.  
 
Analysing the Agenda-Upsetting Effect 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, the hypotheses are tested on the full version 
of the dataset in order to answer the question what determines the appearance of 
focusing events on the European Council agenda (a). The dependent variable here is 
dichotomous indicating whether each of the 5353 crises was discussed at all or not 
(see table 6.1). Therefore a logistic regression is used. The second step in the analysis 
addresses the question what determines the level of attention a focusing event 
receives. Here the dependent variable corresponds to the segment of attention each 
focusing event has been allocated as a share of the total agenda of the respective 
meeting. Thus, it contains only a subset of 134 focusing events featured in the full 
dataset, which the European Council referred to. In this case a fractional logic model 
is utilised as it is the most suitable method for fractional dependent variables, i.e. 
ranging between zero and one and including the extremes (Papke & Wooldridge, 
1996).  
Table 6.2 presents the first analysis. The type of focusing event indeed has an effect 
on agenda access (H1a). Considering the full model (7), it appears that if a focusing 
event is man-made, it has a 5.13 per cent higher probability to appear on the agenda. 
The relevance of number of people killed in a conflict (H2a) is not so straightforward. 
It does not seem to matter in the simple model (controlling only for agenda capacity 
factors) but becomes significant in the full model. Performing model 7 with an added 
interaction effect between event type and number of victims (not shown) yields a 
significant interaction suggesting that man-made focusing events with higher number 
of casualties might be more likely to fall in the spotlight of attention. Therefore, it 
seems that we need a more fine grained measure of number of deaths, sensitive to 




(especially disasters versus man-made catastrophes) might not send the same signal to 
policy makers. 
From the exogenous elements economic ties or oil imports with the country in which 
the event happens do not have an effect (H5a and 6a). Among the factors that 
significantly exercise an effect on the placement of a crisis on the agenda are the two 
geopolitical considerations. Focusing events in neighbouring countries are much more 
likely to be attended to, whereas those erupting in strategic partners have a lower 
chance to appear on the agenda. The first finding is especially important due to the 
substantial size of its effect. Being a neighbouring country is associated with a 7.54 per 
cent increase in the probability of a focusing event featuring in the European Council 
discussions, holding all other variables constant (model 7). Being a strategic partner is 
related to a reduction in this probability by 1.2 per cent, again holding all other 
variables constant (model 7). While hypothesis 3a is confirmed, the reversed findings 
on hypothesis 4a are a bit puzzling at a first glance. The EU seems to care significantly 
less about crises in strategic partners than in the rest of the world even if the 
difference is not vast. Yet, there seems to be a logical explanation behind this striking 
result. Probably the countries with which the EU has formal partnership ties are the 
ones where relations are well established and can hardly be disturbed by focusing 
events of unpleasant character. Moreover, spending attention to such events would 
not have much impact on the bilateral ties anyway and it is therefore more worthy to 
invest agenda time in urgent matters occurring on territories where there is still 
something to gain.  
Regarding the control variables on institutional agenda constraints, we see that the 
diversity of the agenda does not play a role in determining whether to respond to 
focusing events. The annual number of the latter has significant impact on the chance 
of an individual crisis to be addressed only in some of the models and not in the final 
one. Thus, increasing the competition between focusing events might lower the 
chance for an individual event to appear on the agenda but the evidence is not very 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.3 presents the second step in the analysis – fractional logits on the subset of 
the data featuring only those focusing events discussed in the European Council. 
Since the coefficients in a fractional logic are not very informative, marginal effects are 
presented. In these models we see that the type of event and amount of human deaths 
do not influence the level of attention a crisis receives (H1b and 2b). Like in the 
previous tests we observe country-bound logic but in this case the pattern is slightly 
different. Focusing events in neighbouring countries are not only more likely to 
receive attention generally (H3a) but they can also be expected to gain more attention 
once discussed (H3b). In particular, focusing events occurring in neighbouring 
countries are associated with an increase in attention of 0.05 percentage points 
compared to those in countries from the rest of the world (model 7). This effect is 
quite large and significant at the 0.01 per cent level. Being a strategic partner or having 
oil trade with the EU does not play a significant role (H4b and 6b). Yet, what we see 
here is an additional economic ties explanation. Although with a relatively weak 
power, stronger trade interchange between the EU and a third country seems to go 
hand in hand with stronger attention to focusing events in that state (H5b). In 
determining the level of attention to be spent on urgent crises, neither the 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Focusing events play an important role in the policy cycle with their power to disrupt 
the preferences of the day and reshuffle agendas. Large scale dramatic phenomena are 
by default triggers for political attention but such crises are in fact not so rare. 
Therefore, spending attention in policy venues is not a matter of automatic reaction 
mechanism but involves the element of political choice. Understanding the decision-
making logic behind the placement of a focusing event on the agenda and the 
allocation of a certain level of attention to it has broader implications for the way 
political institutions function in agenda-setting processes. Starting such an inquiry with 
the case study of the EU is a tough test for disentangling stable logics of impact, since 
the EU is a polity in the making. A focus on the European Council is justified as it 
presents most appropriate venue for immediate reaction in the EU, an institution 
prone to rhetorical responsiveness.  
Combining data from multiple sources, the study conducts the first systematic analysis 
of determinants of attention to focusing events over a period longer than two decades. 
The results demonstrate that decisions regarding the overall placement of crises on the 
EU agenda are not ad-hoc but underscored by a ‘neighbourhood attraction’. The 
closer a country is to the EU geographically the more likely it is events occurring on 
its territory to elicit some response from the European Council, as well as to receive a 
higher portion of its attention eventually. It is notable that the need to address 
catastrophes in strategic partners is rather weak, as crises elsewhere are more likely to 
make it to the agenda. On the other hand, once a focusing event is addressed, besides 
the neighbourhood logic an economic ties dimension seems to exercise a positive 
effect though in a rather weak fashion. Furthermore, the type of event plays a role in 
granting agenda access, with man-made incidents being more likely to appear as a 
discussion point than natural disasters. This factor however does not have an impact 
on the level of attention. The results also suggest that studies which combine various 
types of focusing events need to come up with a more elaborate measure of 
magnitude, since the number of people killed in a conflict and a disaster cannot be 




The fact that the EU is foremost interested in what is going on in its immediate 
environment suggests that it is first of all a regional organisation. This finding goes 
also hand in hand with the fact that widening has always been a core dimension in 
European integration. The neighbours are important because they might become 
Union members or at least be part of a more fluid integrationist network, like the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. But this trait is probably not exceptional to the EU. 
There are reasons to believe that any polity should activate its immediate reaction 
mechanisms mostly when a dramatic event is occurring close to its borders, therefore 
threatening to have some domestic impact as well. The motivation behind spending 
more attention to focusing events in close neighbours is probably grounded in 
expectations for internal repercussions. 
The finding that the European Council is more likely to address man-made accidents 
rather than natural disasters corresponds with a prevention logic which has two 
important considerations. Focusing events happening as a result of guided human 
action provide learning examples on how to tackle contemporary security challenges. 
Since such challenges usually have a global implication, this certainly implies domestic 
effects even if the scope varies. External man-made accidents and catastrophes also 
present an opportunity for positioning in international affairs, and addressing such 
matters can be the first step in involvement in a military or peace coalition with long-
term implications for the EU’s image as an international player. 
The recent study has laid the basis for theorising on the logic of responsiveness to 
focusing events. The distinction between potential and effective focusing events proves to 
be important and we cannot anymore proceed with the assumption that any striking 
sudden occurrence of a large scale will automatically trigger attention. The selection of 
the venue for responsiveness is crucial for the kind of expectations one can suggest on 
attention dynamics on focusing events. Further research should test the ‘successful 
ingredients’ for allocating attention on such occurrences on other political systems and 
across venues. It should also concentrate on developing a more fine-grained measure 
of magnitude. With the creation of new event datasets it might become possible to 
differentiate further the dichotomous typology of focusing events, yielding useful 










The European Council, born outside the EU treaty framework and powerful by the 
virtue of its own composition, is nowadays an informal agenda setter of the Union. It 
has been involved in multiple ways in steering the European integration process – 
taking vital decisions in deadlocked situations, giving birth to new initiatives and 
regularly monitoring all kinds of developments.  This institution has been functioning 
as a regular meeting arena since 1975, enjoying high level of discretion regarding the 
issues to be discussed and the intimate benefit of closed-door negotiations. With the 
approaching date of a new meeting of the European Council the media alertness is 
increasing and EU affairs analysts start making predictions about the topics which the 
Heads of State and Government are going to address. Despite the enormous 
implications of the discussions held at the summits for the overall EU policy-making 
process, little is known about the dynamics that drive agenda composition within the 
European Council. Therefore, this dissertation set to provide a systematic analysis of 
the allocation of attention at the summits and the factors which influence shifts in this 
attention.  
The research first embarked on the task of classifying the nature of the agenda in 
relation to the institution’s standing in the EU policy-making framework, focusing on 
the magnitude and level of attention changes. The studies then focused on specific 
aspects which could potentially act as agenda determinants and critically evaluated 
their role in analyses covering long-term periods. In particular, factors belonging to 
three broad categories were considered – institutional conditions, external 
stakeholders’ effect and the ‘problem stream’. The rich empirical material allowed 
drawing conclusions regarding the extent to which the various determinants exercise 
an agenda-setting effect, and in some respects also the conditions under which this 
happens. Besides offering insightful empirical findings, the five pieces of research 




postulates, such as the punctuated equilibrium model, to test in the EU context and 
conduce to thickening the theoretical basis via proposing complementary elements.  
 
Out of the Black Box: Main Findings 
Empirical Patterns and Lessons 
Over almost four decades of functioning the European Council has dealt with a 
multiplicity of issues but the overall attention has been distributed disproportionately. 
The most visible themes are foreign affairs, macroeconomics and governance88, 
occupying altogether about half of the agenda space. The pattern of attention shifts 
across topics over time corresponds well with the punctuated equilibrium theory, 
which predicts relative stability interspersed by substantial changes. But the European 
Council’s issue attention pattern is notable for its even stronger level of high negative 
change. For this institution it is relatively easy to spend attention to one topic and 
completely ignore it at the following summit. Almost no policy theme besides the big 
three is secured from dropping off the agenda. Despite this outstanding feature, the 
degree of peakedness of the distribution of attention change (kurtosis) is quite similar 
to this of other process type agendas, such as hearings in the US Congress or coalition 
agreements in multiparty parliamentary systems. This reflects the twofold position of 
the European Council in the EU’s institution framework. It sets in motion policy 
input by initiating new programmes and delegating actions to other institutions but at 
the same time produces policy output when taking crucial decisions or functioning as 
conflict arbiter.  
Considering the nature of attention change over time, the European Council agenda 
has undergone an evolution in both scope and spread across domains. During the 
early years of the institution, from the mid-70s till the end of the 80s, the agenda was 
                                                          
88 The term governance is used to refer to issues like functioning of government institutions, 
relationships between the EU, its member states and regions, bureaucratic oversight, regulation 




gradually becoming more diverse but also displaying a lot of instability between 
consecutive years. Since the time of negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, the overall 
trend of increasing fragmentation was preserved although at a slower speed but an 
additional effect became visible. The period 1991-2010 features three similar 
oscillating patterns after each other – moving from concentration to diversity and 
back to concentration. This specific shape is somewhat a reflection of balancing 
between conflicting forces, such as expansion of areas of involvement and the need to 
focus on major problems. Yet, even more it seems to be related to the share of 
attention received by the three core topics on the agenda – foreign affairs, 
macroeconomics and governance. In the post-1991 period, when the attention to 
these three themes increased the agenda diversity underwent a reduction, while it 
expanded at the times of their decline. Lastly, concentration and fragmentation shifts 
appear to be affected by the total volume of the agenda, with higher diversity visible at 
moments of contraction of this volume.  
Corresponding with the politically elevated position of the institution, attention in the 
European Council is higher on topics within the scope of core functions of 
government. This is the underlining issue character type with strongest conditioning 
power for the distribution of attention. However, a second line of issue character with 
smaller explanatory value also plays a role, and its degree varies over time. Topics can 
gain more attention when economic attributes are underlined, making it possible for 
non-core issues to occupy substantive portions of attention at single meetings when 
they are wrapped in economic references and implications. Selecting what issue 
character to emphasise is essentially a political decision in the hands of the participants 
in the policy process with agenda-setting power acting within the constraints of 
external influences. Applying this model to the European Council, it is possible to see 
what factors are responsible for the rises and falls in prominence of the economic 
character line. During the period 1995-2006, attention allocation was more likely to be 
affected by an economic dimension when the European Council had predominantly 
left-wing orientation and the aggregate public deficit figure in the EU was on the rise. 
While generally, no specific Head of State or Government can be seen as 




agenda, the office of the Presidency is often considered a key to such influence. 
Within the European Council the Presidency was chairing the summits during its half-
annual rotating term until the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty which 
introduced the post of a permanent President. However, thorough comparative 
analysis shows lack of any privilege in European Council agenda setting for the 
Presidency-holder. This conclusion is derived via an examination of issue prioritisation 
in European Council Conclusions and national executive agendas in five member 
states: Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. These five 
countries constitute a representative sample of the whole population of EU member 
state in terms of size and geography (at least until the big enlargement). Yet, none of 
them was more powerful in lining up the European agenda with its national one when 
running the Presidency compared to the times when it was just a ‘simple’ member. 
Thus, while the overall agenda of the European Council might be a battle field where 
each member state tries to push for its own preferred issues, the office of the 
Presidency does not provide an institutional advantage in this respect. 
The European Council is located at the top of the political hierarchy in the EU, a 
position quite distant from ordinary citizens, which at a first glance suggests one 
should not expect any direct interaction between the two to occur. Yet, because of its 
visibility and discretion in addressing issues the European Council might have both 
the motivation and the ability to respond to the public’s concerns. In fact it can do so 
in a rhetorical way, by giving more attention to the topics which the citizens consider 
to be important at a given moment. The analysis of the relationship between the 
agendas of the European top and the EU public on ten different policy fields shows 
differentiated responsiveness – present only in some issue areas. The size of attention 
in the European Council on crime, economics, environment, and immigration is 
predicted well by the issue prominence on the citizen’s most important problem list. 
But on the topics education, employment, health, inflation, taxation and terrorism no 
relationship exists. The responsiveness pattern does not reflect traditional domains 
within European Council discussions, and more research is necessary to disentangle 
the logic behind the existing differentiated responsiveness. Yet, jurisdictional 




responsiveness is considered. On environmental matters where the EU has higher 
level of jurisdictions and stronger policy involvement the European Council is 
following public concerns more than on crime, economics, and immigration. 
The agenda of the EU top is often shaken by focusing events. The empirical 
investigation of this long-ago-suggested claim shows that ten per cent of the contents 
in the Conclusions are associated with a focusing event. But while the European 
Council has spent portions of attention to various sudden striking occurrences, it has 
by no means addressed all events which could potentially be considered ‘focusing’ 
over the last almost 40 years. The EU leaders have been setting in force selection 
mechanisms on the basis of characteristics of the crisis situation and the relationship 
between the EU and the event’s geographic locus. Focusing events have a higher 
chance to appear on the agenda when they are man-made (i.e. not natural). They are 
also more likely to be discussed when taking place in a neighbouring country or 
region. The number of casualties plays a role but its impact is not straightforward, and 
probably depends on the type of event. Once an item is on the agenda the factors 
which influence how much it will be discussed are slightly different. Focusing events 
happening in countries in the neighbourhood are more prominent also in attention 
levels, but stronger economic ties between the country of origin and the EU affect the 
attention size positively as well.  
In short, the European Council shows disproportionate information processing of 
policy issues resulting in a punctuated pattern of attention change. Considering the 
three groups of categories of agenda determinants – institutional conditions, external 
stakeholders’ effect and the ‘problem stream’ – it seems that each of them can have an 
effect depending on various conditions. Institutional role expectations predict the 
predisposition of the European Council towards core themes of government. The 
institutional context however, in the face of the Presidency, does not add to the 
leverage of individual member states in advocating domestic preferences. The public is 
not an ignored external stakeholder despite of its distance but citizens’ concerns are 
addresses only selectively. The problem stream is clearly putting pressure on the 
Heads of State and Government to react. Rising negative indicators, such as public 




domains. Last, focusing events with specific characteristics can upset the agenda, via 
adding new issues which demand attention.  
 
Theoretical Contributions 
One of the major advances of agenda-setting theory undertaken with the research in 
this dissertation is the application of the punctuated equilibrium model to the 
European Council. John called the EU ‘the toughest test for the Policy Agendas 
Project’ (2006: 982) but the first systematic examination of the agenda of a core EU 
institution with the toolbox of this project demonstrates that the Union is functioning 
as an ordinary political system. As any other political institution, the European 
Council has to cope with the problem of bounded rationality and make sacrifices of 
some topics while rewarding others at its summits. The fact that the nature of 
attention change in this institution is similar to other process agendas, such as for 
example parliamentary interpellations in Denmark and Belgium or Hearings in the US 
Congress (Baumgartner et al., 2009), confirms once again that there is systematic logic 
regarding the level of friction across types of policy agendas. This logic pertains to the 
EU system as well. 
The research on shifts in attention focusing on the temporal aspect of such dynamics 
contributes to substantiating the punctuated equilibrium model further. Relying on the 
measure of entropy as an indicator of the agenda diversity (John & Jennings, 2010), it 
is possible to classify periods of attention evolution in terms of scope and dispersion.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the European Council experiences a volatile pattern 
of agenda diversity with an upward trend. This suggests that it is still finding its place 
in the institutional architecture but also gradually expanding its remit of activity. Since 
the early 1990s a trice repeated stable oscillatory patterns is visible starting with 
stepwise expansion of diversity followed by a stepwise contraction. This continuous 
rebalancing of attention dispersion over a few years period is a reflection of rises and 
falls in prominence of the three core issues – foreign affairs, macroeconomics and 




et al., 2011), suggesting once again that similarity between agendas is related to the 
position in the institutional hierarchy and not to systemic factors. 
The contraposition of core themes of governance and the remaining topics is quite 
strong for the European Council. However, it is not the only determining line of 
attention distribution. The research in this dissertation proposed a novel model on 
explaining agenda setting via the notion of issue character. The emphasising of a 
specific issue character line by political actors has direct impact on the allocation of 
attention. In the European Council, besides the core themes logic an economic load 
also conditions the relative presence of topics on the agenda. Thus, issue character can 
be used as an intermediary step for predicting the overall allocation of political 
attention via a range of other theoretically derived factors. These factors can be related 
to both the participants in the policy process and the context around them. The study 
of the economic issue character line in the European Council demonstrates that in 
practice both types of elements influence the uplifting of its prominence. The two-
stage model of predicting attention allocation can be applied to any political agenda. It 
offers a new approach able to account for the problem of ignorance of issue 
competition and bounded rationality in studies focused on attention determinants for 
a specific policy domain. 
Another theoretical advancement is reflected in the examination of the term rhetorical 
responsiveness (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). This concept introduced a few years 
ago adds to the literature of political responsiveness by emphasising that reacting to 
public demands is not only associated with effective policy outputs but also with 
general discussions and considerations. In short, the allocation of political attention is 
also a sort of responsiveness, the most appropriate way for some institutions to react. 
Considering the politically elevated but to some extent also symbolic role of European 
Council Conclusions and the general formal lack of legislative functions of this 
institution, it appears as a perfect target for rhetorical responsiveness. Doing the first 
of this kind study on the EU level demonstrates the relevance of using this concept. 
The findings of differentiated level of responsiveness show the need of further 




The last study in the dissertation makes first steps into building of a systematic theory 
of attention to focusing events. The notion that sudden striking occurrences can 
overturn agendas is old but the conditions under which this in fact happens have not 
been systematically explored. Two types of factors could influence the likelihood of 
potential focusing events to materialise in effective ones considered from the 
respective of the venue that exhibits a reaction – exogenous and endogenous ones. 
Exogenous characteristics are those directly stemming from the nature of the event, 
such as magnitude or type. Endogenous characteristics reflect a relationship between 
the agenda-setting venue and the locus of the occurrence. For example, political or 
economic relations between states or certain interdependencies belong to this group. 
Endogenous features can also relate to the nature of the agenda, most notably to its 
capacity to incorporate additional issues. The study on the European Council 
demonstrates that different specific factors within both categories have determined 
the placement of focusing events on the European Council agenda and the level of 
attention they receive.  
In short, the dissertation has offered an application of existing theoretical standpoints 
to the EU context, which in some respects can be considered challenging. In 
particular, the punctuated equilibrium theory was applied to the European Council, 
successfully explaining shifts in attention, with further exploration of temporal 
dynamics and their underlying reasoning. Moreover, the concept of rhetorical 
responsiveness was utilised in the EU multi-level system, with mixed results requiring 
further theorising on the logic behind differentiated responsiveness. The studies in 
this dissertation also make first steps towards theory building by proposing a two-
stage model for disentangling the composition of complete agendas over long time 
periods. Last but not least, delving into the logic of responding to focusing events 
delivers arguments on which a substantive theory of reactivity to such occurrences can 






Implications for Further Research 
The European Council as a Policy Venue 
The Presidency Conclusions issued after almost every summit are a rich source of the 
attention to policy issues. The results of the first study show that these Conclusions 
are very similar to the executive speeches in nation states both in terms of overall 
composition and the nature of attention change. This suggests that the de facto role of 
the European Council in the EU’s institutional framework is much closer to that of a 
top executive than one might wish to admit. Calling this institution the government of 
the EU might sound exaggerated considering its absence in the official decision-
making procedures and the informality with which it can impose decisions. Yet, its 
output and information processing manner hint at a functional layer of government in 
EU politics, confirming the claim of legal scholars and practitioners that this 
institution is a key locus of executive power in the Union (e.g. Curtin, 2009; 
Peeperkorn, 2013). Therefore, further research needs to reconsider the role of the 
European Council in EU agenda setting and place a stronger emphasis on its 
Conclusions in studies of EU agenda formation. A step in this direction has been 
undertaken recently in an attempt to relate the topical output of the summits to the 
EU’s decision-making modes (Puetter, 2013). 
A step beyond the scope of attention evolution is an analysis incorporating state 
positions and attitudes. While this will be impossible to disentangle on the basis of the 
Conclusions solely, in-depth interviews can shed more light on the dynamics behind 
the bargaining process at the summits (as Puetter's 2013 study demonstrates). With 
gradual opening of access to classified archival data, confidential records from the 
meetings or their preparatory stages can be explored as additional evidence.89 The 
acquisition of this type of data could allow for more systematic analysis of important 
decisions and attempts for placing issues on the agenda. The position and preferences 
derived from declassified historical archives could be combined with the existing 
                                                          
89 For example, the UK has declassified such records older than 30 years. They are 




dataset on European Council Conclusions to answer a range of relevant research 
questions. It will be possible, for example, to analyse the role of specific state leaders 
in promoting policy initiatives, or to determine why certain issues have failed to 
appear in the final version of the Conclusions.  
Existing research provides evidence for no permanent groupings among the Heads of 
State and Government that could dominate the agenda in a longitudinal perspective 
(Tallberg, 2008a). This dissertation demonstrated that the institutionally elevated 
office of the Presidency does not offer a long-term de facto advantage for any 
member state either. Both findings suggest that national preferences, even if they are 
fiercely defended, are placed on the negotiation table in the context of many 
constraints. Some of them stem from the environment which calls for reaction – 
signals coming in the form of a financial crisis, a devastating earthquake or citizens’ 
public disagreement with a policy course. But other constraints are subject to 
behavioural powers within the institution’s framework. The information processing 
capacity of state leaders sitting together in the European Council is limited, and 
scheduling an additional number of meetings has only narrowly extended this leeway. 
More research needs to be done on the manner in which information is processed 
beyond the formula of punctuated equilibrium. Recent attempts in this direction try to 
zoom in the leptokurtic distribution of attention change in order to understand its 
longitudinal development (Alexandrova, Carammia, & Timmermans, 2014) or suggest 
a delicate balance between ‘routine monitoring’ and ‘selective targeting’ regarding the 
European Council’s mode of work (Carammia, Princen, & Timmermans, 2013). 
Building on the insights from these studies, and conducting additional systematic 
analyses will eventually allow us to grasp the nature and role of behavioural constraints 
in agenda setting at the EU top. 
 
Disentangling the EU Policy-Making Process 
The studies in this dissertation reveal that the European Council is a crucial policy 




addressing citizens’ concerns. Their results underline the importance of considering 
this institution in research on EU policy making alongside the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament. The European Council’s monitoring of various 
developments, including crises and rising negative indicators, results in swift attention 
shifts. Being the gatekeeper of the ‘high politics’ route (Princen & Rhinard, 2006), 
these reactions can go further and materialise in policy initiatives which the 
Commission takes up. The extent to which ideas originating with the European 
Council are reworked into specific proposals is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Recent research testifies that this relationship might be quite powerful with the 
European Council pulling the strains (Eggermont, 2012). Therefore, systematic 
analysis of the de facto involvement of the European Council in legislative initiative 
and decision making is necessary if we want to grasp how these processes actually 
work in the EU. 
Besides research on inter-institutional relationships, policy area studies on the EU 
should incorporate the European Council in their scope of analysis. The wide variety 
of issues the Heads of State and Government have addressed or induced cooperation 
in is a sufficiently compelling reason. A recent study on the EU’s energy agenda 
demonstrates that we cannot analyse the developments in this area without 
considering the multifaceted involvement of the European Council. It was the driver 
for building new initiatives, such as ‘Energy Policy for Europe’, deliberated and made 
key choices in reaction to focusing events like the second oil crisis, and materialised 
issue linkages, such as incorporating energy security in the EU’s external relations 
(Alexandrova & Timmermans, forthcoming). While it is an old wisdom that the 
European Council is the body responsible for history-making decisions, in particular 
via treaty change, its significant impact on day-to-day agenda shaping and policy 
modelling also becomes to get recognised. Therefore, research on EU issue portrayal 
and competition needs to place a stronger emphasis on the role of the European 
Council in its scientific enquiries. 
The findings on determinants of the European Council agenda also pose questions to 
the nature and direction of European integration. The discovered rhetorical 




democratic deficit thesis. But we need similar cross-sectional studies to analyse the 
scope and level of effective responsiveness since existing research focuses only on 
overall support for EU integration (e.g. Toshkov, 2011) and ignores public 
preferences on specific issues. Acquiring such knowledge is crucial for juxtaposing 
reality against popular myths about the vices of the Union. Another major question 
indirectly touched by the research in this dissertation concerns the power and position 
of the EU in the global order. The analysis of conditions under which focusing events 
materialise on the agenda presents a neighbourhood bias. The European Council is 
more likely both to react and pay more attention to striking events in the world if they 
occur next door. While this is probably a logical supervisory mechanism towards one’s 
own backyard, it might also point out that the EU is still only a regional organisation 
rather than a global player. Such a proposition clearly requires theoretically 
underpinned analysis in order to reconcile the self-perceptions and aspirations of the 
Union with the empirical reality. 
 
Construction of Policy Agendas in Political Institutions 
The studies on the European Council demonstrate that the building of a political 
agenda is a process in which multiple factors exercise influence at the same time. 
Constructing a single model which can incorporate all is hardly possible due to the 
different foci (e.g. micro vs. macro policy level) and the variety in which available data 
can be measured. Yet, separate systematic analyses of different agenda-setting 
determinants yield evidence for the extent to which specific variables matter and the 
conditions under which they can become crucial. While such an approach has its 
shortcomings, in particular the low chance to find jointly working effects or such that 
may cancel each other, overall it provides more parsimonious and straightforward 
explanations. Therefore, conducting separate analyses on specific factors is still the 
most suitable way to move such research forward. 
One direction in which the study of policy agendas can progress is comparative 




that an institution which at a first glance appears unique shares a lot of similarities 
with other venues in nation states (see also Baumgartner et al., 2009). Expanding the 
investigations offered in some of the studies in this dissertation towards other 
comparable contexts could help build stronger theories of agenda formation. For 
example, the idea of focusing events as powerful drivers in reshuffling attention in 
policy venues is quite well-known. But so far there have been no studies trying to 
unfold a systematic logic behind spending attention to such events. The analysis of the 
European Council demonstrated that there are both endogenous and exogenous 
factors which underscore the reaction mechanism. Expanding research towards other 
political institutions can provide insights into the similarities and differences in 
engaging with such unexpected information. Analysing the determinants of attention 
across different types of venues – executives, legislatives, media, the public, etc. – can 
enlighten us also on the systemic variation in reactivity.  
Another possible direction for research building up on the findings of this dissertation 
is the incorporation of the two-step agenda-setting model into various studies of 
overall agenda composition. Using data reduction techniques on policy agendas 
datasets will enable scholars to disentangle dominant types of issue character and their 
relative emphasis over time. This finding can then serve as the basis for testing 
theoretically derived hypotheses on determinants of the overall allocation of attention. 
Such analyses lack the detailed focus of case studies on specific policy areas but more 
importantly they do not share the pitfalls of case-study research – its limited scope and 
impossibility to account for cross-domain issue competition. Employing the two-stage 
agenda-setting model permits to draw conclusions on the factors which influence the 
overall shifts in issue character emphasis, and therewith thematic loadings of policy 
talk regarding particular issues.  
A single dissertation is only a drop in the sea of knowledge. But it also lays a 
foundation on which others to build and delve further. This dissertation offered fresh 
insights into the functioning of a powerful institution, which for over almost forty 
years has regularly guided the moves of the most successful experiment in 
international cooperation thus far, the EU, which nowadays functions as an ordinary 




the policy-making process – agenda setting – and the variety of factors which 
influence attention to issues by political actors. The findings have far-reaching 
implication for research and practice. They can be expanded into a number of 
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Annex 1: The European Council in the EC/ EU Treaties  








Act (SEA)   
1986/ 1987 
Title I Common Provisions, Article 2 
The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of 
Government of the Member States and the President of the 
Commission of the European Communities. They shall be assisted by 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and by a Member of the Commission. 




Title I Common Provisions, Article D 
The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and shall define the general political 
guidelines thereof. 
The European Council shall bring together the Heads of State or of 
Government of the Member States and the President of the 
Commission. 
They shall be assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the 
Member States and by a Member of the Commission. The European 
Council shall meet at least twice a year, under the chairmanship of the 
Head of State or of Government of the Member State which holds the 
Presidency of the Council. 
The European Council shall submit to the European Parliament a 
report after each of its meetings and a yearly written report on the 








No changes to Art. 4, Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
Declaration on the venue for European Councils 
As from 2002, one European Council meeting per Presidency will be 
held in Brussels. When the Union comprises 18 members, all 
European Council meetings will be held in Brussels. 
Lisbon 
Treaty 
Article 9 – The European Council listed among the EU institutions  
 




2007/ 2009 Treaty of Amsterdam) 
1. The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary 
impetus for its development and shall define the general political 
directions and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislative 
functions. 
2. The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or 
Government of the Member States, together with its President and the 
President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall take part in its work. 
3. The European Council shall meet twice every six months, convened 
by its President. When the agenda so requires, the members of the 
European Council may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in 
the case of the President of the Commission, by a member of the 
Commission. When the situation so requires, the President shall 
convene a special meeting of the European Council. 
4. Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the 
European Council shall be taken by consensus. 
5. The European Council shall elect its President, by a qualified 
majority, for a term of two and a half years, renewable once. In the 
event of an impediment or serious misconduct, the European Council 
can end the President's term of office in accordance with the same 
procedure. 
6. The President of the European Council: 
(a) shall chair it and drive forward its work; 
(b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the 
European Council in cooperation with the President of the 
Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs 
Council; 
(c) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the 
European Council; 
(d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the 
meetings of the European Council. 
The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that 
capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice 
to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy. 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annex 3: Dataset of Policy-Content-Coded European Council 
Conclusions  
The European Council Conclusions dataset was developed within the framework of 
the Comparative Agendas Project. This project started in the early 1990s with the 
work of Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones on the US (cf. also Baumgartner, Jones, 
& MacLeod, 1998; Baumgartner & Jones, 2005). The international collaboration 
network built over the years90 is united around a shared notion about the way policy 
venues process issues and uses a common instrument for detecting attention patterns 
in such venues. In particular, the approach consists of measuring attention to policy 
issues via classifying the occurrence of these issues in texts on the basis of a detailed 
typology of policy fields. This process is conducted via a common codebook with 
most features of it shared by the Policy Agendas community, but also adjusted to 
national differences in each of the individual projects, including the EU.  
Over the course of 2010-2011 (with an update in 2013) two teams of researchers and 
student assistants at Catania and The Hague conducted content coding of the 
European Council Conclusions. The work stated by collecting all issued Conclusions 
(some of which were then not publicly available) and recording some basic data about 
them and their context. In particular, the following elements were traced: the date of 
the meeting, the year, the location, the member state holding the Presidency (relevant 
until the introduction of a permanent president in December 2009), the consecutive 
number of the Presidency (again, until 2009), and the type of meeting (three separate 
variables indicate whether the summit was informal, extraordinary, and Council 
meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government). Then, the coding could 
begin. It involved two steps – identifying measurement units and applying policy 
agendas codes. The measurement unit chosen for the project was quasi-sentence – the 
lowest possible entity with policy content. This labour-intensive approach was 
necessary in order to reflect as closely as possible the true allocation of attention, since 
the Conclusions cover a multiplicity of issues and even single paragraphs usually 
                                                          





contain several topics. The method is similar to the approach taken in the 
Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al., 2001; Klingemann et al., 1994). The 
second step in the coding processes consisted of assigning codes from the EU policy 
agendas codebook.  
The main variable in the dataset records policy content. The policy agendas topic 
codes consist of two levels: major topics, which cover broad policy areas, and 
subtopics, which indicate specific issues within those areas. The EU codebook 
(version 3.2 of October 2013) contains 21 major topics and 250 subtopics.91 Within 
each major topic the first subtopic covers general matters in that category and all the 
remaining ones correspond to specific matters. For example, the topic environment 
has as a first subtopic ‘environment – general’ followed by other subtopics as waste 
disposal, land and water conservation, air and noise pollution, etc. This two-level 
coding offers a standard aggregation of policy issues within broader themes but also 
allows for specific aggregations depending on the research question. Three additional 
dummy variables trace cross-cutting policy issues, namely foreign policy, cohesion and 
structural policy, and enlargement. For example, administrative reform and good 
governance in Afghanistan would be coded with the respective issue code for 
bureaucratic oversight and government efficiency under the major topic governance 
but it will also be assigned the foreign policy dummy. This allows for further 
restructuring of the dataset for specific purposes. Furthermore, the coding also 
identifies references to countries within and outside of the EU with two variables – an 
international country code (which also includes international organisations) and an EU 
Member State code. In the above mentioned example the respective code for 
Afghanistan would be assigned. Last but not least, the full text of the Conclusions is 
preserved, easily allowing extensions of the dataset in the future. A variable indicates 
which quasi-sentences belong to the main text and which are part of the annexes to 
the Conclusions.  
After extensive checking, in December 2013 the full dataset was released for non-
commercial public use. It consists of 44755 quasi-sentences, in 43561 of which policy 
                                                          




content has been identified. The most frequently occurring subtopics are some of the 
general categories – foreign policy, macroeconomics, employment, defence, and 
governance, whereas 47 topics have been used less than 10 times each. Among the 
most often coded specific issues are government budget and debt, monetary policy, 
international economic development, treaty reform, and Common Market. This 
diversity becomes even more pronounced when differences in attention over time are 
considered.  
All five chapters in this dissertation make use of the dataset in substantial terms. It is 
either the only data source (chapters 2 and 3) or one of the main databases (chapters 
4, 5 and 6). A general overview of the relative size of the main topics on the agenda is 
presented in the second chapter of this dissertation.92 This study covers the period 
1975-2010 only as the last two years of coding were still under development at the 
time of writing (and article publication). The chapter relies exclusively on the compiled 
dataset and applies the measures of kurtosis and entropy to on the major topic level. It 
aggregates the Conclusions annually in order to make comparisons with existing 
studies in different contexts easier.  
The third chapter also focuses on the major topic level but proposes a half-annual 
aggregation, as this was the most appropriate planning structure for the European 
Council until the Treaty of Lisbon. The full dataset is subjected to data reduction 
techniques (multidimensional scaling) with the aim to disentangle the main dimensions 
of the agenda and explore their development over time. In the last stage additional 
data sources are included in order to predict the temporal evolution of one of the 
discovered dimensions.  
The remaining three chapters use the Conclusions in combination with other data. 
They also extract only a part of the European Council dataset. Chapter four analyses 
the role of the Presidency in agenda setting by focusing on the domestic agendas of 
five EU member states. For this purpose the Conclusions are integrated with data on 
executive speeches content-coded within the Comparative Agendas Project. Hence, 
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only 25 half-annual terms are considered in the analysis – those in which one of the 
selected five countries was in charge of the EU Presidency.  
Chapter five connects the Conclusions to data on EU-level public opinion in terms of 
the so-called ‘most important problem' question. This question offers respondents a 
list of issues out of which they can indicate up to two matters as the most important 
for them at the moment of the survey. The list is limited, and 10 matches of 
questionnaire issues could be made to those in the codebook (singe codes or a 
combination of a few codes). The data for relative attention on these 10 policy areas 
was extracted from the Conclusions dataset. The aggregation was again half-annual 
and the period used was 2003–2012 due to the shorter existence of the public opinion 
measure. 
Chapter six combines the European Council attention with data on potential focusing 
events from three different sources. The study does not use the compiled dataset to its 
full scope, but only a basis for further development. In particular, after a review of the 
text of all Conclusions, focusing events on the agenda were identified. The presence 
or absence of these occurrences was then coded in the new dataset of potential 
focusing events. Furthermore, the attention spent to each occurrence was recorded in 
relative terms to the other issues on the agenda. This calculation was possible because 
of the quasi-sentences level division of the European Council dataset. The policy topic 
codes allowed drawing a short descriptive overview of the policy areas with which the 









10. Samenvatting  
 
Toen de Libische Revolutie in februari 2011 uitbrak, riep de Europese Raad een 
bijzondere vergadering bijeen om de steun van de EU te betuigen aan het Libische 
democratiseringsproces. Toen tijdens de recente economische crisis de 
jeugdwerkloosheidscijfers dramatisch toe begonnen te nemen, besteedde de Europese 
Raad in de loop van 2012 extra aandacht aan dit onderwerp culminerend in het 
Jeugdwerkgelegenheidsinitiatief in februari 2013. In het proces tot de oprichting van 
de interne EU-energiemarkt, bekrachtigde de Europese Raad in 2005 eerst de 
behoefte aan een dergelijk project. Sindsdien stond het frequent op de agenda. In 
bijeenkomsten gaf De Europese Raad commentaar op rapporten van de Europese 
Commissie, verzocht hij lidstaten om nieuwe richtlijnen te implementeren, en 
bevestigde hij de uiterste termijn voor de voltooiing van de gemeenschappelijke 
energiemarkt. Dit zijn enkele voorbeelden waaruit blijkt dat de Europese Raad zijn 
stempel heeft gedrukt op bijna elke kwestie die in het EU-beleidsproces in omloop 
was, waarbij hij de agenda van de Unie heeft bepaald en belangrijke besluiten over de 
koers van verdere integratie heeft genomen.  
Het is daarom niet verassend dat de Europese Raad is benoemd tot “motor” 
(Johnston, 1994: 145) van de Unie, zijn “hoogste politiek instantie” (Westlake & 
Galloway, 2004: 171) en “een plaats van macht zoals geen ander ... in het EU 
institutionele stelsel vandaag” (Hayes-Renshaw & Wallace, 2006: 165). De Europese 
Raad bestaat uit de staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van alle EU-lidstaten en sinds 
december 2009 voorgezeten door een permanente voorzitter.  De voorzitter van de 
Commissie woont de vergaderingen bij. Zij komen sinds maart 1975 regelmatig samen 
om “de noodzakelijke impulsen voor de ontwikkeling van de Unie” te geven en “de 
algemene politieke beleidslijnen” vast te stellen (Verdrag van Maastricht). Hoewel de 
aanname van waarnemers dat de EU-toppen de “regering van Europa“ vormen (Peter 
Ludlow, in Peeperkorn, 2013; see also Werts, 2008) wellicht nog wat overdreven is, 




Europees politiek bestuur“ zou moeten worden bestudeerd (Foret & Rittelmeyer, 
2014: 2). 
Dankzij de wijze van haar samenstelling heeft de instelling altijd relatief veel vrijheid 
gehad in de selectie van onderwerpen voor bespreking en in de allocatie van aandacht. 
Ondanks deze relatieve keuzevrijheid zijn er verschillende factoren die direct of 
indirect de definitieve samenstelling van de agenda beïnvloeden. Ons begrip van de 
processen die aan dergelijke beleidsdynamica ten grondslag liggen zijn erg beperkt. Dit 
proefschrift behandelt de vraag welke factoren de agenda van de Europese Raad 
beïnvloeden, door de aard van verschuivingen van aandacht in deze instelling te 
analyseren en determinanten van de structuur en omvang van de agenda te 
onderzoeken. Het antwoord op deze vraag heeft implicaties voor zowel studies over 
het politieke stelsel van de EU en zijn beleidsoutput, als voor de literatuur over 
prioriteitenstelling van kwesties en politieke aandacht. 
De beleidsagenda is een concept dat de „verzameling van kwesties die onderhevig zijn 
aan besluitvorming en debat binnen een bepaald politiek systeem op een gegeven 
moment“ aanduidt (Baumgartner, 2001: 288). De politieke agenda vaststellen verwijst 
dus naar de allocatie van aandacht over verschillende beleidsonderwerpen, waarbij het 
zowel om de selectie als om de prioritering van onderwerpen gaat (Cobb & Elder, 
1971). Elk politiek stelsel heeft beperkte capaciteit om een groot aantal agendapunten 
te verwerken. Wegens bounded rationality is de aandacht van beleidsmakers schaars 
en begrensd tot een klein aantal kwesties (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Om die reden 
neigen beleidsmakers informatie te negeren zolang als mogelijk is, of overreageren ze 
door onevenredig veel aandacht toe te wijzen. Dit resulteert in een patroon waarin een 
kwestie lang relatief weinig aandacht krijgt afgewisseld met plotselinge 
aandachtspieken (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). 
Het bestuderen van agendavorming in de EU kan worden herleid naar medio jaren 
'90, en in het bijzonder naar een artikel van Guy Peters (1994; zie ook 2001), dat 
benadrukte dat de Europese Gemeenschap vele toegangsmogelijkheden voor policy 
entrepreneurs biedt en een groot aantal fora met flexibele grenzen van 




richtingen ontwikkeld. Zo hebben studies van EU-agendavorming zich 
geconcentreerd op de rol van de verschillende instellingen en de lidstaten van de EU 
in het proces (b.v. Blom-Hansen, 2008; Bunse, 2009; Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2010; 
2013; Tallberg, 2003), de betrokkenheid van georganiseerde belangen (b.v. Coen & 
Richardson, 2009; Klüver, 2013), issue framing en onderliggende strategieën erachter 
(b.v. Daviter, 2001; Rhinard, 2010), agendadynamieken van op zichzelf staande 
beleidskwesties (b.v. Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Moschella, 2011), evenals 
theorieontwikkeling over het specifieke karakter van EU-agendavorming en testen in 
welke mate bestaande theorieën in de EU-context van toepassing zijn (b.v. Citi, 2013; 
Princen & Rhinard, 2006; Princen & Kerremans, 2008). 
De eenvoudig lijkende vraag “Wie bepaalt de EU-agenda?“ kent geen makkelijk 
antwoord. Volgens de verdragen heeft de Europese Commissie een monopolie over 
wetgevende initiatieven. Academici hebben echter vaker op een complexe onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid van de belangrijkste EU-organen in agendavorming gewezen (Cini, 
1996: 145-146; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996: 359). Princen en Rhinard (2006) 
betogen dat dit proces uiteindelijk volgens twee mechanismen kan verlopen: via high 
en low politics routes. In het geval van agendavorming via de lage politieke route 
beginnen de kwesties in expertgroepen binnen de Commissie en beklimmen de ladder 
van de organisatorische hiërarchie van de EU. De top-down weg van de hoge 
politieke route begint bij de staatshoofden en regeringsleiders van de EU-lidstaten en 
hoe deze, met name in de Europese Raad, op elkaar inwerken, waarna een kwestie in 
de formele beleidsvormingsmachinerie belandt. Hiermee wordt de rol van de 
Europese Raad in EU agendavorming als essentieel erkend. De Schoutheete en 
Wallace stellen dat de Europese Raad sinds diens oprichting “de agenda van de Unie 
heeft bepaald, vooral ook omdat de EU zich verder heeft ontwikkeld dan de 
specifieke taken zoals vastgelegd in de oorspronkelijke verdragen“ (2002: 10). Hij is de 
incubator van nieuwe initiatieven geweest, die vervolgens door de Commissie moesten 
worden opgenomen en zijn conclusies hebben „impulsen“ aan 
besluitvormingsprocessen en aan de Europese integratie in het algemeen geleverd 




Echter, tot dusverre heeft de academische interesse in de Europese Raad zich 
voornamelijk geconcentreerd op institutionele/functionele en juridische aspecten van 
de evolutie van dit orgaan (zie Bulmer & Wessels, 1987; Eggermont, 2012; Johnston, 
1994; Stäsche, 2011; Taulègne, 1988; Werts, 1992; 2008; Wessels, 1980) en is het 
onderwerp agendavorming goeddeels vermeden. Dit is niet verrassend aangezien de 
Europese Raad buiten de verdragen ontstond en er lange tijd buiten bleef (tot het 
Verdrag van Maastricht, 1993). Pas in het Verdrag van Lissabon (2009) is hij als EU-
instelling benoemd. Voorts hebben de besloten vergaderingen, waarin de nadruk ligt 
op informaliteit, zich jarenlang verborgen afgespeeld, waardoor het moeilijk was er 
inzicht in te krijgen (zie Tallberg, 2008). Daarom zijn pogingen om de kwesties die bij 
de Europese Raad toppen worden besproken en hun determinanten te categoriseren 
beperkt gebleven. Bulmer en Wessels (1987) en Bonvicini en Regelsberger (1991) 
stelden een mengeling van functionele soorten kwesties en inhoudelijke 
beleidsonderwerpen voor, die overgebleven vraagstukken van vorige vergaderingen 
omvat, plotselinge gebeurtenissen die aandacht behoeven, prioriteiten van het 
voorzitterschap en de lidstaten, zaken betreffende de economische en sociale 
ontwikkeling van de Gemeenschap en internationale ontwikkelingen. Er is een 
enigszins substantiëlere categorisering van inhoudelijke beleidsterreinen verschenen in 
EU handboeken. Nugent (2010) onderscheidt bijvoorbeeld zes algemene gebieden: de 
evolutie van de EU, constitutionele en institutionele punten, economisch en monetair 
beleid, uitbreiding, externe betrekkingen, en specifieke interne beleidskwesties. 
Wessels (2008a; 2008b) bracht het categoriseren van het activiteitenprofiel een stap 
verder door het aantal kopjes in de conclusies te tellen en deze te verdelen onder vijf 
soorten beleidsterreinen – constitutioneel, sociaal-economisch, intern beleid, extern 
beleid en overige punten – waarbij elk uit een paar subcategorieën bestaat.  
Hoewel deze studies onze kennis over welke issues toegang tot de Europese Raad 
agenda krijgen hebben vergroot, zijn zij te algemeen of lijden zij aan tekortkomingen 
in de meetmethoden. Daarom stelt deze dissertatie een nieuwe methode voor om de 
agenda van de Europese Raad te analyseren door de inhoud van de conclusies op een 
meer gedetailleerde manier te meten en te bestuderen. Met deze intentie is een dataset 




eind 2012, gecodeerd met behulp van het codeboek van het EU Policy Agendas 
Project  (de EU-versie van het Comparative Agendas Project codeboek). De 
inhoudsanalyse van de conclusies maakt longitudinaal onderzoek mogelijk met 
betrekking tot beleidskwesties die op de agenda staan en de hoeveelheid aandacht die 
aan deze beleidskwesties wordt toegewezen. De dataset die deze 
coderingsonderneming opleverde bestaat uit meer dan 44000 (quasi-)zinnen, die elk 
één enkel beleidsissue bevatten. De kwesties zijn volgens het codeboek onder 
algemene onderwerpscategorieën geschaard, elk bestaand uit een aantal kwesties. De 
dataset behandelt een totaal van 126 gepubliceerde documenten over een periode van 
38 jaar, waarin 154 vergaderingen plaatsvonden. Van sommige vergaderingen, vooral 
informele, zijn geen conclusies. Deze empirische benadering maakt een systematische 
exploratie van de samenstelling van de agenda mogelijk, net als het testen van 
hypothesen betreffende de aard van het toewijzen van aandacht in longitudinaal 
perspectief. 
Hoewel de Europese Raad zijn eigen agenda kan bepalen en dit ook doet, is deze 
agenda een strijdtoneel tussen diverse belangen. De formulering brengt complexe 
interacties tussen actoren met verschillende motivaties met zich mee, welke zich 
afspelen in een context van beperkingen in het verwerken van informatie en druk uit 
de omgeving. De mate waarin de agenda gestalte kan worden gegeven, d.w.z. de mate 
waarin nieuwe issues geïntroduceerd worden of geplande kwesties worden uitgesteld, 
hangt van een aantal factoren af. Zij kunnen in drie algemene categorieën worden 
gegroepeerd – institutionele omstandigheden, het effect van externe belanghebbenden 
en de “probleemstroom“. 
De eerste groep factoren – de institutionele – bestaat uit zowel eigenschappen van de 
Europese Raad als beleidsforum als van de institutionele inrichting van de EU in zijn 
geheel. Hoewel EU-bevoegdheden hier nauwelijks een factor zijn (zie b.v. de 
Schoutheete, 2012), zouden rolverwachtingen over de institutie wel relevant kunnen 
zijn. Zo zou het feit dat de Europese Raad de algemene richting van de EU-
ontwikkeling bepaalt kunnen betekenen dat hij zich vooral met een klein aantal 
kwesties bezighoudt dat centraal staat in het functioneren van het EU systeem van 




2011). De voorkeuren van de individuele lidstaten maken ook een deel uit van deze 
groep, aangezien de Europese Raad de belangrijkste arena voor nationale belangen is 
in de EU. Eerder onderzoek wijst uit dat er tussen landen geen vaste coalities op de 
lange termijn bestaan die wel een duidelijk stempel op de agenda hebben weten te 
drukken (Tallberg, 2008; Tallberg & Johansson, 2008). Andere EU-instellingen, 
bijvoorbeeld de Europese Commissie (Eggermont, 2012), kunnen ook proberen om 
hun stempel op de agenda van de Europese Raad te drukken. Het voorzitterschap van 
de Raad, dat tot de inwerkingtreding van het Verdrag van Lissabon onder de lidstaten 
roteerde, is een ander potentieel institutioneel toegangspunt. Het land dat het functie 
bezette kon de rol als voorzitter gebruiken voor het bevorderen van binnenlandse 
belangen (Elgström & Tallberg, 2003).  
De tweede groep factoren die aan de dynamiek van agendavorming ten grondslag ligt 
heeft betrekking op externe belanghebbenden. Dit zijn actoren die niet direct 
betrokken zijn bij de Europese Raad maar die potentieel een indirect effect kunnen 
uitoefenen. Theoretisch gezien omvat deze categorie georganiseerde belangen, de 
media en het brede publiek. Maar in tegenstelling tot de Commissie en het Parlement, 
en net als bij de Raad van Ministers, is de Europese Raad nauwelijks een doel voor de 
lobby van georganiseerde belangen. Het is bijna onmogelijk voor belangengroepen om 
de Europese Raad te belobbyen wegens het gebrek aan transparantie van de 
vergaderingen, de norm van de consensusbesluitvorming en de afwezigheid van 
permanent personeel (Hayes-Renshaw, 2009). Media lijken even zeer weinig directe 
invloed te hebben op de Europese Raad, en waarschijnlijk voor de EU als geheel, 
aangezien er geen echte berichtgeving op Europees niveau bestaat en nationale media 
divergerende agenda's hebben. De enige mogelijke relevante actor zou hier het publiek 
kunnen zijn in termen van één of ander gezamenlijk niveau van de voorkeur van 
burgers in de EU (aangezien er ook geen Europese demos bestaat).  
Een derde groep factoren die de verdeling van aandacht kan structureren is vastgelegd 
in wat Kingdon (1984) de „probleemstroom“ noemt. Hier kunnen diverse kwestie-
indicatoren worden overwogen, zoals bijvoorbeeld werkloosheid of milieuvervuiling. 
Hoewel dergelijke indicatoren issue-specifiek zijn en daarom gewoonlijk een effect op 




de rol van probleemindicatoren op een meer algemeen niveau te analyseren. Echter, 
een kwestie is nooit een probleem van zich zelf – zij moet door deelnemers in het spel 
van agendavorming gedefinieerd worden als probleem. Sommige typen indicatoren 
maken mogelijk meer kans om door de Europese Raad te worden opgepikt. Een 
andere factor in deze groep zijn onverwachte plotselinge majeure gebeurtenissen die 
het potentieel hebben om eerder opgestelde prioriteiten van een gegeven moment te 
doorkruisen (Birkland, 1997; 1998). Deze zogenaamde focusing events of crises 
zouden voor een studie in het kader van de Europese Raad bijzonder relevant kunnen 
zijn wegens de vrijheid van de Raad in het plannen van vergaderingen en vanwege de 
representatieve positie als arena voor het uitdrukken van de “gezamenlijke stem“ van 
de EU. 
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit vijf individuele studies die samen het doel hebben om ons 
begrip te verhogen over de types van kwesties die bij de Europese Raad toppen 
worden behandeld en de factoren achter hun verschijning en prioriteitstelling. De 
dissertatie heeft als eerste doel om de aard van de agenda te classificeren met 
betrekking tot de status van de instelling in het EU-beleidsvormingskader, met focus 
op de omvang en het niveau van veranderingen in aandacht. Daarna, met het oog op 
de drie brede categorieën van potentiële agendadeterminanten – institutionele 
omstandigheden, het effect van externe belanghebbenden en de „probleemstroom“ – 
evalueert het onderzoek de rol van specifieke aspecten binnen de categorieën. 
De eerste studie (hoofdstuk 2) toont aan dat over de bijna vier decennia van zijn 
functioneren de Europese Raad vele kwesties heeft behandeld maar dat de algemene 
aandacht onevenredig is verdeeld. De meest zichtbare thema's zijn de 
kernfunctiegebieden van overheden – buitenlandse zaken, macro-economisch beleid 
en bestuurlijke kwesties, die samen de helft van de agenda innemen. Het patroon van 
verschuiven in aandacht over onderwerpen door de tijd correspondeert goed met de 
punctuated equilibrium theory, waarin wordt voorspeld dat relatieve stabiliteit wordt 
onderbroken door aanzienlijke veranderingen. Het patroon van aandacht van de 
Europese Raad is opmerkelijk door zijn nog sterkere niveau van hoge negatieve 
verandering. Voor deze instelling is het vrij gemakkelijk om de ene keer aandacht te 




beleidsthema, behalve de grote drie, ontloopt het risico buiten de agenda te vallen. 
Ondanks deze opmerkelijke eigenschap is de hoeveelheid grote 
aandachtsverschuivingen (kurtosis) vrijwel gelijk aan die van andere typen agenda's, 
zoals hoorzittingen in het Congres in de V.S. of coalitieovereenkomsten in 
parlementaire meer-partijen stelsels. Dit wijst op de dubbele taak van de Europese 
Raad in het instellingskader van de EU. Hij brengt beleid in beweging door nieuwe 
programma’s te initiëren en acties af te vaardigen aan andere instellingen, maar 
produceert tegelijkertijd beleidsoutputs door het nemen van essentiële besluiten of 
door op te treden als arbiter in conflicten. 
Wat betreft de aard van de verandering in aandacht door de tijd, heeft de agenda van 
de Europese Raad een evolutie in zowel omvang als verspreiding ondergaan. Tijdens 
de vroege jaren van de instelling, van medio jaren '70 tot het eind van de jaren '80, 
werd de agenda geleidelijk aan meer divers maar vertoonde ook heel wat instabiliteit 
tussen opeenvolgende jaren. Sinds het Verdrag van Maastricht, bleef de algemene 
tendens van stijgende fragmentatie, hoewel bij een langzamere snelheid, en werd een 
extra effect zichtbaar. De periode 1991-2010 kenmerkt zich door drie gelijkaardige 
oscillerende patronen na elkaar – bewegend van concentratie naar diversiteit en terug 
naar concentratie. Deze specifieke vorm is enigszins een weerspiegeling van het in 
evenwicht brengen tussen tegenstrijdige krachten, zoals uitbreiding van gebieden van 
betrokkenheid en de behoefte om zich op grote problemen te concentreren. Maar hij 
schijnt nog meer betrekking te hebben op het aandeel van aandacht voor de drie 
kernonderwerpen op de agenda – buitenlandse zaken, macro-economisch beleid en 
bestuurlijke zaken. Tijdens de periode vanaf 1991, toen de aandacht voor deze drie 
thema’s steeg, verminderde de diversiteit van de agenda, terwijl deze in periodes van 
verminderde aandacht voor deze thema’s steeg. Ten slotte, concentratie en 
fragmentatie schijnen beïnvloed te worden door het totale volume van de agenda, 
waarbij er meer diversiteit valt waar te nemen wanneer het volume toeneemt. 
Corresponderend met de politiek verheven positie van de instelling is de aandacht in 
de Europese Raad groter voor onderwerpen binnen het werkingsgebied van 
kernfuncties van overheden. Dit is het type issuekarakter met de sterkste 




hoofdstuk 3 aan dat een tweede lijn issuekarakter met kleinere verklarende waarde ook 
een rol kan spelen, al is de mate waarin variabel over tijd. Bepaalde onderwerpen 
kunnen meer aandacht krijgen wanneer economische attributen worden onderstreept, 
wat het mogelijk maakt voor niet-kerntaken om aanzienlijk veel aandacht te krijgen op 
vergaderingen wanneer zij in economische verwijzingen en implicaties worden 
verpakt. Het selecteren welk issuekarakter te benadrukken is hoofdzakelijk een politiek 
besluit in de handen van die deelnemers in het beleidsproces die invloed hebben over 
agendavorming, handelend binnen de beperkingen van externe invloeden. Als dit 
model op de Europese Raad wordt toegepast, is het mogelijk om te zien welke 
factoren de oorzaak zijn van de stijgingen en dalingen in prominentie van de 
economische karakterlijn. Tijdens de periode 1995-2006 was werd de aandacht ook 
mede door de economische dimensie beïnvloed, omdat de Europese Raad een 
hoofdzakelijk linkse ideologische oriëntatie had en het gezamenlijke 
overheidstekortcijfer in de EU stijgende was. 
Terwijl over het algemeen geen specifiek staatshoofd of regeringsleider systematisch 
als bevoordeeld kan worden gezien wanneer het over het bepleiten van individuele 
belangen op de EU-agenda gaat, wordt de functie van het voorzitterschap – dat tot 
aan het Verdrag van Lissabon met in de instelling van een permanent voorzitter 
halfjaarlijkse roteerde – vaak beschouwd als een sleutel tot dergelijke invloed. De 
grondige vergelijkende analyse in hoofdstuk 4 toont aan dat het de voorzitter 
ontbreekt aan enig voorrecht in de agendavorming in de Europese Raad. Deze 
conclusie volgt uit een onderzoek van prioriteitenstelling in de Europese Raad 
conclusies en nationale uitvoerende agenda's in vijf lidstaten: Denemarken, Frankrijk, 
Nederland, Spanje en het Verenigd Koninkrijk. Deze vijf landen vormen een 
representatieve steekproef van de gehele bevolking van EU-lidstaten in termen van 
grootte en ligging (op zijn minst tot de grote uitbreiding). Geen van deze landen wist 
het voorzitterschap te gebruiken om de Europese agenda te convergeren met de eigen 
nationale agenda. Het voorzitterschap lijkt dus geen institutioneel voordeel op te 
leveren in de beïnvloeding van de hele agenda van de Europese Raad. 
De Europese Raad staat bovenaan de politieke hiërarchie in de EU, een positie vrij ver 




tussen de twee zouden kunnen verwachten. Maar wegens zijn zichtbaarheid en 
vrijheid in de keuze van onderwerpen zou de Europese Raad zowel de motivatie als de 
capaciteit kunnen hebben om toch op publieke zorgen te reageren. In feite kan hij dit 
op een retorische manier doen, door meer aandacht aan de thema’s te geven die de 
burgers op een bepaald ogenblik belangrijk vinden. De analyse van het verband tussen 
de agenda's van de Europese topinstelling en het EU-publiek op tien verschillende 
beleidsgebieden in hoofdstuk 5 toont onderscheid in responsiviteit, d.w.z. dat deze 
slechts op sommige kwestiegebieden aanwezig is. De mate waarin de Europese Raad 
aandacht besteed aan misdaad, economie, milieu en immigratie wordt goed voorspeld 
door de prioriteitenstelling van deze onderwerpen op de probleemlijst van de burgers. 
Op de thema’s onderwijs, werkgelegenheid, gezondheid, inflatie, belastingheffing en 
terrorisme is geen relatie gevonden. Het responsiviteitspatroon wijst niet op 
traditionele domeinen binnen de vergaderingen van de Europese Raad, en meer 
onderzoek is noodzakelijk om de logica achter de bestaande onderscheiden 
responsiviteit te ontwarren. Toch heeft het er alle schijn van dat de bevoegden van de 
EU ten minste gedeeltelijk een rol spelen, wat met name zichtbaar is wanneer het 
niveau van responsiviteit wordt overwogen. Inzake milieukwesties, waarvoor de EU 
meer bevoegdheden en een sterkere beleidsbetrokkenheid heeft, volgt de Europese 
Raad openbare zorgen meer dan in het geval van misdaad, economie, en immigratie. 
De agenda van de EU toppen wordt vaak beïnvloed door focusing events. Deze lang 
geleden voorgestelde stelling wordt empirisch kwantitatief onderzocht in hoofdstuk 6. 
De resultaten tonen aan dat tien procent van de inhoud in de conclusies met een 
focusing event wordt geassocieerd. Maar alhoewel de Europese Raad een zeker mate 
van aandacht heeft geschonken aan diverse plotse gebeurtenissen, heeft hij in geen 
geval alle gebeurtenissen besproken die potentieel konden worden overwogen als 
‘focusing’ in de loop van de laatste bijna 40 jaar. De EU-leiders hebben 
selectiemechanismen in gezet op basis van kenmerken van de crisissituatie en de 
verhouding tussen de EU en de geografische locatie van de gebeurtenis. Focusing 
events hebben een hogere kans om op de agenda te verschijnen wanneer zij door de 
mens veroorzaakt zijn (d.w.z. niet natuurlijk). Zij zullen ook eerder worden besproken 




slachtoffers speelt een rol maar het effect daarvan is niet helder en hangt waarschijnlijk 
van het type gebeurtenis af. Zodra een gebeurtenis op de agenda staat, bestaat er enig 
verschil tussen de factoren die de hoeveelheid van aandacht kunnen beïnvloeden. 
Focusing events die in buurlanden gebeuren zijn ook in aandachtsniveaus 
prominenter, en worden ook positief beïnvloed door de sterkte van de economische 
banden tussen het land in kwestie en de EU. 
Naast de empirische bijdrage levert dit proefschrift een kleine theoretische bijdrage 
door manieren voor te stellen waarin de bestaande theorieën kunnen worden 
uitgebreid en verder methodologisch kunnen worden ontwikkeld. Één van de 
belangrijkste toevoegingen aan de agendavorming theorie die dit onderzoek in deze 
dissertatie doet is de toepassing van het punctuated equilibrium model op de 
Europese Raad. Net als andere politieke instellingen moet de Europese Raad vechten 
met het probleem van bounded rationality en sommige onderwerpen slachtofferen 
terwijl andere onderwerpen extra aandacht krijgen tijdens zijn toppen. Het feit dat de 
aard van de verandering in aandacht in deze instelling lijkt op die van andere 
procesagenda's, zoals bijvoorbeeld parlementaire interpellaties in Denemarken en 
België of hoorzittingen in het Congres van de V.S. (Baumgartner et al., 2009), 
bevestigt nogmaals dat er een systematische logica betreffende het verloop van 
aandacht op beleidsagenda’s kan worden onderscheiden. Deze logica is ook van 
toepassing op het EU-systeem. 
Het onderzoek naar verschuivingen in aandacht dat zich op het tijdelijke aspect van 
dergelijke dynamieken concentreert draagt verder bij aan het substantiëren van het 
punctuated equilibrium model. Door gebruik te maken van entropie scores als 
indicator van agendadiversiteit (John & Jennings, 2010), is het mogelijk om de evolutie 
in aandacht in termen van omvang en verspreiding te classificeren over bepaalde 
perioden. Agendadiversiteit kan verder aan institutionele voorwaarden en de aard van 
aandacht over onderwerpen worden gerelateerd. De bevindingen over entropie van de 
Europese Raad agenda tonen aan dat in de vroege jaren de instelling nog zijn plaats in 
de institutionele architectuur aan het vinden was. Hij breidde ook geleidelijk zijn 
bereik van activiteit uit. Sinds de vroege jaren '90 is een gelijksoortig bepaald 




stijgingen en dalingen in aandacht voor de drie kerntaken beïnvloedt de algemene 
agendadiversiteit. 
Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift biedt ook een nieuw model voor het verklaren van 
agendavorming via het concept van het issuekarakter. Het benadrukken van een 
specifieke soort issuekarakter door politieke actoren heeft directe impact op de 
toewijzing van aandacht. In de Europese Raad conditioneert een economische lading, 
naast de logica van de kernthema's, de relatieve aanwezigheid van onderwerpen op de 
agenda. Zo kan issuekarakter als intermediaire stap worden gebruikt voor het 
voorspellen van de algemene toewijzing van politieke aandacht via andere theoretisch 
afgeleide factoren. Deze factoren kunnen op zowel de deelnemers in het beleidsproces 
als de context rond hen worden betrokken. De studie van de economische 
issuekarakterlijn in de Europese Raad toont aan dat in de praktijk beide typen 
elementen toenames van zijn belangrijkheid beïnvloeden. Het twee-stadia model voor 
het voorspellen van de allocatie van aandacht kan op iedere politieke agenda worden 
toegepast. Het biedt een nieuwe benadering om het negeren van competitie tussen 
kwesties en bounded rationality te verklaren in studies die gericht zijn op de factoren 
die de aandacht voor een bepaald beleidsdomein beïnvloeden. 
Een andere theoretische vordering wordt weerspiegeld in het onderzoek van de term 
retorische responsiviteit (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). Dit concept dat enkelen jaren 
geleden werd geïntroduceerd is een toevoeging aan de literatuur van politieke 
responsiviteit door te benadrukken dat het reageren aan publieke eisen niet alleen met 
efficiënte beleidsoutputs maar ook met algemene besprekingen en overwegingen 
wordt geassocieerd. Kort samengevat, de toewijzing van politieke aandacht is ook een 
soort van responsiviteit, de meest passende wijze voor sommige instellingen om te 
reageren. Gezien de politieke status alsmede ook een zekere symbolische rol van de 
conclusies van de Europese Raad en het algemene formele gebrek aan wetgevende 
bevoegdheden van deze instelling, verschijnt het als perfect doel voor de zoektocht 
naar retorische responsiviteit. De eerste studie die zich hier op richt op EU-niveau 
vertoont de relevantie van dit concept. De bevindingen van onderscheiden niveaus 
van responsiviteit duiden behoefte aan verdere theoretisering op de logica achter 




De laatste studie in de dissertatie maakt de eerste stappen in de opbouw van een 
systematische theorie van aandacht voor focusing events in politieke fora. Het idee dat 
plotselinge opvallende gebeurtenissen agenda's kunnen veranderen is oud maar de 
voorwaarden waaronder zij effect sorteren is niet systematisch onderzocht. Er zijn 
twee type factoren die de waarschijnlijkheid dat potentiële focusing events ook 
daadwerkelijke focusing events worden kunnen verklaren vanuit het perspectief van 
het reagerende forum: exogene en endogene. De exogene kenmerken vloeien direct 
voort uit de aard van de gebeurtenis, zoals omvang of type. De endogene kenmerken 
wijzen op een verband tussen het forum van agendavorming en de plaats van het 
voorkomen. De politieke en economische relaties tussen staten of bepaalde onderlinge 
afhankelijkheden behoren bijvoorbeeld tot deze groep. De endogene eigenschappen 
kunnen ook op de aard van de agenda betrekking hebben, met name op zijn capaciteit 
om extra kwesties op te nemen. De studie over de Europese Raad toont aan dat de 
verschillende specifieke factoren binnen beide categorieën de plaatsing van focusing 
events op de agenda en het niveau van aandacht die zij hebben ontvangen hebben 
bepaald. 
Kortom, dit proefschrift heeft ons begrip verhoogd van de manier waarop 
agendavorming binnen de hoogste politieke instelling van de EU gebeurt en biedt 
waardevolle suggesties aan om agendavorming theorieën uit te breiden. De empirische 
bevindingen tonen aan dat de Europese Raad informatie onevenredig verwerkt, wat in 
een onderbroken patroon van veranderingen in aandacht resulteert. Elementen van 
alle drie categorieën van agendadeterminanten – institutionele omstandigheden, het 
effect van externe belanghebbenden en de „probleemstroom“ – hebben mogelijk 
invloed op de agendavorming, ieder afhankelijk van diverse voorwaarden. 
Institutionele rolverwachtingen voorspellen de houding van de Europese Raad ten 
aanzien van de kernthema’s van regeringen. De institutionele context, in elk geval 
voor wat betreft het voorzitterschap, voegt niet aan de hefboomwerking van 
individuele lidstaten in het bepleiten van binnenlandse voorkeuren toe. Het publiek is 
geen genegeerde externe belanghebbenden ondanks zijn afstand, al worden de zorgen 
van burgers slechts selectief behandeld. De probleemstroom zet duidelijk druk op de 




zoals begrotingstekort, kunnen de EU-leiders aansporen om een nadruk op het 
economisch karakter van diverse domeinen te leggen. Ten slotte kunnen focusing 
events met specifieke kenmerken de agenda doorkruisen door nieuwe kwesties op de 
agenda te zetten die een deel van de aandacht opeisen. 
Wat betreft de theorie blijkt het punctuated equlibrium model op de Europese Raad 
van toepassing te zijn en een vruchtbare manier bieden om verschuivingen in 
aandacht te verklaren. De analyse van retorische responsiviteit in het EU multi-level 
stelsel levert gemengde resultaten op, die de behoefte aan verdere theoretiseren op de 
logica achter onderscheiden responsiviteit aantonen en op een mogelijke mengeling 
van bekwaamheden en institutionele rollen wijzen. De studies in deze dissertatie 
maken ook eerste stappen naar theoretisering door een twee-stadia model voor te 
dragen voor het ontwarren van de samenstelling van volledige agenda's over lange 
termijnen. Tot slot draagt het speuren in de logica van de aandacht aan focusing 
events argumenten aan waarop een volwaardige theorie van reactiviteit aan dergelijke 
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